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Introduction 
 
A Critique of “Being” 
 From its inauguration in the works of Aristotle and Plato, the discipline of 
philosophy has sought to define what it means to be human and how it is we 
come to be who we are.  With advances in the empirical sciences in the late 
eighteenth-century, came the advent of new schools of thought based on the 
observation of cause and effect in the experimental sciences, and thus were 
born anthropology, sociology, and psychology, all of which, in their varying 
ways, continue the quest for finding the origins of ourselves.  What has been a 
common trope of these diagnoses, and this is by no means a new observation, is 
that they have been made by white, (largely) heterosexual men, speaking from 
positions of privilege and/or power.  As such, the definition of Being has its 
roots in white, cis-male, heteronormative privilege, excluding from its category 
anyone who does not fit these boundaries.  What is more, the history 
concerning Western definitions of Being has, since at least Plato, insisted on a 
split between mind and body, favouring the mind as formative of subjective 
experience and denigrating the body as secondary, impure, and unworthy of the 
heights of philosophical enquiry.  As this thesis will demonstrate, the 
mind/body binary is in fact symptomatic of the masculine ontological 
imperative to disown the body and its effects on Being.  Following philosophy, 
further ontological studies have perpetuated the mind/body dichotomy in 
inquiries relating to Being, with the exception perhaps of phenomenology. 
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 At all times, however, the body has haunted the ontological enquiries of 
the humanities, from somatic symptoms in psychoanalysis to the scandal of the 
speaking body1 in linguistics.  Additionally, feminist reviews of the canon have 
called for another look at the body, which was at first rejected by these writers 
for its essentialist connotations, and which have tied the mind/body binary to 
those of man/woman, white/black, rational/emotional and so on.  However, the 
outright rejection of the critical evaluation of the body’s role in Being is akin to 
rejecting a critical reading of half of any of these binary categories, as well as 
serving to reify the idea that dichotomised categories are opposites.  Bodily 
practices have in recent years, and mostly by way of Feminist and Queer 
Theory, found themselves an integral part of the ontological enquiries made by 
“critical theory,” a practice encompassing the humanities and which ranges 
from linguistics to literature, philosophy to psychoanalysis.  This enquiry 
follows those made by feminist theorists pertaining to the body, to bodily 
practices, and to the female body in particular, the reasons for which are that in 
its separation of mind and body, the canon has “lost” what it means to be a 
body, disparaged the body as inferior to the mind, and has made the body 
symbolic of a further denigrated femininity.  Luce Irigaray, for example, points 
out that psychoanalysis “gets rid” of the body by ascribing it to the feminine, 
suggesting that both the body and the feminine are things to be rid of (This Sex 
Which is Not One 90).   
 With the desire to move forward and break away from this formation of 
the feminine in ontological discourse, this thesis will build on the ontologies of 
post-structuralist feminist theorists, Judith Butler and Rosi Braidotti, combining 
their main theories with the critical evaluations of masculinist ontologies made 
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by theorists Julia Kristeva, Peggy Phelan, Hélène Cixous, and Luce Irigaray.  
Feminist theory makes up the bulk of my theoretical analysis because it brings 
the maligned body back to ontology in its emphasis on the analytic link between 
the feminine and the corporeal.  Moreover, the established connection of the 
mind/body dichotomy to that of man/woman questions not only the excluded 
feminine, but probes the reasons for the body’s denigration, finding ontology at 
a severe loss in its omission of the body.  What started this investigation was a 
desire to link the performative elements of identity practices to a theory of 
monstrosity, one which could explain how fictional qualities adhere to bodies, 
effectively constituting identities which are recognizable by the outward signs 
and gestures these bodies perform, but which exist simultaneously to, and in 
tandem with, various identity performances of self-knowledge.  These signs and 
gestures are often taken as marks of an “authentic” or “original” self, which 
come from an essential, internal core, but, as Butler shows, these gestures are 
what constitute identity in the first place, concealing their genesis and 
presenting substance as the origin of these acts (Gender Trouble: Feminism and 
the Subversion of Being 33).  Thus, acts which have come to be understood as 
originating from the inside are, instead, mimetic of behaviour which has been 
perceived as appropriate for certain bodies.  These acts therefore come from 
outside the body (enacted by other bodies), finding themselves re-embodied 
and re-enacted.   
 Unlike Butler, however, I do not interpret identity performance as always 
deriving from the outside: as this thesis will later demonstrate, some identity 
acts are practised (consciously or unconsciously) in defiance of the acts 
expected of certain bodies, coming from the self.  What is more, self-birthed 
4 
 
performances may or may not contradict the ways in which externally imposed 
fictional qualities have been embodied and thus performed.  Butler’s reworking 
of Austinian performativity in Gender Trouble and Bodies that Matter: On The 
Discursive Limits of “Sex” is thus the starting point of this investigation and is 
used as a way of explaining how bodily practices constitute identity, 
particularly gendered identity.  Butler was first to implement the performative 
and use it to demonstrate the ways in which bodily acts that are recognisably 
gendered constitute the identity of the performer, with Queer Theory, 
spearheaded by Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick in Epistemology of the Closet, following 
close behind.  Butler’s analysis of the sedimented acts which come together to 
form gender has brought the body back to scholarship concerning Being, by 
pointing out that the mundane daily gestures of the body are in fact what 
produce the “I.”  Peggy Phelan’s work in Unmarked: The Politics of Performance 
and, particularly, in Mourning Sex: Performing Public Memories builds on 
Butler’s and Sedgwick’s analyses of gender performativity by using the 
performative to talk not just about the acts made by gendered and Queer 
bodies, but to question the enactment of consciously fictional identities in 
theatre settings, examining the conceptual slippage that occurs between 
performing fiction and “reality,” between literature and life.  Phelan’s inquiries 
thus assist this investigation by already standing on the threshold that 
ostensibly separates the literary and the “real”, using theatrical performance 
theory to conceptualise Being.  Furthermore, Phelan’s writing style straddles 
the boundary between categories of writing that have traditionally been cast as 
either critical or creative, where each category has been understood to offer 
differing functions.  The admixture of the creative and the critical in Phelan 
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proposes a re-evaluation of the performative abilities of “serious” and “non-
serious” acts, whether the acts are produced on a stage or in life.  The bearing of 
such a combination on ontological categories is that Being comes to mean not 
only performing, which is already dangerous, but performing in ways that may 
or may not be “serious.” 
 The implications of Butler’s and Phelan’s studies on ontology are that 
one’s identity is not a fixed category but a structure in flux, one that makes 
various negotiations between bodily performances which can be “serious” or 
“non-serious,” and are, in either case, what Butler describes as “strategies” that 
the “I” adopts for survival in a binary world (“Performative Acts and Gender 
Constitution: An Essay in Phenomenology and Feminist Theory” 522).  It is for 
this reason that this thesis uses the ontological theory of Rosi Braidotti; both 
her Nomadic Subjects: Embodiment and Sexual Difference in Contemporary 
Feminist Theory and Metamorphoses: Towards a Materialist Theory of Becoming 
propose a conceptualisation of identity as a process of Becoming rather than 
Being.  The transferal from a noun to a verb not only emphasises the 
performative qualities of identity formation, in the sense that it is a “doing”, and 
one that creates, but suggests fluidity and multiplicity in its creation.  Moreover, 
“Becoming” is in the imperfect tense, signifying a sustained process that comes 
to accrue substance, as well as the creation of an opening for varied, 
multiplicitous, and even contradictory identity practices.  As Butler already 
points out in Gender Trouble, “[g]ender is a complexity whose totality is 
permanently deferred, [as it is] never fully what it is at any given juncture in 
time” (22, my emphasis).  That it is not “fully” what it is implies the ambivalence 
at the heart of gender and, if gender is a series of acts that performatively 
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constitute identity, this ambivalence also becomes a structural property of the 
“I.”  It is through the explanation of the “I” as multiplicitous, contradictory, 
ambivalent, and incongruous that some forms of Being have been linked to 
theories of monstrosity.  Certain feminist and Queer theories,2 postcolonial 
critiques,3 and theories on race and ethnicity concerned with identity have 
noted the inclination of authorities to employ the language of monstrosity when 
writing or speaking about difference.  What I mean by the “language of 
monstrosity” is the Othering that takes place in discourse and which makes the 
Other an uncanny and dangerous spectre that haunts the “I,” carried out for the 
purposes of making a consolidated identity for the “I” who speaks.  I understand 
“discourse” to mean precisely what Butler understands by the term in her 
Foucauldian reading of gender and identity politics, which is the combined 
signifying processes of cultural practices that, repeated over time, create what 
they signify; in other words, I understand “discourse” as being fundamentally 
performative. 
 It is useful at this point to list the meanings of monstrosity pertinent to 
this discussion.  The OED cites the Latin monstrum, meaning a portent or a 
prodigy, as the root of “monster,” with the verb monere (to warn) as its base.  
Chris Baldick points out that another verb makes up the base of monstrum, 
which is monstrare, to reveal or show, hence the English “to demonstrate” (In 
Frankenstein’s Shadow: Myth, Monstrosity and Nineteenth-Century Writing 10).  
Monsters are thus a revelation of something; they serve as a warning to others, 
usually for behaviour considered depraved or aberrant.  The etymology of 
“monster” is important to this discussion, as its category indicates a “doing”: the 
monster signifies not only a “to be” but a “to do” at its very root.  That it signifies 
7 
 
a “doing” is what makes the monster performative and, as performative acts do 
something to bodies, this indicates that the monster is an affective category; it is 
a body that affects other bodies.  This affectivity is also signified by the use of 
“monster,” which the OED lists as a verb as well as its more frequent application 
as noun or adjective. However, the definition of “monster” has evolved over the 
centuries to incorporate other meanings, such as a mythical creature that is 
“large, ugly, and frightening,” “a creature of huge size,” and, “[a] person of 
repulsively unnatural character, or exhibiting such extreme cruelty or 
wickedness as to appear inhuman” (OED, def. 1.a, 4.a, 5).  Because of its varying 
meanings, the etymology of “monster” thus demonstrates a multiplicity of 
identities, and thus, a multiplicity of meanings, which are always already at the 
core of the monstrous figure. 
 
Finding a Feminist Ontology 
 This thesis continues the project of realizing a feminist ontology, and it 
utilises feminist theory for its various demonstrations of the models of Othering 
at work in gender politics, a politics which has incorporated a persistent and 
sustained strategy in the identity formation of the feminine Other.  However, I 
attempt to read the end result of Othering, the misrepresented body of the 
Other, as a potential site for more positive, empowered identity performances; 
in other words, I interpret the monstrous body and thus the monstrous “I” as a 
potentially positive model for identity practice.  Kristeva’s Powers of Horror: An 
Essay on Abjection is a compelling analysis on which to build my exploration of 
gender politics and its effect on the formation of gendered identity, while her 
investigation of the abject is potently productive to a discussion on what makes 
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identities monstrous.  Given the connotations of the term “Becoming” in 
Braidotti’s work, and the exploration of abjection in the expulsion of bodily 
matter in Kristeva, this analysis is also concerned with birth, both as a real, 
bodily function and as a conceptual tool for authorship.4  This also means that 
feminist theory concerning mothers’ bodies is re-appraised in this thesis, which 
assesses feminist associations of women’s bodies with their confinement to 
producing children and to performing childcare, and analyses of the 
simultaneous denigration and exaltation of archetypal mothers.   
 Much feminist theory has interrogated psychoanalytic theory concerning 
motherhood, as well as that relating to childhood repression, and the 
constitution of the feminine sex drive.  Kristeva’s Powers of Horror, Braidotti’s 
Metamorphoses, and Irigaray’s work in This Sex Which is Not One are examples 
of this review of classic psychoanalysis, which scrutinise the phallogocentrism 
of the “founding fathers” of psychoanalysis, Sigmund Freud and Jacques Lacan.  
Such phallocentric analysis represents the feminine as lack, as eternally 
desirous of the Phallus, and as childlike, at least in the evolutionary scale of 
sexual maturity (which in Freud finds its teleology in phallic stimulus).  
Authoritative discourses such as psychoanalysis have Othered women 
according to their standpoint on what constitutes feminine identity, at the same 
time as (re)creating their own prominence as authority.  As both Irigaray and 
Braidotti have demonstrated, Freud and Lacan view feminine desire only as 
complete, when (in their understanding) woman obtains the Phallus through 
the production of a child, preferably male.  While I do build on both Freud and 
Lacan in regard to the split of the psyche, my argument steers away from 
classical psychoanalysis, as many of the theorists listed above have already 
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critiqued its influence on feminine ontology, where this thesis searches for the 
next step in understanding the nature of Being.  However, the effects of 
psychoanalysis as a constitutional discourse are here well-documented as 
examples of the monstrosity of performative acts, acts which found and 
perpetuate fictional qualities of the bodies they describe.  Using Butler’s 
analysis in Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative of the ability of 
performative speech acts to injure, I will demonstrate that discourse that has as 
its project the definition and categorisation of the Other is a constitutional force 
that makes the Other other to themselves.  The effect of living as simultaneously 
other to oneself and the struggle to consolidate fictional qualities with a 
differing self-view is monstrous, as it suggests a subject not in control of him-
/herself.  This self is not in control, because s/he is in fact a host of 
multiplicitous, often contradicting, “selves.”  The force of performative acts to 
create the Other’s identity is in itself monstrous, as these acts assist the 
formation of this multiplicity but, also, because of the violence contained within 
the performative force to precipitate this Othering.  Using Butler and Phelan, I 
will establish that this violence is the effect of performative (speech) acts, 
whether or not it is the intent of the speaker to injure with words.  This thesis 
therefore also demonstrates the monstrosity of naming the body of the Other.   
 I also use Jacques Derrida’s conceptualisation of the “event” as monstrous 
in this thesis, both as a means by which to view performative identity acts and 
as an apt metaphor for the suspicion with which (particularly pregnant) women 
have been historically viewed.  The “event,” an unpredictable, unheralded 
happening that disrupts history, causing us to question everything that has 
come before, is characterised by Derrida as a monstrous birth (“Structure, Sign 
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and Play in the Discourses of the Human Sciences” 370), one which announces 
the arrival of something else, another unknown.  Thus, my examination of birth 
and of mothers’ bodies plays a significant part in defining what I mean by 
“monster” in this thesis.  However, in his depiction of the future as a monstrous 
birth, Derrida neglects the real bodies affected by birth, those of the child and of 
the mother – a move sadly characteristic of the phallogocentric project of 
philosophy.  The bodies involved in birth are resurrected (as it were) by this 
thesis, from such narratives concerning male creation, especially authorship, 
where I reclaim their validity as bodies and not as mere metaphors.  What is 
more, performative acts can be read as births, in that they bring something else 
into being; performatives constitute something, whether that is a marriage 
ceremony, a promise, or a gendered identity.  They can, moreover, be 
characterised as monstrous births, because their invocation always creates the 
possibility of another act, one that is unforeseeable by the interlocutor and thus 
unpredictable.  This means that the performative act of promising can be seen 
as a birth because it births a promise, but also as a monstrous birth, because 
that promise might signify something else yet to come. 
 The “to come” that animates Derrida’s “event” is also at the heart of what 
structures the new theoretical category this thesis proposes.  By demonstrating 
the ability of performative acts to affect bodies, at the same time as analysing 
the affectivity of monstrous figures, I propose the theoretical category of the 
“monstrative,” a performative force that Others the “I” through bodily acts that 
include discourse and the gaze.  If monsters exist as signs, whether they be of 
things to come or as warnings of the result for aberrant behaviour, then the 
monstrative is the performative force that makes the Other into such a sign, into 
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a monster.  The monstrative is related to both the performative and to Othering; 
however, while the monstrative is performative, the performative is not always 
monstrative.  What I mean by this is that by acting upon bodies, the monstrative 
is an affective and constitutional force (it is performative), but the performative 
is not always monstrative because, while it accounts for creation, it does not 
explain the end result: the performative does not always create monsters where 
the monstrative does.  Moreover, while Othering explains the process by which 
the “I” is made Other by exterior forces, it does not adequately account for the 
processes that make the Other other to themselves.  The monstrative also 
underlines the significance of embodiment to identity formation through its 
affectivity. 
 The monstrative determines the Otherness of the “I” through the 
performative acts of contagion and mutation, which affect both bodies and the 
Symbolic order.  Thus, theories pertaining to contagion and mutation in both 
monstrosity and performativity also inform the category of the monstrative.  
With regard to contagion, I connect J. L. Austin’s assertion that speech acts 
uttered as “play” are “etiolations” of the “real” thing with aberrant identity acts, 
through Parker and Sedgwick’s analysis (Performance and Performativity) of 
Austinian terminology and Kristevan abjection.  Mutation, meanwhile, is linked 
to the monstrative by way of teratology and etymology, where concepts of 
origin are called into question by the inaugurative qualities of repetitive acts.  
That the monstrative is manifested by contagion or mutation is important 
because both contagion and mutation are performative forces that affect bodies 
and the Symbolic order.  I will demonstrate this through a detailed study of the 
relation of contagion to bodies and bodily performances, especially theatrical 
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performances, connecting such a concept of contagion to Derridean 
citationality, and, along with mutation, an examination of monstrous births in 
Early Modern Europe.  These, in turn, will be compared to Derrida’s 
understanding of iterability, which he differs from citationality in order to 
explain the evolution of certain acts, especially those acts designated as 
ritualistic (Limited Inc 40).  Birth, particularly monstrous birth, is an important 
metaphor for understanding the ways in which the mechanisms of contagion 
and mutation have led to a conceptualisation of the feminine that is denigrated 
for fear of its reproductive power.   
 The monstrative is also related to demonstrative acts; however, while “to 
demonstrate” means to show or indicate, to be an example of, monstration 
implies a demonstration of monstrosity itself.  What does it mean to 
demonstrate monstrosity, if to be monstrous already means to demonstrate 
something?  For Baldick, who reads monstrosity against the backdrop of 
Enlightenment Europe, monstrosity demonstrates the abortive ways of Being 
exemplified by what in the first place instigated the French Revolution, and, by 
the Revolution itself, which, in tracts regarding the monstrosity of one party or 
another, were often characterised by the language of filiation or paternity (27).  
Given the abrupt move from a feudal system based on patrilineage to what 
essentially became anarchy, this comes as no surprise.  Thus, monsters such as 
the Creature in Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein might demonstrate the monstrosity 
of ungrateful offspring, or, conversely, the monstrosity of inheritance.  However, 
Baldick describes the use of monstrative language within a specific timeframe: 
this thesis, while not detracting from the specificity of certain monsters to their 
cultural and historical contexts, questions the apparent timelessness of these 
13 
 
monsters in their continued ability to demonstrate our deepest fears.  The 
monstrative explains how monsters are made, not biologically, but socially and 
culturally.   
 While “monster” comes from the Latin monstrare, “to demonstrate” comes 
from demonstrare: given the addition of the prefix “de-,” which means to do the 
opposite of, to remove or reduce, or to be derived from, it would seem that we 
are given to believe that these are opposing forces, such as between “construct” 
and “deconstruct.”  However, an etymological search reveals that both 
monstrare and demonstrare mean “to demonstrate” (which is why Baldick uses 
monstrare as the basis for “monster”), suggesting that monsters cannot be read 
as anything other than signs or indications of something else yet to come.  Alan 
Rauch, on the other hand, contends that to de-monstrate something is to make 
it not monstrous through the act of exhibition and revelation, as in the empirical 
sciences (“The Monstrous Body of Knowledge in Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein” 
237).  In either sense, there is a curious lack of contradiction in these terms, 
which suggests that “monster” is a signifier whose signified is always already 
yet to come; this, in turn, emphasises the Becoming that repeatedly takes place 
within monstrosity.  Although Derrida stresses the gap that occurs between any 
signifier and its signified, “monster” is a signifier without any signified at all; it 
is what Jeffrey Jerome Cohen calls a “kind of third term” or a “third-term 
supplement” (Monster Theory: Reading Culture 6-7).  Thus, the monstrative is a 
performative force that makes the Other into a living sign. 
 This thesis uses existing feminist theory to demonstrate the force of the 
monstrative in the following ways.  First, using Butler’s revision of performative 
acts, I indicate that the monster is an ontological category which carries 
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with(in) it the notion that Being (or substance) takes its form through 
performance, and that it does so by embodying the “doing” that its category 
names.  The discourse surrounding bodies, including the names we use to 
categorise them, constitute them according to that diagnosis.  “Monster” is the 
descriptive category of the result of the monstrative, the performative force that 
brings the monster into being as monster.  Material bodies come to mean the 
monikers by which we know them, becoming embodiments of these names: for 
the embodied, they become neither the physical body itself nor the accrued 
meaning, but something in between.  Elin Diamond eloquently explains 
embodiment as the “visible form and social incarnation of the body,” but that 
which is “haunted by what it has swallowed, the material ‘body’” (“The Shudder 
of Catharsis in Twentieth-Century Performance” 154).  What I am at pains to 
avoid in this analysis of materiality, discourse, and performance, is the creation 
of another binary, that of the material/immaterial.  The material body does not 
oppose performance or discourse, nor is it more “real” or more telling of 
identity.  Neither does one’s self-understood identity cease to exist in the advent 
of exterior categorisation, but is performed in tandem with it; the material body 
also remains, simultaneously accruing and resisting this signification.  That 
one’s identity takes shape as multiplicity and that this “taking shape” is a 
continuous project also echoes the multiple meanings of “monster” and the 
resistance of the monstrous body to take on signification as anything other than 
sign.5   
 Reading both Butler’s and Phelan’s work on the conceptual slippage 
between identity performance and performance as play or simulation, between 
the “serious” and the “non-serious,”6 I demonstrate the capacity of Becoming to 
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disrupt the authority of monstrative acts, while exploring the implications of 
this disruption.  The interplay between acts considered “serious” and “non-
serious,” between acts considered original and imitative,7 is explored because 
the hybrid meaning of “act” implies the possibility of misrecognising “serious” 
acts for “non-serious” acts and vice-versa.  Monstrosity occurs at boundaries 
and always signifies the possibility of misrecognition.  Furthermore, the 
blurring of conceptual boundaries, especially between what is regarded as 
“serious” or “non-serious,” is monstrous, because what crosses these 
boundaries is represented as an arrival, or birth.  Using Kristeva’s 
understanding of the abject as that which “disturbs identity, system, order” 
(Powers of Horror 4), I maintain that the arrival of bodies that act 
“inappropriately” according to an already established Symbolic order are 
incoherent and unrecognisable to those who benefit from this order.  Figured as 
birth because they are regarded as something new, identities and the acts of 
which they are composed resist categorisation through their inability to be 
recognised by the established imperative, which, as all of the feminist theorists I 
have listed above expound is the Law of the Father, the Symbolic order that 
constitutes reality according to a hierarchical binary model, and which 
exercises its power through the monstrative forces of the gaze and discourse.  
Thus, unrecognisable identity acts are conceived of only as something “Other,” 
constituting an unknown entity that resists the Symbolic, remaining 
unnameable and “unrepresentable except as representation” (Rebecca 
Schneider The Explicit Body in Performance 23), or, as a body existing only as 
sign. 
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 Furthermore, Derrida’s characterisation of the future as unknown entity, 
outrageous for the unpredictability of its arrival, is like a monstrous birth, in 
that the threat of misfortune that it portends is both unpredictable and figured 
as something that is yet to come.  The description of arrival as something yet to 
come, its “to-come-ness,” is another form of Becoming.  Using Becoming to 
explain identity as the accretion of substance through performative acts 
suggests a process that lacks teleology, calling into question those structures 
that have been viewed as having a “natural” end, including “civilisation” in 
anthropological discourses, human (especially female) sexual maturity in 
psychoanalysis, and even the classical philosophical concept of Being, where the 
stability and oneness implied by “Being” infers completion.  Becoming always 
already implies something else yet to come, a project that is unceasing.  
Monstrosity is a powerfully generative paradigm against which to read the 
processes of Becoming at play in human identity practice because its etymology 
indicates not only the multiplicity of meanings always already incorporated8 by 
the “I,” but that these various meanings comprise the “to come” inherent in 
Becoming and in the performative itself.   
 The “to come” that structures the performative is dramatized by the 
attempt Austin makes in How to Do Things with Words (1962) to bring 
illocutionary and perlocutionary speech acts together.  The divide Austin 
inaugurates between speech that performs an act in the utterance of what it 
describes (illocutionary) and utterances/acts that fulfil the possibility of the act 
that has already been enunciated (perlocutionary) is one which Austin finds 
impossible to bridge, precisely because the perlocutionary is a “to come” whose 
arrival is impossible to predict.  Meanwhile, the illocutionary performative 
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always already signifies its perlocutionary answer, even if that answer is still “to 
come.”  The “to come” that structures identity is manifested by the various 
identity performances that accumulate to form the “I.”  While this thesis uses 
feminist theory as a starting point at which to examine these identity practices 
through its focus on gendered acts in Butler, it also combines this focus with a 
greater appreciation for other practices at work in the making of identity, 
including race, ethnicity, and sexuality.  Braidotti’s re-evaluation of Deleuzean 
Becoming forces a revision of second-wave feminist theory (such as Irigaray’s) 
by characterising Becoming not just as Becoming-woman, but, as Deleuze, and, 
following him, Braidotti, put it, as “Becoming-minoritarian” (Metamorphoses 
96).  My interpretation of this is that identity is a process of Becoming-monster, 
which entails multiplicity in terms of identity structure (race, ethnicity, 
sexuality, class, religion, age, species, and so on), confounding any one “reading” 
of identity.  Becoming-monster is a process, but it is not to be confused with 
monstrative acts. 
 Where monstrativity constitutes the body as a sign of Otherness, 
Becoming-monster is an empathetic response to the Other who has been 
classified as monstrous through monstrative acts.  As such, monstrative acts are 
done to the body of the Other, where Becoming is a process adopted by the “I.”  
As I will explain, the result of the monstrative is a body of difference that is 
characterised as monstrous by the Other, and thus made monster, by which I 
mean abhorrent, abject, filthy, feared, and excluded.  Becoming, on the other 
hand, results in a monster, but by which I mean specifically a hybrid category.  
Many classical monsters are hybrids, and are monstrous only because of their 
resistance to categorisation.  As I will demonstrate, the feminine can be classed 
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as this form of monster because of her ability to reproduce and thus become, in 
a fundamentally bodily sense, a hybridised form.  However, I also want to make 
it clear that I do not consider monstrativity and Becoming to be opposing forms: 
where the monstrative is a process perpetrated against the (body of the) Other, 
while Becoming is a process that can only be initiated through mutual consent, 
both are performative processes that result in monstrosity – the monstrative 
results in a body being made sign, where Becoming is to be necessarily between 
forms.  What differs the monstrative from Becoming is that the monstrative is a 
violent and negative force, where Becoming allows for a much more positive 
view not just of femininity and Otherness, but of monsters themselves. 
 
Methodology 
 I use feminist theory, as opposed to, say, Postcolonial Theory or Queer 
Theory9 in this thesis, because of the sustained project of phallogocentrism to 
attribute the bodily to the feminine in discourse ranging from the poetic to the 
juridical, the medical to the imperial.  The point I would like to argue, and 
which, through her analysis of biblical interdictions, Kristeva has demonstrated 
in Powers of Horror, is that the feminine has a much longer history of 
deprecation according to the phallogocentric model of identity than that of any 
other Other.  While certainly not implying that the feminine is a more important 
identity structure to study, this thesis does contend that there is a much larger 
corpus from which to garner examples of the performative function of discourse 
in the phallogocentric project.  More importantly, I will also demonstrate that 
the feminine is the primordial form upon which further forms of Othering have 
been founded, and that its status as the foundational Other has made for the 
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continued derogation of femininity, as a form of gender expression but, also in 
the wider sense of archetypal human traits.  As such, I use various textual 
categories, “serious” and “non-serious,” to build a sample of the performativity 
of discourse to create what it describes.  The identities that come under 
discussion are theoretical insofar as this investigation of identity formation 
requires the analysis of the theoretical texts listed above, but literary identities 
also infiltrate this thesis, some which may or may not embody “real” material 
bodies, such as those involved in theatrical productions.   
 My utilisation of the “serious” discourse at work in theory (psychoanalysis, 
philosophy, feminist revisions), and of the “non-serious” at work (or at play) in 
literature is to determine that fictional/fictive identities have a weighty bearing 
on “real” identities and bodies.  The “non-serious” is also a specifically feminist 
space in which to launch an assault on The Law of the Father; as Irigaray 
playfully asks, “Isn’t the phallic tantamount to the seriousness of meaning?”10 
(This Sex Which is Not One 163).  What this means is that the playfulness, the 
“non-seriousness,” of performance hints at the possible creation of a feminist 
conceptualisation of Becoming as something infinitely more positive than 
existing in relation to lack, as forever desirous of the Phallus, as abject, as object, 
as endlessly requiring regulation – all of which are monstrative formations of 
the feminine and thus of the women whose bodies have become the sign of 
femininity.  I argue that the process of Becoming-monster can be used to 
political ends as a way of confounding the Symbolic Order by refusing to adapt 
to the binary of signifier and signified, simultaneously poking fun at the 
“serious” concept of a unified sign that identifies a unified subject or object.  If 
the sign is confounded, then so might be the identity to which it points. 
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 Literary identities feature in two ways in this thesis.  First, I use two 
canonical literary monsters, Frankenstein’s Creature (Frankenstein 1818) and 
Grendel’s Mother11 (Beowulf), to theorize monstrous identity, at the same time 
as appraising a selection of the human characters in these texts for their 
apparent monstrosity.12  The literary thus becomes the theoretical in the 
process of this examination.  This analysis leads me to an inquiry on 
motherhood, birth, and mothers’ bodies and monstrosity, where feminist 
revisions of psychoanalysis and the philosophical mind/body divide are shown 
to be most pertinent in the monstrative formation of monstrous identities.  
Secondly, I use literary identities as case studies of the performativity of 
monsters and the monstrosity of performative acts in two literary texts, David 
Henry Hwang’s play, M. Butterfly (1986), and J. M. Coetzee’s novel, Disgrace 
(1999).  Hwang’s play offers a powerfully affective example of the external 
fictive qualities that adhere to the body of the Other, which make meaning 
happen for the “I”/eye of the beholder, while using various layers of the “non-
serious” as a method in which to disrupt this meaning and the sovereignty of 
this gaze.  Disgrace also unsettles the power of the phallogocentric “I”/eye by 
(dis)locating the authority of straight, white, cisgender, male identity in the 
aftermath of the “event,” and in so doing, allowing various nuanced 
interpretations of Becoming as it occurs in the novel. 
 During this analysis, I will be paying special attention to form and its 
interconnection with the various layers of authorship in the performance of 
literary identities, especially with regard to Hwang’s play, which requires live 
bodies in order to be actualized.  I will be emphasising throughout this analysis 
that the identities in Beowulf, Frankenstein, M. Butterfly, and Disgrace posit a 
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“what if,” a sort of literary exemplum of behaviour within the certain 
parameters laid out by each author.  I employ Beowulf and Frankenstein as 
theoretical texts that propose the “what if” of the existence of fantastical 
monsters and what this existence entails for identity, monstrous or otherwise, 
while examining the layered meanings attributed to the birth and authorship of 
monstrous identities.  The monstrative animates this discussion, as it explains 
why we are made to view these creatures as monsters and how, quite often, 
their apparent monstrosity has much more to do with the signifier that labels 
them rather than any essential internal quality of monstrosity.  I will then move 
on to assess the birth and authorship of identities specific to M. Butterfly and 
Disgrace, considering literary form and its convolution of any reading of 
identity. 
 An evaluation of literary form is essential to this analysis as form plays a 
huge part in creating the fictional identities represented in the play and the 
novel.  The difference these forms take also give us a greater understanding of 
how bodies become signs, whether this is through the performativity of the 
gaze and its constitutional effects upon the live bodies of a play, or the 
performative effects of narrative structure upon the identities represented in 
fiction.  That drama uses actual live bodies in the unfolding of its narrative 
means that an audience participates in the story through the act of gazing, 
which, in M. Butterfly, implicates audience members as contributing actors in 
the creation of the identities represented on stage.  The particular narrative 
form used by Coetzee in Disgrace, meanwhile, discursively shapes the identities 
represented according to a specific ideological view, which is that of David 
Lurie, the novel’s protagonist.  While the speech and action of a dramatic 
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performance is predicated on its disappearance, and therefore exists in the 
same temporal reality as its audience (that is, if it is live performance), narrative 
fiction does not necessarily unfold at the time in which the reader reads, and 
therefore it relies on narrative structure in order to make the story happen.  In 
Disgrace, while the use of the present tense gives the reader a sense of temporal 
congruity, it is written from the point of view of its protagonist: that is, it is 
focalized through him.  However, Coetzee writes in the third person for most of 
the narrative, perhaps to gain some distance from Lurie, who, like him, is an 
affluent, white, male academic.   Through this evaluation of bodies and the gaze, 
and of narrative representations of identity, I thus use “non-serious” texts as a 
way in which to evaluate the “non-serious” at play in the very serious business 
of identity formation, which are posed as a “what if” by the very same “non-
serious” texts that Austin famously disparages in his inaugural work, How to Do 
Things with Words. 
 The binary created and perpetuated by Austin of serious/non-serious 
exemplifies the various binaries I attempt to deconstruct in this thesis by way of 
textual analysis.  My critique of binary models also brings me to a crucial re-
evaluation of the core binary at work in philosophical and psychoanalytic 
ontology, that of the sovereign self/Other.  This binary is made explicit by the 
characterisation of the self as “I”/eye, which suggests the returned gaze of the 
Other, an unforeseen event by the authority who does the looking and who 
categorizes according to that look.  My analysis of the Other’s returned gaze 
takes its form as an appraisal of the artistic technique of anamorphosis, where I 
read the Other as an anamorphic image.  The gaze of the sovereign “I” is 
disrupted by the returned gaze of the anamorphic image, which cannot be seen 
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“except when viewed from a particular angle and distance or with a correcting 
mirror or lens” (Mayer A Dictionary of Art Terms and Techniques 14).  
Anamorphosis is an important metaphor for the misrecognition of the Other by 
the sovereign gaze and, as I have pointed out above, the possibility of 
misrecognition is symptomatic of monstrosity.  Viewing an anamorphic image 
“incorrectly” is a monstrative process, as it makes the anamorphic image Other 
to itself. 
 The gaze thus plays an imperative part in the constitution of the Other by 
constructing knowledge based on the (mis)recognition of outward bodily signs.  
While, in Butler, the constitution of the Other remains within the realm of 
discourse, other theorists have attributed the metaphysical concept of 
knowledge (of the Other) with seeing.  As the empirical sciences have based the 
accumulation of knowledge on observation, seeing has become the method by 
which objects are understood, while discourse has served to disseminate13 the 
results of such (mis)understanding.  For those who are not able to observe first 
hand, discourse is the sole form of knowledge by which to gain understanding, 
and reading thus becomes an extension of experience.  This has, as I will show 
in chapter four of this thesis, certainly been the case in what Edward Said calls 
the Orientalisation of Asian bodies (Orientalism).  The constitutional power of 
the gaze is analysed in this thesis alongside that of discourse, as the principle of 
the possibility of misrecognition is crucial to any theory of monstrosity as well 
as any theory concerning Being.  To be categorised as something, one must 
exhibit outward bodily signs that are recognisable, and recognisability can only 
function with the existence of both the gaze and discourse.  The monstrative is a 
combination of the performative forces of discourse and the gaze, which make 
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monsters by excluding them from the realms of recognisability and 
categorisation.  What becomes clear in the process of this analysis is that what 
is meant by “discourse” includes acts by bodies upon other bodies, which act as 
a supplement for ideological and rhetorical imperatives.  As I will demonstrate 
in the final two chapters of this thesis, these acts are carried out in order to 
enforce ideological constraints, which violently (re)order bodies according to 
these constraints.  As such, in the process of demonstrating the monstrativity of 
bodily acts, I will also explain that inasmuch as speech can act, bodily acts can 
also perform as discourse. 
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Chapter One: Constituting the (Feminine) Other 
 
  “ . . . gender is in no way a stable identity or locus of agency from which 
  various acts proceed; rather, it is an identity tenuously constituted in 
  time –an identity instituted through a stylized repetition of acts” (Butler 
  “Performative Acts and Gender Constitution” 519, her emphasis). 
 
 
Origins of the Monstrative: J. L. Austin’s Performative Speech Act 
and the Concept of Discursive Practice 
 The concept of discursive practice or of speech as an act derives from two 
mid-twentieth century schools of thought, linguistics and sociology, the former 
more specifically the work of J. L. Austin and the latter of Michel Foucault.  
Where Austin’s intent seemed to be to try to understand what kinds of speech 
could also be considered performance, Foucault deliberated on language as a 
social contract, specifically one of power.  Judith Butler, an avid pupil of 
Foucault’s, first formulated her theory of gender performativity through an 
analysis of the Foucauldian conceptualisation of discursive practice, on his 
theorisation of the power of speech to affect bodies, only giving Austin her full 
attention in a later book on linguistic violence.14  However, what Butler borrows 
from Austin, and powerfully so, is the concept of the performative: an act that 
constitutes something in its invocation.  This thesis concentrates on discursive 
practice as Austin has conceived it, for two reasons.  First, Butler has already 
mapped out the ways in which Foucault’s work has influenced her own 
thinking; secondly, because this thesis concentrates on lexical choice and the 
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specific names used for the literary figures it analyses, the detail expressed by 
the term “performative” as Austin has imagined it, and Butler, following him, 
allows for a more nuanced understanding of the power of language to affect 
bodies.  The first part of this chapter traces the movement of the performative 
from linguistics to gender theory, not just because this thesis examines 
performatives uttered in literary texts, but because Butler’s understanding of 
gender performativity is based on an underlying Foucauldian assumption that 
discursive practice has a lot to do with identity formation.  Thus, in tracking the 
trajectory from speech acts to gendered acts, this chapter queries how the 
performance of speech relates to the making of identity, particularly the 
constitution of the feminine Other. 
 As such, I form a base in this chapter for monstrative acts, by examining 
the effect of (speech) acts upon the body of the Other.  This assists me in the 
formulation of this new category by explaining how my acts create you, as well 
as giving an account of how these creational acts also go towards constituting 
my identity.  From this basis, I move on to an investigation of other acts that 
may be considered performative, paying close attention to the act of gazing.  
Like speech, the gaze is constitutional and is wielded by the One who has power.  
Using Lacanian psychoanalysis, I examine the constitution of the monstrous self 
through the metaphor of the artistic method of anamorphosis.  The gaze, as I 
demonstrate through this analysis, is vital to any theorisation of monstrosity, 
because a figure’s monstrousness is incumbent on one’s ability to recognise it.  
When a person, creature, event, or text is unrecognisable, its uncategorisability 
is what makes it monstrous, which is something I return to time and again in 
this thesis.  What is more, using the metaphor of the anamorphic image, I 
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demonstrate the contagion of monsters and their ability to make monsters of 
us. 
 
The Performative: From Speech Acts to Identity Acts 
 Before I discuss Butler’s appropriation of the performative, I wish to 
highlight a few points about Austinian performativity that are important to this 
thesis.  An Austinian performative is an utterance that performs an act in its 
very invocation, such as “I promise,” which not only states the promise made 
but creates it.  During his attempt to isolate the performative utterance from the 
constative (an utterance which Austin claims has description as its mission) 
Austin created a further split between illocutionary and perlocutionary 
performatives: if an illocutionary utterance performs an act in its expression, 
such as in “I promise,” the perlocutionary act is that which the illocutionary 
performative ignites.  While the illocutionary act of promising is rendered 
felicitously, as the promise occurs despite the intent of the speaker, the 
answering acts may not be: the promise may be reneged upon or fulfilled as 
expected, but its outcome is absolutely unforeseeable despite the best 
intentions of its speaker.  Intention plays an important part in Austin’s 
understanding of linguistic utterances, as his doctrine for the felicitous 
enactment of performatives makes clear: 
  (A. 1) There must exist an accepted conventional procedure having a 
  certain conventional effect, that procedure to include the uttering of 
  certain words by certain persons in certain circumstances, and further, 
  (A. 2) the particular persons and circumstances in a given case must be 
  appropriate for the invocation of the particular procedure invoked. 
  (B. 1) The procedure must be executed by all participants both correctly 
  and 
  (B. 2) completely. 
  (Γ. 1) Where, as often, the procedure is designed for use by persons 
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  having certain thoughts or feelings, or for the inauguration of certain 
  consequential conduct on the part of any participant, then a person 
  participating in and so invoking the procedure must in fact have those 
  thoughts or feelings, and the participants must intend so to conduct 
  themselves, and further 
  (Γ. 2) must actually so conduct themselves subsequently (How to Do 
  Things with Words 14-5, my emphases). 
 
 However, J. Hillis Miller observes that 
  [i]n order for my performative to be felicitous, I must mean what I say, 
  and I must know what I mean and that I mean what I say, with no arrière 
  pensée, no unconscious motives or reservations [ . . . meaning that a] 
  Freudian notion of the unconscious would pretty well blow Austin’s 
  theories out of the water . . . (Speech Acts in Literature 29). 
 
Austin’s expectation for performative speech acts to be uttered felicitously thus 
means that they must be uttered by a sovereign “I” always already in control of 
himself, which 
  indirectly assert[s] and reinforce[s] a powerful set of presumptions: the 
  ideal of the male at the top in full possession of his “I,” speaking from a 
  position of authority in the right circumstances, with the conventions 
  and the law all already firmly in place, and then women, animals, poets,  
  “low types,” actors and actresses, soliloquizers who mutter sotto voce, 
  and so on, beneath the men of authority, firmly kept in place (58). 
 
Like the canon which he criticises for its preoccupation with true and false 
statements, Austin’s treatise is phallogocentric: it assumes that one is singular, 
in complete control of one’s destiny and faculties, and in a position to speak as 
Austin’s equal.   A doctrine of intention rules out unconscious motives at the 
same time as reasserting the Law of the Father, while Derrida explains that 
intention is the “organizing center” of the phallogocentric model of a “free 
consciousness” it assumes the sovereign “I” to be in ownership and control of 
(Limited Inc 15).  In the next chapter, I demonstrate the tragic fissure between 
intention and outcome in Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein, but for now, I want to 
move on to a closer reading of the first set of conventions that Austin lays out 
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for the felicitous enactment of performative utterances, the reason for which is 
a prerequisite for appropriateness. 
 In the first section of the rules he lays out for the “happy” production of 
performatives (A. 1- B. 2), Austin invokes the particularities of ritual required 
for felicity, which includes setting out the belief that only certain actors may be 
deemed appropriate to perform certain utterances felicitously.  While intention 
remains a part of an “inner” self, appropriateness is all about bodies and the 
outward signs that indicate whether or not someone may enact a performative 
utterance felicitously.  The most famous of his examples in regard to 
appropriateness is the marriage example, where the utterance, “I do (take you 
to be my lawfully wedded wife/husband)” performs the act that binds two 
people together by law.  Of course, like all performative utterances, the 
marriage example requires a little more than just the uttering of these words: it 
requires the adjudication of a qualified individual to oversee the marriage and 
at least two witnesses to testify that the marriage has taken place.  Eve Kosofsky 
Sedgwick and Andrew Parker point out that for a marriage to take place 
felicitously, it also requires “the silence of witness (we don’t speak now, we 
forever hold our peace),” while making explicit the assumption that the 
“appropriateness” of the two individuals to marry rests on their gender 
(Performativity and Performance 10). 
 For Austin, the felicity of the performative act hinges on convention, as he 
writes in his list of rules, “conventional procedure” that has “conventional 
effect” and which requires conventional utterances (How to Do Things with 
Words 14).  However, Austin does not question the existence of convention 
itself, which is precisely what renders his argument vulnerable to Derrida’s 
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judgement that convention or “‘[r]itual’ is not a possible occurrence 
(éventualité), but rather, as iterability, a structural characteristic of every mark” 
(Limited Inc 15, his emphasis).  What Derrida means by this becomes clearer on 
review of his earlier explanation of the way in which writing works: 
  [i]n order for my “written communication” to retain its function as 
  writing, i. e. its readability, it must remain readable despite the absolute 
  disappearance of any receiver, determined in general.  My 
  communication must be repeatable – iterable – in the absolute absence 
  of the receiver or of any empirically determinable collectivity of 
  receivers (Limited Inc 7). 
 
A signifier must recognisably identify a certain signified, and it must be iterable, 
or changeable in regard to context and this is as true of the spoken word and 
performance as it is of writing.  The sign (written, enunciated, performed, or 
embodied) can only be read if it is repeatable and, because it is repeatable, it is 
susceptible to change in order to make it fit the context in which it is being used.  
The repetition of the sign means that it is citational, where “[c]itation is 
supposed to drag its original context implicitly along with it” (Hillis Miller 
Speech Acts in Literature 71), while “[i]teration alters, [and] something new 
takes its place” (Derrida Limited Inc 40). 
 Marriage is therefore only conventional because it has been cited as such: 
it is a repetition of acts that have preceded it and may only be felicitous because 
of its long history of repeated performances.  All ritual works in this way; it 
requires the citation of acts that have happened before.  Opponents of gay 
marriage consistently refer to the conventional aspect of the tradition in regard 
to its definition as a legal or religious institution, without giving any regard to 
the repetition of signs that make up convention and which can easily be 
changed because of the iterable nature of the sign.  What is more, Austin’s 
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exclusion by way of appropriateness has ironically produced a performative act: 
Austin may as well say, “I forbid you.”  Derrida’s reading of Austin in Limited Inc 
is what enabled Butler to use a linguistic term to describe the constitutional 
effects of gendered acts: because of Derrida’s emphasis on the citational and 
iterable qualities of language, Butler was able to explain the constitution of 
identity as the repetition of recognisably gendered acts.  I will return to Butler’s 
use of the performative briefly, as I want to direct my attention to one more 
point Austin raises in How to Do Things with Words and which initiates 
Derrida’s argument in Limited Inc – Austin’s contempt for the “non-serious.” 
 In his desire to exemplify “ordinary” language use, Austin writes that “a 
performative utterance will . . . be in a peculiar way hollow or void if said by an 
actor on the stage, or if introduced in a poem, or spoken in soliloquy” where 
“[l]anguage in such circumstances is . . . in ways parasitic upon its normal use –
ways which fall under the doctrine of etiolations of language” (How to 22, his 
emphases).  The act that is spoken on stage is, according to Austin, “hollow or 
void” as it violates the rules Austin lays out in Г. 1 and Г. 2, that is, if one is to 
take the actor’s body as that which is responsible for its speech and 
gesticulation.  Intention is thus once more the bone that sticks in Austin’s 
throat, as the intent of the enacted “I” who speaks cannot be felicitously 
communicated, precisely because that “I” is fictional and does not exist in any 
“real” sense of the term.  Again, this presupposes the existence of a singular 
subject in complete control of his faculties, as well as calling attention to the 
suspicion Austin has for the literary, the art that uses words and gestures as 
“play.” 
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 Hillis Miller writes that “[l]iterature is the ghost that haunts How to Do 
Things with Words” (Speech Acts in Literature 18), posed by the “what if?” of 
each of the examples Austin uses to demonstrate his theory of performative 
speech acts.  Naming the literary speech act “parasitic upon its normal use,” or 
an “etiolation” of language (How to 22), not only demonstrates a fundamental  
lack in understanding of the citationality of language15, but, as Parker and 
Sedgwick note, add an element of moralism to Austin’s rhetoric (Performance 
and Performativity 5).  Using the Greek etymology of “parasite,” the guest “who 
eats you out of house and home,” Hillis Miller points out that Austin’s use of the 
term “parasitic” leads one to question “whether the parasite may not belong in 
the home, or come to be at home there, that is, whether literature may not after 
all be an essential part of the economy of speech acts” (Speech Acts in Literature 
36).  The “parasite” characterises the unwelcome guest par excellence, but it also 
calls for a re-examination of the conceptual boundaries that separate inside 
from outside, forcing one to ask who or what “belongs” on each side of the 
fence. 
 Austin’s exclusion of literary speech acts is also quite clearly for fear of 
mixing the “non-serious” with the very serious business of making certain what 
it is that I mean to say.  The very same fear is echoed in Butler’s earliest attempt 
to explain that the performance of gender can be equated with theatrical 
performance, where she suggests that intermixing “serious” with “non-serious” 
acts can lead to trouble for the social actor: 
  [i]n the theatre, one can say, “this is just an act,” and de-realize the act, 
  make acting into something quite distinct from what is real.  Because of 
  this distinction, one can maintain one’s sense of reality in the face of this 
  temporary challenge to our existing ontological assumptions about 
  gender arrangements; the various conventions which announce that 
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  “this is only a play” allows strict lines to be drawn between the 
  performance and life.  On the street or in the bus, the act becomes 
  dangerous, if it does, precisely because there are no theatrical 
  conventions to delimit the purely imaginary character of the act, indeed  
  . . . there is no presumption that the act is distinct from reality . . . 
  (“Performative Acts and Gender Constitution” 527). 
 
The existence of this distinction, of course, assumes that the “I” is performing 
his/her gender “incorrectly,” a practice that Butler exemplifies in her 
contention that gender is comprised of a series of acts rather than an expression 
of an essential sex.  Like Austin, Butler understands that convention is a crucial 
structural factor for performance, serious or otherwise, but her invocation of 
the vague “theatrical conventions” that allow one to announce that “this is only 
a play” also highlights a mistrust for the “non-serious” and a misunderstanding 
of much of the “serious” intent behind the “non-serious.”  Furthermore, the 
“strict lines” she believes mark off the “real” from the imitative are boundaries 
which are often transgressed in the theatre and which challenge the assumption 
that the “real” and the imitative can indeed be distinguished. 
 Butler does, however, make amends for this early suspicion in her later 
work on drag in Gender Trouble and Bodies That Matter, where she considers 
the serious intent of drag performances and parody.  Her radical adaptation in 
both texts of Austin’s central thesis takes the performative from linguistics to 
feminist theory about the body and discourse, by coupling performativity with 
its morphological forebear, performance.16  Butler uses Austinian 
performativity, which states that language has the ability to create what it 
names, to demonstrate that the acts that accrue to form gender constitute the 
“I” that performs them, or, as she writes “within the inherited discourse of the 
metaphysics of substance, gender proves to be performative – that is, 
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constituting the identity that it is purported to be” (Gender Trouble 34).  In 
short, gender (which is comprised of a series of performances) creates identity.  
The acts that comprise gender have “been going on before one arrived on the 
scene . . . much as a script survives the particular actors who make use of it; but 
which requires individual actors to be actualized and reproduced as reality once 
again” (“Performative Acts and Gender Constitution” 526), meaning that 
gendered performances are citational in precisely the same manner in which 
speech acts are.  Moreover, Butler’s characterisation of the performative as a 
kind of script for social actors to follow not only conflates the “serious” with the 
“non-serious” but entirely disproves the philosophical premise that the actor 
exists before the deed. 
 That gender is a sustained performance which constitutes identity is most 
obvious, Butler writes, when it is enacted “incorrectly,” that is, when gendered 
acts are performed by bodies with the “inappropriate” genital reality.  Butler 
applies the theatricality of drag performance to this theory as a way in which to 
demonstrate the performative elements of gender, but also to establish the 
critical mass of the “non-serious.”  She writes that  
  [a]s much as [male] drag creates a unified picture of ‘woman’ . . . it also 
  reveals the distinctness of those aspects of gendered experience which 
  are falsely naturalized as a unity through the regulatory fiction of 
  heterosexual coherence.  In imitating gender, drag implicitly reveals the 
  imitative structure of gender itself as well as its contingency (Gender 
  Trouble 187, her emphasis). 
 
The “non-serious” act of pretence therefore emphasises the play and imitation 
always already at the core of identity, where “[a]s imitations which effectively 
displace the meaning of the original, they [drag acts] imitate the myth of 
originality itself” (188).  The myth of an inner core of gender is so powerfully 
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believed that Butler contends it is “[o]nly from a self-consciously denaturalized 
position” that we can “see how the appearance of naturalness is itself 
constituted” (149). 
 Butler argues that because of the “serious” intent behind certain drag acts, 
we should view these acts as parody, where “the parody is of the very notion of 
an original” (188, her emphasis).  Parody often takes on a political element, and 
by reading drag acts as parody, we are obliged to see the seriousness at stake in 
the enactment of the “non-serious.”  In an essay on the drag performances of the 
Sisters of Perpetual Indulgence, a worldwide charity of gay nuns in drag, Ian 
Lucas asserts that parody “can only create a vacuum” and that “[i]t does not 
replace that which it usurps” (“The Color of his Eyes: Polari and the Sisters of 
Perpetual Indulgence” 89).  Similarly, Rosi Braidotti quotes “an anonymous ICA 
artist” as saying: “ironic mimesis is not a critique, it is the mentality of the slave” 
(qtd. in Metamorphoses 81).  Butler’s view that the mimicry of drag acts make 
explicit the theatrical elements of gendered identity blows this view out of the 
water, because she stresses the “unnaturalness” of gender and the presence of 
the “non-serious” always already at the heart of the “serious.”  Peggy Phelan’s 
work on spectrality in theatre settings echoes Butler’s assessment by pointing 
out that “theatrical performances . . . stage the phantasmatic becoming 
indicative.  That is as the ‘as if’ of the phantasm takes a place on a stage larger 
than the architecture of a single imagination, it carries the remains of a 
collective reality, however illusionary or material such remains may be” 
(Mourning Sex 16).  Even if it is “only” the rehearsal of a desired event, parodic 
acts permit bodies to perform and thus make actual what is longed for. 
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 The “longed for” in drag acts is not the desire to embody the materiality 
and lifestyle of the “other” sex (as it is for trans* individuals), but for the 
cessation of the violence committed against those who perform their gender 
“incorrectly”: by making explicit the absence of an original gender, drag 
addresses the misinterpretation of “appropriateness” in regard to gender.  What 
is more, Phelan explains that by “stag[ing] the phantasmatic becoming 
indicative” theatrical performance articulates a promise, one of the many 
linguistic performatives that Austin exemplifies in How to Do Things with Words.  
That it stages both a promise and a Becoming (“becoming indicative”) indicates 
the “to come” at work in theatrical performance, and, by extension, identity 
performance.  Although Butler’s earlier work contends that “theatrical 
conventions . . . delimit the purely imaginary character of the act” in 
performances that are consciously fictional, the blurring of conventional lines 
through the use of metatheatrical devices, the exposure of the mimicry of 
gender in drag acts, and the promise that such acts create, indicate that there is 
nothing really to separate the theatrical from the everyday.  I will return to this 
analysis in a later chapter on M. Butterfly, but for now, I would like to turn my 
attention to Butler’s focus on the constitutional effects of discourse in the 
gendering of the Other. 
 The gendered performances that Butler proposes create the “I” also 
always include speech acts and the broader effects of speech and writing to 
create what it categorises.  Using the Althusserian notion of interpellation, 
which states that the address of the “I” by an authority brings him/her into a 
certain social existence, Butler explains that the “I” comes to exist by virtue of 
that call: 
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  [c]onsider the medical interpellation which . . . shifts an infant from an ‘it’ 
  to a ‘she’ or a ‘he,’ and in that naming, the girl is ‘girled,’ brought into a 
  domain of language and kinship through the interpellation of gender.  
  But that ‘girling’ of the girl does not end there; on the contrary, that 
  founding interpellation is reiterated by various authorities and 
  throughout various intervals in time” (Bodies That Matter 7-8). 
 
Again, the citational quality of the act is emphasised by the interpellative 
function of the name; moreover, the point that speech acts require an authority 
to be “appropriately” wielded is introduced by way of Althusserian 
interpellation (although Butler would already have a sense of authority through 
Foucault).  The reiteration of interpellative language is especially prominent in 
naming, where, to continue using the example Butler gives above, the girl child 
is “fixed” not only by her gendered forename and the pronouns used to describe 
her, but also by the surname she inherits, at birth and in marriage.  As Butler 
writes, the initial interpellation “‘It’s a girl!’ anticipates the arrival of the 
sanction, ‘I pronounce you man and wife’” (232). 
 The above are examples of the speech acts Butler says form part of the 
discourse that constitutes women as property; using the anthropological 
assertion that the exchange of women became the means by which peace could 
be assured in tribal and feudal settings, Butler proposes that this exchange is 
echoed by the family name.  Butler explains that “[i]nterpellation is an act of 
speech whose ‘content’ is neither true nor false: it does not have description as 
its primary task.  Its purpose is to indicate and establish a subject in subjection, 
to produce its social contours in space and time” (Excitable Speech 33-4).  If the 
interpellative function of the name is that it allows the bearer a certain social 
existence according to that call, then it follows that the name is a speech act that 
constitutes the bearer as per the description of that name. Family names do not 
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necessarily describe physical features or bodily performances, but they do 
perform the function of inclusion within or exclusion from a familial group.  
Inclusion, however, rests on the patrilineal appropriation of women’s bodies 
and their names, where 
  propriety is achieved through having a changeable name, through the 
  exchange of names, which means that the name is never permanent, and 
  that the identity secured through the name is always dependent on the 
  social exigencies of paternity and marriage.  Expropriation is thus the 
  condition of identity for women (153). 
 
 
Performative Speech Acts and Constituting Women as Monstrous 
 Language therefore not only creates the “I” according to names but it 
affords the “I” a place in a social hierarchy.  Because women do not “own” their 
names, receiving them instead by being someone’s daughter or wife, they are 
also located by such language, becoming the “occupant of a place in symbolic 
and social relations” (R. W. Connell Masculinities 20, her emphasis).  It is not 
only the names by which we come to know and recognise the “I” but the wider 
discourse that legitimises and sanctions the treatment of women according to a 
hierarchical gender binary which constitutes them as secondary.  Thus, 
discourse that lays out the foundation of knowing what it means to be a 
thinking, speaking subject (re)asserts feminine subordination and, to use 
Butler’s phrase, “conceals its genesis” as the natural order of things 
(“Performative Acts and Gender Constitution” 522).  Scholarship concerning 
Being has, in a masculine act of reproduction, repeated the exaltation of the 
masculine subject by casting the feminine as a monstrous Other through 
discourse that performatively generates and confirms her monstrosity.  At the 
birth of Western philosophy, Aristotle posits the human norm as masculine, 
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where the feminine is “a variation on the main theme of man-kind,” making the 
masculine the norm and the feminine a sign of difference (Braidotti Nomadic 
Subjects 79).  The empirical sciences are also “implicitly normative,” where, for 
example, “[b]iologists have set up abnormal cases to elucidate normal 
behaviour,” and, in a move demonstrating the reproduction of masculine 
rationality, Braidotti writes “psychoanalysis will follow exactly the same logic 
for mental disorders” (84). 
 The mental “disorders” diagnosed in the psychoanalytic method devised 
by Freud were most often “disorders” embodied by women, the same women 
who suffered under the strictures of nineteenth-century patriarchy.  As Luce 
Irigaray points out, Freud “takes female sexuality as he sees it and accepts it as 
the norm,” without attempting to understand (feminine) sexuality and sexual 
behaviour as a product of socio-historical context (This Sex Which is Not One 70, 
her emphasis).  Freud takes feminine repression of sexuality as a given rather 
than as the result of patriarchal manipulation, as a condition occurring in nature 
rather than the product of a Symbolic culture that requires the subordination of 
women to function.  “As a result,” writes Irigaray, Freud “generally ends up 
resubmitting women to the dominant discourse of the father, to the law of the 
father, while silencing their demands” (70), being, as it were, “[h]eir to an 
‘ideology’ that he does not call into question” (72).  Such is the effect of living in 
the privileged position of the masculine, where the norm is taken as a natural 
state of affairs rather than a sustained politics enforced by patriarchal control.  
Butler underlines the performative aspect of discourse such as Freud’s, where 
the discourse creates women according to its description, both founding and 
perpetuating their subservience.  What I wish to point out is that this discourse 
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is also monstrative, because it makes women into living signs of their continued 
subservience. 
 Psychoanalysis in particular is monstrative because of its emphasis on 
embodiment and the repression of unconscious drives: as Braidotti writes 
“[t]he burden of embodiment is projected on the maternal feminine and 
immediately erased.  This erasure constitutes the subject and founds 
phallogocentrism, understood as the empire of the One and the objectification 
of the Other” (Metamorphoses 58).  Using a Lacanian model of subject formation, 
which states that in the infant’s separation from the mother, he is brought into 
and made master of the Symbolic order that controls the representation of the 
body from whence he came, Braidotti, Irigaray and Kristeva indicate that 
women come to be represented by this primordial mother and thus enact their 
own disappearance from the Symbolic by their very existence.  Braidotti 
expounds “that it is the specific materiality of the female flesh that is erased by 
the phallic regime.  This primordial erasure is the condition of possibility for the 
subsequent kidnapping of the Symbolic order by the masculine” (45).  By 
enacting their own disappearance, women are replaced by the sign, “woman,” 
which signifies lack and the abject body, itself simultaneously (and 
ambiguously) fecund, polluting, and absent.  That psychoanalytic discourse 
represents the feminine in this way is monstrative – it is a case in point of the 
monstrativity of the Symbolic Order – as it creates women as signs.  Thus, 
women are abjected from the Law of the Father, jettisoned to exist as objects of 
the economy of speech in a place of abjection, where, as Butler comments “one 
can be ‘put in one’s place’ by speech, but such a place may be no place” 
(Excitable Speech 4).   
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 To find oneself in abjection is to discover that one is located outside of “the 
possible circuit of recognition” (5), which Kristeva explains situates the “I” in 
abjection as well as forming her under these conditions (Powers of Horror 8).  
Existing outside the realm of possible categorisation means that naming cannot 
happen, which is precisely why woman comes to be represented as sign, she is 
“unrepresentable except as representation” (Schneider 23); she becomes the 
location where the Symbolic breaks down.  To be unnamed, to be unnameable, 
as I will explain in a later chapter, is to be monstrous.  To be unnameable is also 
the condition of women, who exist as a sign of lack, but also, as Butler and 
Irigaray both point out, as a sign of exchange:  
  [t]he value of a woman always escapes: black continent, hole in the 
  symbolic, breach in discourse . . . It is only in the operation of exchange 
  among women that something of this – something enigmatic, to be sure  
  can be felt.  Woman thus has value only in that she can be exchanged 
  (Irigaray 176, her emphasis).  
 
Like money, women are the (bodily) signifier for economic exchange among 
men, ensuring peace between different familial groups while founding and 
perpetuating the incest taboo. 
 Furthermore, one’s recognisability hinges not only on discourse but on a 
conceptualisation of the gaze and its constitution of the Symbolic order.  While 
Butler’s analyses of the performativity of discourse does not critique the 
constitutional properties of the gaze, she does point out that the gaze does not 
exist prior to discourse, where  
  to be addressed is not merely to be recognized for what one already is, 
  but to have the very term conferred by which the recognition of 
  existence becomes possible.  One comes to “exist” by virtue of this 
  fundamental dependency on the address of the Other.  One “exists” not 
  only by virtue of being recognized, but, in a prior sense, by being 
  recognizable” (5, her emphasis). 
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The gaze does thus not exist before discourse, but neither does discourse exist 
before the gaze.  Although Braidotti criticizes Butler’s proposal of “a 
performative notion of gendered identity which fails to account for unconscious 
processes” (Metamorphoses 50), it is Butler’s neglect of the constitutional force 
of the gaze in her conception of the Symbolic that I find most disconcerting, 
especially given her adaptation of Lacanian psychoanalysis to her theory of 
performativity.  It is for this reason that my analysis will now move on to 
classical psychoanalytic theory and its application of the gaze to identity 
formation. 
 
The Constitutional Gaze: The Anamorphic Image and Feminine 
Lack 
 The constitutive effects of the gaze are best recorded by Laura Mulvey’s 
seminal essay, “Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema,” which uses Freudian 
and Lacanian psychoanalytic theory to explain its affectivity.  According to 
Mulvey, the gaze, which is explicitly cis-male but implicitly white, Western and 
able-bodied, constructs women’s bodies as eroticised objects made for the 
visual pleasure of men.  Using Freud’s understanding of scopophilia, the 
pleasure obtained from viewing, Mulvey explains that looking subjects the 
Other “to a controlling and curious gaze” (30), which simultaneously objectifies 
and eroticizes bodies for the viewing pleasure of others.  That some bodies are 
eroticized while others are not is dependent not only on a gendered binary of 
male film-makers and eroticized female stars, but quite often on a racial binary 
that subjects bodies marked by race to the same eroticization and 
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objectification, which, in turn, feminizes them.  The gaze is constitutional in 
precisely the same way that discourse is: perpetuated images of bodies serve as 
demonstrations of archetypes that do not actually exist in any “real” sense, 
where images, like words, are part of the Symbolic system that constitutes 
identities according to what is shown. 
 Mulvey’s essay, however, does not account for self-constitution, the way in 
which the “I” views him-/herself.  Such an explanation can be found in Jacques 
Lacan’s “The Mirror Stage as Formative of the I as Revealed in Psychoanalytic 
Experience,” where the infant’s perception of the specular image is indicative of 
the self that the infant feels.  Here, the “I” is “precipitated in a primordial form, 
before it is objectified in the dialectic of identification with the other” (442).  
Thus, the self/Other dialectic that Freud inaugurates in his analysis of the 
infant’s separation from the breast becomes, in Lacan, a secondary split, 
occurring after that of the infant’s psyche into the “I” and the gaze.  Continuing 
this analysis in The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis, Lacan writes 
that during the mirror stage, the infant’s self-perception is divided between 
his/her specular image and bodily self, resulting in a divide between seeing and 
feeling, between the inner self and the outer image of the body.  We thus 
identify ourselves as an image, a flat surface enclosed by skin, simultaneously 
feeling our bodily selves, causing a schism between the interior bodily self and 
the exterior self-as-image.  For Lacan, the dialectic between seeing and feeling 
constitutes a splitting of the unconscious that arises before the child’s perceived 
bodily separation from his/her mother as breast and image, resulting in the 
interpretation of the self as divided before regarding the self as separate from 
the Other. 
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 Phelan views the trauma of the splitting psyche as an ordeal that is 
specifically bodily, where “[s]evered from the placenta and cast from the womb, 
we enter the world as an amputated body whose being will be determined by 
the very mortality of that body” (Mourning Sex 5).  The Freudian separation of 
the “I” from the mother is refigured by Phelan as bodily trauma that forms the 
“I” at the moment of birth; for Phelan, then, the first Becoming of the “I” is birth 
itself.  In these psychoanalytic readings of the moment of Becoming, the “I’s” 
Becoming is always birthed through the trauma of separation, bodily and 
psychically.  Separation, in turn, creates a chasm between the detached parts, 
mother from infant, the Other from the “I,” seeing from feeling.  In the Lacanian 
split between seeing and feeling, a chasm is formed between the Umweld, the “I” 
that sees itself, and the Innenweld, the “I” that feels itself, which, like all binary 
pairs, creates a hierarchy between the seen self and the felt self.  Seeing has 
become the preferred strategy by which to know the Other; as Braidotti 
comments, the “scopic drive [is] the paradigm of knowledge,” where “‘I see’ [has 
become] a synonym of ‘I know’” (Nomadic Subjects 49).  This is because one 
cannot know the Other by his/her Innenweld, simply because we do not have 
access to their thoughts and inner feelings, nor do we have access to their felt 
body.  Over time, one’s specular image comes to represent the way the Other, or 
the Other’s view of one, where one’s “I/eye is always ‘caught, manipulated, 
captivated’ in the field of vision that precedes [one].  The subject never really 
sees [one]self, then, except through the gaze of the other” (Diamond qtg. Lacan 
The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis 152:92). 
 For Lacan, the dialectic between seeing and feeling and its effects on the 
formation of the “I” is best illustrated by experiencing the returned gaze of the 
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anamorphic image.  To reiterate, the anamorphic image is a “painting or 
drawing that is distorted or unrecognizable except when viewed from a 
particular angle and distance or with a correcting mirror or lens” (Mayer 14).  
In their very different accounts of the gaze of the anamorphic image, Lacan and 
Phelan both use what is probably the most famous example of anamorphosis, 
the image of the skull at the foreground of Hans Holbein the Younger’s portrait, 
The Ambassadors (1533).  Lacan points out that one does not at first see the 
skull because it is anamorphic, and that when one does, the result is that one 
recoils in shock to find oneself the subject of the gaze of an “I”/eye that had, 
until that point, been unrecognizable.  Its unrecognizability is what makes the 
anamorphic image an apt metaphor for monstrosity.  As Daniel L. Collins 
observes in “Anamorphosis and the Eccentric Observer: Inverted Perspective 
and the Construction of the Gaze,” anamorphosis is “the inverse of classical 
perspective in which rays emanating from a (usually) ‘disembodied’ eye define 
the space of the painting, ultimately converging at one or more vanishing 
points” (75).  Classical perspective therefore assumes that the image is the 
object of the controlled gaze of a subject who stands directly in front of it.  
Anamorphosis inverts this assumption by “invading the space of the viewer” 
(75), by means of 
  cast[ing] the observer in an active role in which the conventional 
  relationship to the object of vision is literally thrown ‘off-center’.  To 
  observe anamorphic images, one must . . . sacrifice a centric vantage 
  point for the possibility of catching a glimpse of the uncanny from a 
  position off-axis (73). 
 
Shifting one’s position to view the anamorphic image literally changes one’s 
point of view of the object which can only be recognised by altering the 
relationship of subject and object.   
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 Phelan remarks of The Ambassadors that “[t]o look at the men, we must 
overlook the skull . . . [and t]o look at the skull, we must lose the men” 
(Mourning Sex 123): maintaining one’s status as observer of the painting from 
the viewpoint of classical perspective allows one to regard the two young men 
as recognisable subjects of the painting, while the skull in the foreground is 
unrecognisable as a skull.  When one moves to the side of the painting, the skull 
becomes recognisable, but the position of the two men as central figures 
changes inasmuch as the position of the viewer does.  What the viewer’s shift in 
position entails is that “certain associations or body-felt realities registered by 
the observer have the potential of shifting the object of exchange to the identity 
of the observer.  (One could argue in such cases that the observer, not the 
object, is undergoing change –in a phrase, coming into being.)” (Collins 75).  
What Collins parenthesises is what is most compelling about his essay, because 
it uncovers the performative ability of the anamorphic image to (re)create not 
just the sovereign subject’s position in relation to the Other, but who the 
sovereign subject thinks he is.17  The anamorphic image constitutes the 
sovereign “I” by its returned gaze.   
 This reconstitution is not merely performative, but is monstrative, because 
of its ability to mutate the viewer into what he is viewing.  The anamorphic 
image is, at first, unrecognisable, and is thus categorised as unrepresentable.  
On changing his viewpoint in order to see the anamorphic image, the sovereign 
subject is dis-located from his privileged position and made to feel the 
uncanniness of being categorised by misrecognition.  Donning the guise of the 
misrecognised, the viewer becomes the anamorphic image as he exchanges his 
privileged identity position for the ability to see through the Other’s eyes.  What 
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this trajectory would suggest is that the process of viewing the anamorphic 
image from the “correct” angle mutates the observer into the object that he 
views by virtue of positioning and that this repositioning causes monstrosity to 
spread contagiously from the anamorphic image to the viewer.  Because he has 
to actively change his position, effectively stepping into the Other’s place, the 
viewer feels the abjection of being Other to himself.  What becomes apparent 
during this physical act of repositioning is that the performativity of the gaze, 
like that of discourse, is dependent on the position of the one doing the gazing.  
 In anamorphosis, the gaze that constitutes the anamorphic image 
constitutes it according to the misrecognition of its physical attributes: it is only 
in the physical act of repositioning one’s viewpoint that the anamorphic image 
can be understood.  There can be no simultaneous appraisal and recognition 
between the sovereign subject and the anamorphic image because, as Lacan 
explains, “[i]n so far as I am under the gaze . . . I no longer see the eye that looks 
at me and, if I see the eye, the gaze disappears” (Four Fundamental Concepts 84).  
To see the eyes of the skull in Holbein’s The Ambassadors, one must reposition 
oneself so that one is no longer within the trajectory of the skull’s gaze; to stand 
before the skull and not see it gives one “the sense of ‘feeling seeing, like feeling 
the gaze of the other without seeing the other’s eyes.’” (Diamond qtg. Ned 
Lukacher “Anamorphic Stuff: Shakespeare, Catharsis, Lacan” 155:876).  The 
uncanniness associated with “feeling seeing . . . without seeing the other’s eyes” 
comes precisely because of the constituting subject’s misrecognition of the 
anamorphic image, where misrecognition literally blinds the viewer from 
seeing what is right before him. 
48 
 
 In her examination of anamorphosis and contemporary theatre, Elin 
Diamond explains that the anamorphic image “stands for the terror of the 
unseen in the seen” (163).  If the empirical sciences take observation as the 
foundation for knowledge, then it stands to reason that seeing has become the 
basis for knowing the Other; however, because the only information we receive 
of the Other is of the surface of their body and the outward gestures that they 
perform, what we see is not necessarily what we get.  The disjointedness 
between outer embodiment and inner “truth” is dramatically played out by the 
physical (re)positioning that is required to “correctly” view the anamorphic 
image: facing the anamorphic image head-on, one sees it but does not see it, as 
one sees the Other but does not see her, resulting in the terror of the unknown 
and the terror of being gazed at by the unknown.  Monsters are, by definition, 
the unknown; they are categorised as “monster” because of their inability to be 
categorised within a known taxonomic group, and they, like the anamorphic 
image, are “unseen” by the subject that stands before them in a dichotomous, 
hierarchical relation. 
 The “terror of the unseen in the seen” is similarly described by Derrida in 
The Animal That Therefore I Am, where he illustrates the alterity of the Other’s 
gaze as he stands before his cat, who he says “has its point of view regarding me 
[Derrida].  The point of view of the absolute other, and nothing will have ever 
given me more food for thinking than this absolute alterity of the neighbor or of 
the next(-door) than these moments when I see myself naked under the gaze of 
a cat” (11).  What is unseen and therefore unknown is what the Other sees when 
it looks at one; its gaze is “bottomless” (12) because one’s constitution by this 
gaze remains unvoiced.  What anamorphosis results in is a detachment in the 
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viewer between seeing and feeling, as with the infant in a Lacanian model of the 
mirror stage.  The consequence of this split, then, is not that the viewer 
conceives of his felt self as disconnected from his specular self, but that he 
imagines a monstrous Other who, instead of his specular “I” returning his 
sovereign gaze, holds him under its surveillance and its judgement, with the 
viewer all the while unable to see the eyes that constitute him according to its 
gaze. In effect, the inability to see the anamorphic image and to simultaneously 
feel its gaze also destabilizes the sovereign subject’s position by widening the 
fissure between the selves of the subject’s own psyche – it pitches and tosses 
the subject between the seeing “I” and the feeling “I,” destabilizing the very 
notion of a singular subject in control of his consciousness. 
 This destabilization bears two effects: the reproduction of the anamorphic 
image’s monstrosity and the creation of the “I”’s self-regulation.  The 
monstrosity of the anamorphic image is reproduced in the viewer because its 
gaze destabilizes the viewer’s sovereignty and singularity, a viewer who cannot 
know how his gaze is being returned.  Monstrosity is thus, in a sense, 
contagious, as it moves from the misrecognised object to the destabilized 
subject through the gaze: the returned gaze of the anamorphic image is 
monstrative.  The returned gaze, meanwhile, also creates self-regulatory 
behaviour in the “I.”  Because the viewer cannot see from whence the gaze 
arrives, the sensation of being watched by unseen eyes becomes the staple of 
the “I”’s condition.  The perception of being under constant surveillance causes 
the “I” to order his behaviour according to the social script, becoming his own 
monitoring presence and regulatory force.  This self-regulatory Becoming that 
takes hold of the “I” is simultaneously a monstrative force because it makes the 
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“I” monstrous to himself, as it is his monstrosity that requires decoding for him 
to be recognisable.  As such, by viewing the anamorphic image, the sovereign, 
singular subject comes to live the uninhabitable status of the Other, becoming 
anomalous, Other to himself, self-regulatory, and thus, a sign of Otherness, 
where “Other” is the label we ascribe to the uncategorisable. 
 Because the anamorphic image is a powerful metaphor for Otherness, it is 
also decidedly generative for the critique of psychoanalytic readings of the 
feminine.  Diamond writes that the anamorphic image is “both the blot in the 
visual field, and . . . the Mother’s lack – an intolerable sight” (163).  As “a blot in 
the visual field,” the anamorphic image requires the displacement of the 
sovereign subject to be seen “correctly,” at the same time as it represents lack 
by making a hole in the painting that draws the eye/“I” away from the vanishing 
point in classical perspective.  For Diamond, the anamorphic image “cannot be 
cleared” by catharsis because it is “inseparable from anxiety,” the anxiety of 
being seen without seeing the gazer’s eyes (155), while for Ned Lukacher, 
catharsis occurs because the anamorphic image “clarifies the disorder, the 
illness that inheres within intellectual inaccuracy” (qtd. in Diamond 155: 869-
70).  As lack or cavity, as “hollow[ness] or void,” the anamorphic image bears a 
compelling relation to the body, particularly the feminine body (Austin 22).  The 
feminine, as I highlighted earlier, represents lack in classical psychoanalysis 
because of her inability to possess the phallus, for male castration anxiety when 
faced with female genitalia, and because of the physical “lack” of the male 
member on women’s bodies. 
 Phelan’s Mourning Sex centres itself around bodily cavities; as wounds that 
tear bodily boundaries or as openings that comprise body parts, these cavities 
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allow us to glimpse inside the body, to view the unrepresentable.  Because of 
her physiology and her potential for motherhood, the feminine has come to 
represent the possibility of bodily pollution by her symbolic relation to holes 
and fissures in the body, as well as supplementing “the voracious maw, the 
mysterious black hole that signifies female genitalia which threatens to give 
birth to equally horrific offspring as well as threatening to incorporate 
everything in its path” (Barbara Creed The Monstrous-Feminine: Film, Feminism, 
Psychoanalysis 27). Creed writes that 
  [i]f we accept Freud’s interpretation that the ‘Medusa’s head takes the 
  place of a representation of the female genitals’, we can see that the 
  Medusan myth is mediated by a narrative about the difference of female 
  sexuality as a difference which is grounded in monstrousness and which 
  invokes castration anxiety in the male spectator (qtg. Freud “Medusa’s 
  Head” 2:274). 
 
 Figured as a hole that distracts the viewer from the vanishing point, the 
anamorphic image comes to symbolize psychoanalytic lack.  However, the 
phallogocentric model already favours the vanishing point as an apt metaphor 
for femininity: the vanishing point is a hole that does not merely exist in 
classical perspective, but is what founds it in the first instance and what allows 
the artist to create the illusion of depth.  The viewer, taking the privileged 
position of standing before the painting, thus banishes the maternal feminine by 
casting her as vanishing point.  The vanishing point, in turn, signifies femininity 
by being a hole in the painting that simultaneously escapes the Symbolic order 
(it is a reference only to itself) while allowing the Symbolic to be created in the 
first place (the vanishing point creates the illusion of depth).  Anamorphosis, 
meanwhile, only represents the gaping, black hole of feminine lack from a 
centric vantage point; changing one’s position so that one stands in solidarity 
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with the feminine (represented by the misrecognised anamorphic image) is the 
only way to cease seeing the feminine as lack. 
 
Becoming-monster: Destabilizing the Sovereign “I” 
 Because it provokes a sense of empathy within the seeing “I,” the 
anamorphic image cannot be said to be monstrative but, instead, incites the “I’s” 
Becoming-monster.  To recapitulate, Becoming differs from the monstrative 
through the process of mutating the “I” into what the Other already is, through 
the contagion of the Other’s monstrosity, where the monstrative is a force that 
can only be wielded by an authoritative “I” who dichotomises itself from the 
Other it makes Other.  As the anamorphic image can hardly be said to be an 
authority, being, as it were, a metaphor for the abject Other, it instead spreads 
its Otherness through the “I’s” sympathy.  The “I” has sympathy for this abject 
Other, because he must, quite literally, position himself in the Other’s place in 
order to see her.  The anamorphic image therefore inaugurates the 
destabilization of the sovereign “I” “by sabotaging the nest of negativity on 
which it erects itself.  What is affirmed in the process is the impersonal voice of 
a self that is not One, but rather a cluster of multiple [B]ecomings” (Braidotti 
Metamorphoses 94).  The shift in view-point inaugurated by anamorphosis gives 
the shaken subject the lived experience of abjection, thus recreating his self-
view and his view of the world.  Obtaining the self-knowledge of the “I” is a form 
of Becoming (73), where “Becoming is the actualization of the immanent 
encounter between subjects, entities and forces which are apt mutually to affect 
and exchange parts of each other in a creative and non-invidious manner” (68): 
in his encounter with the anamorphic image, the subject is initiated into a 
53 
 
process of Becoming, by the very questioning of his status as subject.  This is 
precisely why, like Braidotti, I find the paradigm of monstrosity in identity 
formation considerably more positive than the psychoanalytic/philosophical 
figuration of masculine subjectivity having to rest on the denigration and 
disappearance of the feminine: Becoming, while certainly traumatic (as all 
births are), allows for infinite possibilities of expression that are not hinged on 
categorisation and which permits the existence of the unclassifiable without 
insisting on its disappearance. 
 Like monsters, the feminine is commanded by the Symbolic order to 
vanish, to leave the domain of the Symbolic, which is why the feminine 
represents only itself: it exists only as sign.  The monstrative is the process by 
which the body of the Other is made to exist as a sign of its Otherness, but is a 
process that hinges upon the sovereignty of the subject who wields it.  The 
problem, however, with making monsters in this fashion is that the subject’s 
sovereignty is threatened by the possibility that this monstrosity is catching.  
From the viewpoint of the anamorphic image, from the position of the Other, 
this is a positive process, because the “I’s” sovereignty has resulted in the 
violent subjugation of the Other.  The destabilization of sovereign subjectivity 
by the (continued) existence of monsters means that we must view monsters, as 
unreadable as they may be, as positive influences that mutate us into Becoming-
monster.  The consequence of our contact with monsters will always be 
traumatic and may not necessarily result in positive effects, but Becoming is 
never an end in itself, it is always a process that, like the monster, is yet to come. 
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Chapter Two: Birthing Monsters 
 
Introduction: The Monstrativity of Knowing (the Other) 
 In the previous chapter, I traced the trajectory of the performative from 
speech acts to gendered identity, and, in so doing, concluded that Butler’s 
application of performativity to gender theory afforded its further use by other 
theorists to account for the affectivity of human acts.  Butler’s use of the 
performative gave later scholars an insight into ways of performing Being, 
which transformed the category from stable immutability to potentially radical 
ways of living.  It is thus the foundation upon which I animate my category of 
the monstrative, the force that makes the Other a sign, which I develop in this 
chapter.  The aim of this chapter, then, is to examine performative identity 
practices by analysing the creation of the identities of fictional monsters, those 
of the Creature in Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein (1818) and Grendel and his 
Mother in the Old English poem, Beowulf;18 in this chapter I ask what it is that 
makes these creatures monstrous and why it is, and by whom, that we are 
persuaded to read them this way.  Monstrosity is a pragmatic paradigm against 
which to evaluate performative identity practices because its concept directly 
indicates the perceived binary between normal and abnormal, natural and 
artificial, and, as such, implies a regimented structure for “normal” identities –
the very antithesis of what Butler argues in her work on gendered identity 
formation. 
 Monstrosity occurs at any point in which boundaries are drawn to 
separate the known from the unknown and is thus emblematic not just of 
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human identity formation but of the myriad ways we categorise reality.  
Conceptualising the ways in which knowledge is formed and disseminated 
assists this theorisation of monstrous identity by demonstrating the ways in 
which knowledge affords creation, in this case, the creation of identity.  If we 
create our identities and the identities of others through the sedimented acts 
done by and to bodies, it is through the collected knowledge of how to act (as 
well as who can act, when they should act and where to act) that creation can 
come about at all.  Using Austin and Butler as examples, I indicate the two ways 
that this knowledge ensues, explaining how both occurrences can be 
understood as monstrous.  I will then move on to monstrous births, “real”19 and 
literary, examining the relationship between bodily monstrosity and the 
formation of monstrous identity.  Because of the nature of birth, I will also 
examine the perceived origin of these monstrous babies – the body of the 
mother, who is herself monstrous.  This, in turn, leads me to a reading of the 
monstrosity of motherhood, by discussing the ways monstrosity haunts the 
pregnant body and, using this body as a metaphor, the creative imagination.  
From this, I shall return to knowledge and how it helps constitute monstrous 
identity. 
 
Parasitism, Etiolation, Mutation: Writing and Dissemination 
 Butler’s theory of gender performativity can be viewed as a monstrosity, 
in that she “misapplies” its felicitous use as outlined by Austin in How to Do 
Things with Words, using it in such a way that Austin had not intended.  As I 
highlighted in the previous chapter, Austin is consumed with intention and its 
effect on performative utterances.  While it has been demonstrated that 
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intention is irrelevant to the performance of a felicitous speech act,20 it is crucial 
to a full understanding of monstrosity because it has everything to do with 
creation: no matter our intentions, we cannot know the outcome of our 
creations, including the repeated creation of identity acts.  Because Butler uses 
the performative in a way that it was not intended, it can be said to be 
“parasitic” upon its proposed use: as a “misapplication” of Austin’s intended use 
for the performative, Butler’s theory of performative gender is an “etiolation” of 
Austin’s speech act and can be characterised in this way by the very criteria that 
Austin has laid out for the successful production of performative speech acts.  
As Anders M Gullestad points out “literary scholars who want to apply these 
tools [of Austin’s] to their own object of research encounter a serious problem: 
Austin specifically forbids them from doing so” (301).  If Austin feels so strongly 
about the “misuse” of the performative by literary criticism, imagine his dismay 
if he were to find its later use by a scholar who, at least in her early work, seems 
uninclined towards studying linguistics at all.21  Parasites such as Butler’s 
application of the performative are dangerous, not merely because theories of 
gender performativity threaten patriarchal authority, but because its 
transgression also threatens its “host” to the point of extinction.   Parasites in 
the plant and animal kingdoms feed off their hosts’ blood or food supply, where 
their bodies imbibe so much of the “essence” of their host that it eventually 
becomes difficult to tell the host and the parasite apart.  In his essay on Austin’s 
use of “parasite,” Gullestad explains succinctly the reasons for why it is that 
Austin uses such a negative term to describe the relationship between the 
ordinary, “serious” use of language in philosophy, and the “non-seriousness” of 
literature. 
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 Gullestad draws one’s attention to the original meaning of “parasite,” 
which, as J Hillis Miller concluded in an earlier work,22 was used to describe a 
human being, not a plant or animal.  Hillis Miller writes that the etymology of 
“parasite” is from the Greek meaning “beside the grain,” where the term 
referred to the arrival of an uninvited guest who shared one’s bread (Speech 
Acts in Literature 36).  Therefore, writes Gullestad, the parasite is someone who 
“was originally viewed positively [and who] over time became known as the 
opposite, namely a guest, often of the uninvited sort, out to acquire a free 
dinner” (305).  Thus, “it was only after the natural sciences of the early 
nineteenth century adopted the term that it became applied to sponging 
animals and insects,” which means that “it is not the human parasite which was 
modelled on the animal one, but the other way round” (305-6).  The purpose of 
Gullestad’s investigation is to reinterpret Austin’s use of “parasite” as a means 
by which to transcend its negative connotations, and he does so both by an 
etymological reading and a biological one.  He explains that the relationship 
between parasite and host in nature is far more complex than the former 
merely feeding off the latter, an “etiolation” of the host, as it were.  Instead, 
using the work of microbiologist, Luis P. Villarreal, Gullestad contends that a 
complex understanding of the relationship between host and parasite leads one 
to find very little difference between this relationship and the one between a 
mother and the child developing in utero: 
  [m]ammals, being viviparous, pose an interesting immunological 
  dilemma.  They have highly adaptive immune systems that fail to 
  recognize their own allogeneic embryos.  In a sense, mammalian 
  embryos resemble parasites that must suppress their mother’s immune 
  recognition systems to survive (Villarreal “On Viruses, Sex, and 
  Motherhood” qtd. in Gullestad 306:859).  
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 While Gullestad draws the connection between parasites and human 
pregnancy as a way in which to reinterpret the Austinian parasite as a positive 
force that adds to its host’s Becoming, his observations are useful for this 
analysis not only because they provide a workable model of the monstrative but 
because this model relies on a reading of feminine (re)production to work.  
Furthermore, the parasite’s propensity to blur the lines between itself and the 
host by imbibing the host’s food or blood supply, as well as through its 
proclivity to control certain physiological features of its host (such as its 
immune system), allows for a deconstructive reading of the originality, 
authenticity, and identity of knowledge and its dissemination.  Knowledge is 
necessarily parasitic; it depends upon earlier writing for it to qualify as 
knowledge, and all writing, as Derrida’s Limited Inc demonstrates, requires the 
ability to be argued with, reshaped, reorganised, and, as it were, to be host to 
the parasite that is further scholarship.  Derrida writes that “each species” of 
writing23 “constitutes its own identity only by incorporating other identities –by 
contamination, parasitism, grafts, organ transplants, incorporations” (“Some 
Statements and Truisms” 66).24  He follows this by stating “you can imagine 
what kinds of monsters these combinatory operations must give birth, 
considering the fact that these theories incorporate opposing theorems, which 
have themselves incorporated other ones” (67).   
 Taken in this sense, Butler’s reshaping of the performative is parasitic 
upon the very tradition it uses, thereby “contaminating” the original thesis and 
changing its meaning.  For many scholars, performativity means the accrual of 
substance through gendered acts before it ever means using speech as action25 
while Austin’s coinage of the term ironically26 relies on its morphological 
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predecessor, performance, to explain itself as action, which is also partly why 
Butler’s early work was often accused of using the term incorrectly.27  The 
monstrosity of the verbs “to act” and “to perform” is therefore in one’s inability 
to be sure of whether or not the act that is taking place is serious or not, where 
its “non-serious” context is “parasitic” on its “serious” use, causing intent to be 
lost (as if we could ever be sure of its sentiment in the first place).  Moreover, 
the parasite is itself performative, because it constitutes a change of meaning, a 
mutation, as it were.  The monstrosity of mutants is in their etymological 
meaning: coming from the Latin mutare, meaning “to change,” they are 
monstrous because they exist between categories, because they change and 
refuse to remain in their “original” form.  Mutation is of course necessary for the 
purpose of the evolution and continued survival of any species.28  However, as 
well as being utterly necessary, mutation is also dangerous.  Derrida describes 
Critical Theory as a “mutation,” which, “as enriching and as positive as it may 
be, remains dangerous” (“Some Statements and Truisms” 83).  The mutant is 
dangerous because we do not know what changes will take place: Austin, for 
example, could not control the mutation of performativity any more than he 
could control the rules or doctrines by which he thought the performative 
utterance should abide.  Birth and mutation are not mutually exclusive, as 
Derrida suggests in his statement that combinatory scholarship gives birth to 
monsters, but are, in fact, phenomena that are both found in the pregnant body, 
where “[t]he mutable nature of women’s bodies is made most clear in 
pregnancy” (Creed The Monstrous-Feminine 50).  Gullestad explains that 
“parasites do not only have to evolve if they want to stay ahead, they can also be 
seen as forcing their hosts to do the same” (Gullestad 309); similarly, during 
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pregnancy, the foetus adapts its mother’s body into a habitable environment, 
one which nurtures and supports the foetus’ growth. 
 Mutation can be connected to Austin’s invocation of “etiolated” speech 
acts in that it is not merely that language is sickly or bleached in its theatrical 
use29 but that the language becomes altered or mutated by this (mis)use, where 
it is made to become pale or sickly looking, at least as Austin understands it.  
Like parasitism, the “etiolation” of performative utterances by their theatrical 
use is itself performative, because something is done to language to make it 
change – for Austin it is the “non-seriousness” of the imitating act that 
“etiolates” the original.  As I highlighted in the previous chapter, Derrida has 
observed that all language is thus “etiolated” because of its iterable and 
citational nature, because it is necessarily repeatable in order for it to work as 
language.  Iterability and mutation share the ability to change something from 
its original form, where iterability allows a mutation of meaning.  Bennett and 
Royle exemplify this when they indicate that even the meaning of “monster” has 
mutated (Literature, Criticism and Theory 259): while monstrous figures in 
literature and film may allude to the etymology of “monster,” the noun now also 
describes “any imaginary creature that is large, ugly, and frightening,” as 
something or someone “malformed,” or “[a] person of repulsively unnatural 
character, or exhibiting such extreme cruelty or wickedness as to appear 
inhuman” (OED). 
 An etiolated speech act, an act that is “parasitic upon its normal use” 
(Austin 22), is citational, but is also iterable because it uses “the same words in 
a radical new context” (Hillis Miller 71): certainly, Butler’s use of the 
performative to explain how gendered acts form identity drastically changes the 
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context of Austin’s theory.  However, no new knowledge would exist if it were 
not for the radical reapplication or “misapplication” of earlier scholarship: its 
mutation is necessary for knowledge to grow, in the same way that the 
mutation of language is necessary for its continued survival.  In this sense, 
mutability, the propensity to change and to adapt, is necessary for the existence 
and the continuity of both language and knowledge, inasmuch as it is for the 
continuation of the species: if mothers’ bodies were not mutable, if their skin 
were not able to stretch and house their infant, none of us would be here to 
utter our “I”.  As Derrida comments: “[t]his teratology is our normality” (“Some 
Statements and Truisms” 67).  Because it is a common feature of scholarship, 
“parasitism” or mutation is referred to by Derrida as a “normal monstrosity,” 
which he distinguishes from “monstrous monstrosities” (79).  If Butler’s use of 
the performative, as a parasitism or mutation of Austin’s original thesis, is a 
“normal monstrosity,” Austin’s conception of the performative utterance can be 
understood to be a “monstrous monstrosity,” that which Derrida names the 
“event.” 
 
Monstrous Monstrosities: Derrida’s “Event” and the Metaphor of 
Birth 
    As a theory that conceptualises speech as action,30 Austin’s 
performative speech act is already monstrous as its formulation seemed at first 
to be entirely original (Hillis Miller 26).  Austin’s performative utterance is an 
example of what Derrida would refer to as an “event” or break in history that 
ushers into being something entirely new, an unexpected birth.31  J. Hillis Miller 
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explains that the performative speech act is an event “ . . . in the same way that 
Kant’s third Critique was” (26), while Nicholas Royle considers “9/11”, the 
bombing of New York’s World Trade Centre and the Pentagon on September 
11th, 2001, as an event, writing that its uncanniness had to do with what was 
“already happening as well as the fear or dread of what may be to come” (The 
Uncanny viii, his emphasis).  The event is something that seems to arrive from 
nowhere, and is monstrous because it cannot be known or takes the form of the 
unknowable.  Derrida writes that “[a] monstrosity can only be ‘mis-known’ 
(méconnue), that is, unrecognized and misunderstood.  It can only be recognized 
afterwards, when it has become normal or the norm” (“Some Statements and 
Truisms” 79).  What he means by this is that the event, the break with history, 
cannot be immediately assimilated into knowledge as it is utterly alien and 
therefore uncategorisable.  To be uncategorisable means to be unknown.  If the 
monstrous constitutes the unknown, then it stands to reason that the unknown 
also constitutes the monstrous.  The unknown, the strange, the foreign are all 
monstrous because “[s]trangers are almost always other to each other” and 
cannot be assimilated into a category until they are known and understood 
(Richard Kearney Strangers, Gods and Monsters 3).  Monstrosity is, to Derrida, a 
“formless form,” something that has material form but which eludes the 
Symbolic (“Some Statements and Truisms” 80).  Thus ‘monster’ becomes a 
signifier in which to classify the unknown, the as yet uncategorisable.32 
 Until Austin’s performative could be “domesticated” by further 
philosophers and theorists, it remained unknowable and monstrous.  The 
monstrosity of canonical works such as How to Do Things with Words or Kant’s 
Third Critique is described by Harold Bloom as a “strangeness, a mode of 
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originality that either cannot be assimilated, or that so assimilates us that we 
cease to see it as strange” (qtd. in Royle The Uncanny 35:3).  How to Do Things 
with Words is strange and original because it was the first to point out the 
propensity for language to do things and to do things in ways that affect bodies 
and the social world at large.  Austin gives birth to the performative in How to 
Do Things with Words; it is an event “that makes a decisive break in history” 
(Hillis Miller 26), and it is strange because it forces us to re-view an already 
established category, which, in this case, is the preconceived binary between 
speech and action.  The “event” is constituted as such because it “cannot depend 
on pre-existing conventions, laws, rights, justifications, and formulations, 
however much it characteristically attempts to claim that it does,” precisely 
because it is anomalous and unknowable (26-7).33  This also means that the 
monster, as something unknowable, is by its very definition lawless or a law 
unto itself: as an unknown entity, it arrives at the borders of our understanding 
without rules or laws to help us know how it should be governed, or even if it 
should be governed at all.  We do not know how to act on the arrival of the 
monster with a lack of knowledge that is dramatically played out by texts that 
incorporate monsters in their narratives, and which both Beowulf and 
Frankenstein demonstrate. 
 That Bloom characterises the event of canonical works as “a mode of 
originality that either cannot be assimilated, or that so assimilates us that we 
cease to see it as strange” is significant in that his statement implies the process 
of the “I’s” Becoming-monster, which is the hazard involved in creating 
monstrous Others in the first instance: their monstrosity is contagious.  Original 
works, the event, the monstrous Other, either cannot be integrated into the 
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existing system or change the system itself: monsters are not domesticated, they 
domesticate us.  Monsters do not change to fit the status quo, the status quo 
itself is destabilized to make room for the monster.  The change that the event, 
the monster, inaugurates is a Becoming: it is a performative force that mutates 
the system into a habitable environment for the monstrous Other, so that the 
Other ceases to be Other.  Otherness thus becomes the staple of the “I” who now 
finds himself other to himself.  Deleuze characterises the literary event as 
“minor literature” that stands “in a parasitic relation to major language,” or the 
status quo, the Law of the Father, phallogocentrism, heteronormativity, or the 
favouring of art forms that express privilege by typifying it as the norm 
(Gullestad 314).  Gullestad notes that by “standing in a parasitic relation to 
major language, the minor forces it into a state of continual Becoming,” where 
“exactly what sorts of creative Becomings these agents will set in motion cannot 
be told in advance,” just as a mother cannot precisely know how her child will 
look or what health issues s/he may have in later life (314-5).34 
 I use the birth metaphor because the “event” in Derrida’s writing is 
characterised by an arrival, as “who or what comes to the shore or turns up at 
the door” or, as a birth (Royle Jacques Derrida 111).  In the closing sentences of 
“Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences,” the paper 
that introduced the world to deconstruction, Derrida writes in a startlingly self-
reflexive manner of the “event” this very paper constitutes, calling it the “as yet 
unnameable which is proclaiming itself and which can do so, as is necessary 
whenever a birth is in the offing, only under the species of the nonspecies, in the 
formless, mute, infant, and terrifying form of monstrosity” (370).  The event, the 
break with history, is here described as the “nonspecies,” an uncategorisable, 
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“as yet unnameable” force of change.   The “as yet unnameable” is such because 
it is also the as yet unknowable, demonstrating that to name something is to 
know it.35  The “event” is characterised as a birth because it is an arrival of 
something entirely new, in the same way that birth is the arrival of a new 
individual (animal or human).  Derrida chooses to regard deconstruction in this 
way, emphasising “the operations of childbearing” by referring to the “event” as 
“conception, formation, gestation, and labor” (370, his emphases). 
 It is not, however, purely as birth that the “event” is characterised; 
Derrida refers to this birth as specifically monstrous.  This birth is monstrous 
first because the “event” is anomalous and thus has “monster” as its signifier to 
indicate this indecipherability.  Secondly, it is monstrous because of its 
anomalousness, which means that the “event” is unpredictable.  This 
unpredictability is precisely the reason why Austin could not control the 
performative, either by formulating rules for its felicitous performance or for 
the radical ways in which it was later used.  The event’s unpredictability stems 
from monstrum, meaning “to demonstrate or to portend” (OED), and which 
gives us the third reason for its characterisation as a monstrous birth, in that it 
presages something that is yet to come.  The meanings of omens and portents 
are notoriously difficult to predict and their implications are usually only 
defined in their aftermath.  If birth is the arrival of a new entity, monstrous 
birth signifies a further arrival of something that is entirely unpredictable, as 
Royle’s earlier quote suggests (The Uncanny viii).  To grasp the bodily 
implications of such a fear and its effect on the feminine, it is necessary to turn 
to literal and literary monstrous births to illustrate the ways these arrivals have 
been understood as precursors of certain but unknown misfortune, and how 
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mothers (however they may be constituted) are always held responsible for the 
existence of monsters. 
 
Monstrous Birth: Arrivals from the Womb 
 Alexandra Walsham writes that during England’s Early Modern period,36 
births that were considered monstrous “were widely acknowledged to be 
providential tokens of future misfortune” (Providence in Early Modern England 
167).  Monstrous births were births where the (human or animal) foetus was 
malformed in some way so as to appear “unnatural” next to a “normal” offspring 
(such as Siamese twins, which were traditionally considered abnormalities), or 
were the “incorrect” issue of the mother, as in the case of Mary Toft, a Surrey 
woman who in the early eighteenth-century was said to have given birth to 
seventeen rabbits.37  Walsham writes that in Early Modern England these births 
were considered “aberrations in the natural order [that] literally incarnated the 
spiritual chaos and anarchy created by sin” (169), citing various examples of 
these prophetic births and their “results” from sixteenth- and seventeenth-
century Europe.  She points out that the practice of reading monstrous births 
and other prodigious “signs” as tools of divination stemmed from a combination 
of “superficially inconsistent intellectual traditions” (169), including Biblical 
texts that mention signs heralding the apocalypse, the “series of prodigies 
observed prior to the siege of Jerusalem” in AD 70,38 writings from the Classical 
tradition,39 and various other influences.  What is worth emphasising at this 
juncture is that most of these so-called “signs” heralded the arrival of something 
to be treated with fear and suspicion, as their existence was perceived as a 
warning of worse to come, hence one of the routes of monstrum: monere, “to 
67 
 
warn” (OED).  In Early Modern England, this warning was understood to be 
from God, where “[t]hese unsightly spectacles unveiled His glory no less than 
perfect human specimens,” being understood as both Godly creations and his 
punishment for sinful behaviour (194-5).   
 Walsham writes that this divine justice was not necessarily meted out to 
the parents of a monstrous child for immoral behaviour, but as a warning for 
entire communities to cease their sinful ways (198-9).  In Signs and Portents: 
Monstrous Births from the Middle Ages to the Enlightenment, Dudley Wilson 
agrees with this line of thinking, where he notes that in many Renaissance 
ballads40 “the lack of personal responsibility of the parents for the monstrosity 
of their offspring may . . . be emphasised” (43) as these ballads served as 
warnings for whole communities rather than just their parents, hence their 
popular form.  If, however, the child’s parents were suspected of infelicities, 
they were held accountable for bringing monstrosities into the world, where 
“physical malformity was [regarded as] the outward manifestation of private 
immorality” (Walsham 201).  Monstrous births were especially linked to sexual 
infelicities, given the logic of reproduction, and their existence has been mostly 
blamed on the apparent sexual misconduct of mothers.  Using an extract from 
an Early Modern text, The forme and shape of a Monstrous child, borne at 
Maydstone in Kent (1568), Dudley Wilson explains that the child’s monstrosity 
is quite clearly linked to its mother’s promiscuity, as she is described as “being 
unmaryed” and having “played the naughty packe” (qtd. in Dudley Wilson 46).  
He writes, however, that “[e]ven in this instance . . .  the call to penitence is 
directed towards England and its people in general, although in the prose 
introduction, a more precise accusation is implied” (47).   
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 Even if the above text demonstrates the warning of monstrosity to whole 
communities, the mother becomes a part of that demonstration, along with her 
monstrous child: it is already what is happening that we must be fearful of as 
well as what may be to come.  Rosi Braidotti writes that “[t]heories of the 
conception of monsters are at times extreme versions of the deep-seated 
anxiety that surrounds the issue of women’s maternal power of procreation in a 
patriarchal society” (qtd. in Betterton 82-3:139), and Rosemary Betterton adds 
that “[m]onstrous births could be linked to women’s sexual excess or 
perversion, the mixing of different sperm or different races, intercourse during 
menstruation, eating forbidden food, or demonic possession – and in a modern 
twist to the theme, to toxic or genetic damage” (83).  Dudley Wilson cites a 
sixteenth-century text by the surgeon Ambroise Paré, Des monstres et prodiges 
(1573), for the causes of monstrosity, which are as follows: 
  The first is the glory of God.  The second his anger.  The third too great a 
  quantity of semen.  The fourth too small a quantity.  The fifth is the 
  imagination.  The sixth the tightness or smallness of the womb.  The 
  seventh the indecorous position of the mother, as when, being 
  pregnant, she sits too long with her thighs crossed or squeezed against 
  her belly.  The eighth, because of a fall or blows directed against the 
  belly of the pregnant mother.  The ninth, because of hereditary or 
  accidental illness. The tenth, because of the decay or corruption of 
  seminal fluid.  The eleventh, because of the mixing or mingling of the 
  semen.  The twelfth, because of trickeries of malignant tavern rogues.  
  The thirteenth, because of Demons or Devils (qtd. and trans. by Wilson 
  68). 
 
 It is interesting to note that of the thirteen reasons for monstrous births 
that Paré explicates, three have supernatural causes, four can be attributed to 
the child’s father, and five to the mother, which includes the “mixing or mingling 
of the semen,” which is something that could only be attributed to the mother’s 
sexual infelicities.  In fact, multiple births were regarded as almost monstrous, 
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as Dudley Wilson explains, where even twins “were generally thought to be the 
result of two impregnations” (97).  Many of Paré’s explanations for monstrous 
birth are physical and some even have their basis in fact, but Dudley Wilson 
notes that Paré is also interested in maternal imprinting, which is “[a]n age old 
belief, which . . . alleges that a pregnant woman’s imagination, frights, or 
longings can be transferred to her unborn child, thereby imprinting the child 
with characteristic marks or deformities” (Philip K. Wilson 1-2).  Philip K. 
Wilson states that “[m]any mothers of children with physical or mental 
disabilities continue to suffer life-long guilt and blame,” as “[c]learly anxiety and 
hope for the effects of maternal imprinting survive in our culture, albeit under 
the guise of prenatal care,” thereby supporting Betterton’s argument that, in 
either occasion, if it is not the result of divine will, then mothers are to blame for 
bringing monsters into the world (17).  Creed also connects imprinting to 
monstrous birth in David Cronenberg’s The Brood (1979), where monstrous 
children are born of their mother’s anger (The Monstrous-Feminine 45). 
 That mothers are responsible for the creation of monsters can be plainly 
seen in the cases of Frankenstein and Beowulf: while one text is an Old English 
epic and the other a Gothic novel from the late Romantic period, both are texts 
that deal with monstrous mothers and their equally monstrous issue.  In each 
text, the monstrous child goes forth and creates havoc: in Beowulf, Grendel 
attacks Heorot and kills its sleeping inhabitants, while his mother exacts her 
revenge after Beowulf slays Grendel for his transgressions against the Scylding 
community; in Shelley’s novel, Victor Frankenstein is the creator of the monster 
that murders those he holds most dear and is, for this reason, often considered 
to be the Creature’s mother.  Other critics41 have noted that it is precisely 
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because the Creature has no biological(ly) female mother that he is monstrous, 
as his “birth” itself is regarded as a violation of natural human reproduction and 
therefore as an example of monstrosity.  
 However, the texts differ in their handling of motherhood and the 
categorisation of mothers: while the Beowulf text groups Grendel and his 
mother taxonomically, the Creature Frankenstein puts together in his 
“workshop of filthy creation” is made from sutured pieces of human and animal 
corpses: “I collected bones from charnel houses; and disturbed, with profane 
fingers, the tremendous secrets of the human frame” (Frankenstein 32).  
Grendel and his Mother are classified as Other in terms of species: they are 
“Caines cynne,” Cain’s kindred (107), like the “eotenas ond ylfe ond orc-
neas, swylce gigantas,” the etins, elves, orcs and giants (112-3) that roam the 
marches outside civilised society.  Grendel’s Mother is also very definitely 
female: “Đæra oðer wæs, þæs þe hie gewislicost gewitan meahton, idese onlicnæs” 
(1349-51), “One of them was, as plainly as they could tell, the likeness of a lady” 
(Fulk).  Victor Frankenstein, on the other hand, is a very unlikely mother, not 
least because he is a man.  He does, however, create life, in a century where life 
was only ever created between the sheets and not in the scientist’s laboratory.  
Because Grendel and his Mother are treated taxonomically, it is easy enough to 
link motherhood to monstrous birth in Beowulf: Grendel is monstrous because 
monsters beget monsters.42  In the case of Frankenstein, however, a monster is 
born because of the determination of a man to produce life “unnaturally,” that 
is, without feminine intervention. 
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The Hideousness of Feminine Birth and the Purity of the 
Masculine Imagination 
  It is specifically the lack of a mother’s body that makes the Creature’s 
birth monstrous in Frankenstein. Ellen Moers writes that “[b]irth is a hideous 
thing in Frankenstein, even before there is a monster” because the Creature is 
made from dead matter; it is also hideous because the womb in which the 
Creature is “grown” is not part of his creator’s body, but is, instead, an artificial 
incubator (220).  If Grendel is monstrous because he is birthed by a female 
monster, Frankenstein’s Creature is monstrous because he is not birthed by a 
woman at all.  Birth is also a hideous affair in Frankenstein because it has 
constituted a series of tragic events in Shelley’s own life.  She would have been 
aware from an early age that her birth was the cause for her own mother’s 
death and she herself lost many children, either through miscarriage or early 
death; as Ellen Moers writes, “[d]eath and birth were thus as hideously mixed in 
the life of Mary Shelley as in Frankenstein’s” (221).  Given the century in which 
Shelley was living and writing, miscarriages, infant deaths and the deaths of 
mothers during childbirth were not at all unusual events;43 this however does 
not remove the fact that birth and death are bodily affairs, involving pain and 
suffering that is both physical and emotional.  Taking into consideration her 
father’s propensity for sincerity (Pérez Rodriguez 184), Shelley must have been 
cognisant of the fact that her delivery into this world caused her mother 
tremendous pain and a slow, poisonous death (she died eleven days after giving 
birth to Mary), as well as causing her father grief and depriving the world of a 
prolific philosopher and social commentator. 
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 We are not privy to the primal scene in Beowulf, but Frankenstein’s 
Creature is, in some sense, born.   However, his birth is not bodily at all: the 
Creature’s body is put together from dead matter, not the living cells that forge 
to make a human baby, and Frankenstein’s “workshop of filthy creation” serves 
as the womb from which he must emerge (Frankenstein 32).  That the 
conception, incubation and birth of the Creature are all achieved without a 
body, and specifically without a woman’s body, is arguably at the crux of what 
makes Frankenstein’s experiment so utterly monstrous.44  Mothers’ bodies are 
therefore both natural and unnatural, particularly when in their pregnant form; 
woman is “morphologically dubious” (Braidotti Nomadic Subjects 80).  Mothers’ 
bodies are natural insofar as they are the only means by which life can 
reproduce itself (at least, without scientific intervention), but they are also 
unnatural because they hold the potential to birth monsters, as both the 
Beowulf text and the various examples Walsham and Wilson have used 
demonstrate.  Because they straddle the boundary between natural and 
unnatural, mothers’ bodies, and, by extension, mothers themselves, are 
monstrous.  Mothers are conflated with their bodies because to become a 
mother (at least, biologically) is a bodily process: conception, incubation and 
birth are bodily occurrences, for both the child and the mother.  That 
Frankenstein writes the mother’s body out of the birth-narrative is disturbing 
on a corporeal level, which is partly why Shelley’s novel works well as a 
horror/ghost story.45 
 We could, however, regard this rewriting of the birth-narrative as having 
a feminist purpose for female writers.  Barbara Johnson notes in her essay, “My 
Monster/My Self,” that female writing can be seen as a birthing of the 
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autobiographical self that must reconceive itself by rejecting the mother’s 
bodily matrix: 
  [i]n order to prove herself worthy of her parentage, Mary, paradoxically 
  enough, must usurp the parental role and succeed in giving birth to 
  herself on paper.  Her declaration of existence as a writer must 
  therefore figuratively repeat the matricide that her physical birth all 
  too literally entailed (249, original emphasis).46 
 
While Frankenstein’s Creature is, in a sense, able to perform this authorial 
matricide through his narrative at the novel’s centre, both Grendel and 
Grendel’s Mother are unable to claim the same authority, as they are not given 
voices to describe their suffering at the hands of the Danes and Beowulf.  
Grendel suffers because of the Danes’ music, which reminds him of his exclusion 
from the realm of men and his Mother suffers because of Grendel’s horrific 
death at the hands of Beowulf.  However, Jeffrey Jerome Cohen points out 
instances within the Beowulf text where we are allowed to sympathise with 
Grendel, where “we see the world, for a moment, through a monster’s eyes” 
(“The Promise of Monsters” 456).  Cohen explains that the first of these 
moments occurs when Grendel perceives the noise of Heorot (456), which he 
argues “causes Grendel great pain (þrage geþolode [from geþolian, to suffer])” 
(456).  Cohen’s explanation as to the reason for this suffering is that the noise 
created by the inhabitants of Heorot, and which Grendel overhears, is the 
narrative of the building of the hall, closely linked in this poetic account with the 
Genesis creation (457).  Grendel’s pain is therefore caused by his knowledge 
“that the Genesis story is just as demarcative, just as exclusionary as the walls of 
the hall” (457): Grendel is cognisant of his state of monstrosity, as an aberrant 
outsider excluded from the happiness of Heorot. 
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 The second moment in which we are given to sympathise with Grendel is 
in his battle with Beowulf, where Beowulf has seized Grendel’s arm in a vice-
like grip with no intention to let go (Cohen 458).  In his analysis of this account, 
Cohen interrogates Heaney’s translation of sweg, the ““wail” that pours from 
Grendel’s mouth” (459) during this grapple with Beowulf.  Cohen writes that 
Heaney translates the sound that issues from Grendel into “a mere scream, a 
visceral howl that signifies but holds no content” (459), explaining that another 
meaning of sweg is music.  Cohen cites the scene in which the poet of Heorot 
sings of God’s creation of the world, stating that “his harp resonates with “sweg” 
(þær wæs hearþan sweg), the melodious accompaniment to sweet song (swutol 
sang)” (459).  As a “visceral howl” or an untranslatable song, Grendel’s death 
dirge (gryre-leoð) is an affective sound, touching the bodies of the men in the 
hall with horror: “Sweg up astag niwe geneahhe; Norð-Denum stod atelic egesa, 
anra gehwylcum þara þe of wealle wop gehyrdon” (782-5, which Fulk translates 
as “The volume mounted again and again; there arose in the North-Danes an 
acute horror, in everyone who heard the wailing through the wall”).  Cohen 
contrasts Grendel’s scream to the Creature’s eloquence in Frankenstein, stating 
that if Grendel had had the opportunity to learn language like Frankenstein’s 
Creature had, perhaps he too, would have more aptly expressed his pain, at 
least in a way that would have been recognisable to the men of Heorot. 
 Gullestad’s essay on parasitism and Becoming explains why Grendel’s 
sweg is unrecognisable to the Scyldings; by referring to the Deleuzean concept 
of minor literature and its effect on major language, he points out that 
  [m]inor literature is internal to language, because it is made up of it, 
  since it is bound to find at least most of its tools in the latter: words, 
  expressions, syntax, and so on.  What separates the two – indicating the 
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  foreign character of minor literature – is that the minor approach will 
  apply these raw materials in new and unexpected ways, purposefully 
  breaking and bending the rules of normal speech for artistic effect. 
  Especially in these cases where it is taken the furthest, a minor use of 
  language will constantly be in danger of being perceived as utter 
  nonsense, madness or as noise, and thereby defined as void of meaning, 
  belonging in the same category as animal sounds, the glossolalia of the 
  infant and the ramblings of the mad (312). 
 
The “raw material” of language implemented by Grendel is sound: unable to 
express himself coherently, he can only make an animal noise that frightens the 
Scyldings, rather than eliciting their sympathy.   
 These moments in which we are given to feel his suffering are also not 
unique to Grendel, as we are given insight into the anguish his Mother feels 
during her episode in the poem (Dockray-Miller 91).  Mary Dockray-Miller 
writes that on her journey to Heorot in order to avenge her son, Grendel’s 
Mother is “yrmþe gemunde [1258], thinking on misery” (92).  She explains that 
while  
  yrmþe could conceivably refer to misery she plans to inflict on the 
  Danes . . . it is not likely in a series of lines that tell us also that she has 
  lived for a long time worrying about the hatred between her son and 
  the Danes and that she lives in a cold, watery place.  This misery is hers.  
  She travels to Heorot on a sorhfulne sið, a sorrowful voyage (1278a), 
  thinking about her loss (92). 
 
In a sense, then, the Beowulf text and its various translations are monstrative.  
As readers of the text, translated or not, we are made to view these creatures as 
monsters, which the text(s)47 descriptively and literally48 constitute. 
 However, as both Cohen and Dockray-Miller have demonstrated, the 
narrative is not entirely unsympathetic with the plight of the two creatures, 
where much of the animosity toward them is perhaps a creation of modern 
translators.  This is precisely why discourse such as narrative, which is often 
designed to instruct, can be described as monstrative: that we are given to focus 
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more on the suffering of the men at the hands of Grendel and his Mother than 
on their own suffering, especially in some modern translations, demonstrates 
Grendel’s and his Mother’s function as signs in this text.  Because the narrative 
is not told from the point of view of the creatures but from the men of Heorot, 
Grendel and his Mother are not offered the opportunity to reject the maternal 
by self-constitution, but are, instead, doomed to misinterpretation in every new 
reading of the text, particularly in its translation.  However, the subversion of 
the text’s celebration of masculine heroics by momentary sympathy with the 
monsters emphasises the importance of the creatures’ existence in the text, not 
as mere adversaries of the titular hero, but as signs of something unknowable.  
Grendel is unknowable because of his guttural howl, which eludes the 
comprehension of the Scyldings by being an unrecognisable signifier, a sign 
whose meaning escapes the Symbolic, while his Mother is unrecognisable for 
her “incorrectly” performed masculinity.49  Neither creature can reject their 
“birthing” by this text, because they are unable to narratively birth themselves 
and give voice to their suffering, and it is only through sympathetic moments in 
the text that we are allowed to feel what they feel. 
 There is also more to the “rejection” of the material mother (Johnson 
249) than the birthing of the self as author, as Gilbert and Gubar note in “Mary 
Shelley’s Monstrous Eve.”  Here, they point out that “Frankenstein is a version of 
the misogynistic story implicit in Paradise Lost” (228), that of bibliogenesis, the 
Christian myth of man/God giving birth to woman.  Although they do not say so 
explicitly, the implication in Gilbert and Gubar’s article is that what may 
perhaps be truly monstrous about the Western canon, and, moreover, of 
Western history, is the acquisition of the feminine realm of birth by a masculine 
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God.  This acquisition is, furthermore, rewritten as a pure, painless, bodiless 
masculine birth, superior in all ways to its female counterpart, which is abject, 
bloody and thoroughly corporeal.  Braidotti’s appraisal of classical mythology, 
which “represents no founding hero, no main divine creature or demigod as 
being of a woman born,” emphasises the “antimaternal dimension at the very 
heart of the matter” of originary mythology, which, in creating the genesis of 
god- and mankind, effectively “gets rid” of mothers (“Mothers, Monsters, and 
Machines” 68).  Shelley’s subversion of the already altered unclean feminine 
birth by pure male birth demonstrates the masculine fears inherent in allowing 
women reproductive power,  where mothers are monstrous not just because 
this status means they overlap the boundary between nature and artifice but 
because they perform the monstrous threat/promise of arrival.  Mothers’ 
bodies threaten to bring into the world something that is unknowable and 
unpredictable, which Shelley seems acutely aware of in Frankenstein.  This is 
dramatically re-enacted by the Creature’s “birth.”  Up to the moment of the 
Creature’s birth, that is, his animation as a sentient being with potential 
autonomy, Frankenstein describes his experiment with anticipation as “[a] new 
species [that] would bless me as its creator and source,” asserting that “[n]o 
father could claim the gratitude of his child so completely as I should deserve 
their’s [sic]” (32). 
 At the instant of birth, however, Frankenstein realises his mistake: 
  [h]ow can I describe my emotions at this catastrophe, or how delineate 
  the wretch whom with such infinite pains and care I had endeavoured 
  to form?  His limbs were in proportion, and I had selected his features 
  as beautiful.  Beautiful!  –Great God!  His yellow skin scarcely covered 
  the work of muscles and arteries beneath; his hair was of a lustrous 
  black, and flowing; his teeth of a pearly whiteness; but these 
  luxuriances only formed a more horrid contrast with his watery eyes, 
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  that seemed almost of the same colour as the dun white sockets in 
  which they were set, his shrivelled complexion, and straight black lips 
  (34). 
 
It is in the precise moment that the Creature looks back at Frankenstein that he 
feels abject horror at what he has created, where he finds himself being 
suddenly appraised as a body by the object of his creation.  That it is this 
moment in which Frankenstein becomes aware of the uncanniness of what he 
has produced is no accident on the author’s behalf: the Creature’s sentience is 
symbolised by the return of his gaze, suggesting an autonomy that Frankenstein 
cannot control.  For women who are mothers, this presence is felt long before 
the arrival of the child.  The movement of the child in the womb signifies an 
autonomous presence that is intimately unheimlich, where its uncanniness is 
due not just to its presence within the mother’s body, but to its potential 
autonomy and Otherness on a very bodily level.  Betterton comments that “[t]he 
embodied pregnant woman, like the monster . . . destabilizes the concept of the 
singular self, threatening to spill over the boundaries of the unified subject,” 
because the pregnant body is in fact more than one body (85).  The returned 
gaze of the pregnant body is also doubly uncanny because of its being more 
than one body, carrying with it more than its own “I”/eye and the possibility of 
the returned gaze of the child in utero. 
 Because Frankenstein does not conceive, incubate or birth his creation in 
a bodily manner, it is only at the moment of the Creature’s sentience – 
animation – that Frankenstein recoils.  As a mother, Shelley must have 
understood this bodily context of birth and pregnancy profoundly, knowing that 
even housing an infant in one’s very body does not mean that what is produced 
in the moment of birth is in any way knowable, predictable or controllable.  The 
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uncanniness of pregnancy is also performative because it constitutes, to use 
Royle’s phrase, “unpredictable and strange effects”: the movement of the child 
in the womb and the knowledge that another body is within one’s own, 
although perfectly natural, is also profoundly uncanny (The Uncanny 16).  As a 
way of explaining this uncanniness, Royle reminds us that the OED gives an 
“archaic synonym for the time of birth, giving birth or being born” as “the canny 
moment” (viii), the moment in which the uncanny, the unseen, becomes canny, 
or visible.  Thus, the moment of becoming aware of the anamorphic image50 is 
an apt metaphor for birth, because the previously unseen is now visible.  
 Frankenstein cannot even predict his own reaction to the Creature’s 
animation, and it is precisely this level of unknowability that monsters inspire.  
This is also specifically what makes Frankenstein himself monstrous: as a 
mother, he performs the threat/promise of the arrival of an entity that is 
unknowable and ungovernable, and it is Frankenstein’s powerlessness to 
control his creation that is played out by the novel’s events.  This is also why 
intention is integral to a clear understanding of monstrosity, in that no matter 
what our intentions are, we still have the potential to produce monsters.  
Frankenstein’s sincere intentions for the Creature were, to begin with, for the 
Creature’s best interests; indeed, he believes that life is such a gift that the 
Creature will be grateful for its existence.  However, as the quotation from 
Paradise Lost on the title page of the 1818 edition forewarns,51 one man’s gift is 
another’s burden.  We cannot know the outcome of our creations; however 
much we may intend good to come from them, the consequence may be tragedy 
and suffering, which is why our creations, whether they be our children or 
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artistic endeavours, perform both the promise of goodness and the threat of 
tragedy. 
 While in Frankenstein motherhood is performed meticulously (and 
horrifically) outside the corporeality of women’s bodies, pregnancy and birth 
are usually bodily affairs, specific to women’s bodies.  If mothers perform the 
threat/promise of arrival, they do so precisely with their bodies.  In this sense, 
mothers’ bodies are not only monstrous, in that they promise/ threaten the 
arrival of something unpredictable, but they are also performative.  By 
performing the promise and/or the threat, mothers’ bodies are, as Phelan 
points out (16), performative in an Austinian sense, as they create the speech 
acts of promising and threatening.  Mothers’ bodies demonstrate the 
performativity of monsters, where monsters perform the promise/threat, 
meaning that they are performative on a linguistic level.  Furthermore, as both 
the monstrous mother and the monstrous child exemplify, this performative is 
also bodily: it is the monster’s very existence that makes it performative, and 
this existence is always corporeal, even if it is only understood in terms of the 
Symbolic.  When Cohen claims that the monster’s body is “pure culture” he does 
not mean that the monster’s material body ceases to be: the monster’s body 
exists materially, but it does so beyond the scope of predictability and knowing, 
and therefore its materiality exists, like pregnancy, as a process rather than as a 
fixed form (Monster Theory: Reading Culture 4).  Butler argues that “to be 
material means to materialize” (Bodies That Matter 32), which locates the body 
as well as the “I” within an ontological theory of Becoming rather than of Being 
(which instead emphasises a fixed and stable object).  In fact, Butler’s entire 
oeuvre is about locating the “I,” which is created by language, within an 
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ontological theory of Becoming, where Becoming is a process: this is how she 
was able to conceptualise gender as both performance and performative in the 
first place.  For Braidotti, the monstrous body is also a process, one “without a 
stable object . . . [and which] makes knowledge happen by circulating, 
sometimes as the irrational non-object” (qtd. in Betterton 83:150).  This 
Becoming, this making knowledge happen through process, sounds remarkably 
like performance, and for performance to happen there needs to be a body.  
However, that the monster exists as a sign of things to come means that its 
material body is also only ever understood in terms of its signifying economy.  
What does this entail for the pregnant body, whose signifying economy 
includes, among other things, the abjection of feminine creativity and the purity 
of the masculine imagination? 
 Of course, men do not give birth to fully grown humanoids in the same 
way that Victor Frankenstein does (cloned sheep and the human genome 
notwithstanding); men do nevertheless give metaphorical birth to their creative 
imaginings, which become “flesh” in their physical form, such as writing.  While 
Braidotti maintains that it is alchemy that is “a reductio ad absurdum of the male 
fantasy of self-reproduction” (Nomadic Subjects 87), and while this is certainly 
played out in Shelley’s novel by Victor Frankenstein, writing is the method in 
which men give birth to an autobiographical self without the assistance of 
mothers or mothers’ bodies.  This is arguably why Frankenstein is a novel that is 
so lacking in mothers: the masculine desire to usurp the bodily in favour of a 
clean, controlled birth and the production of a predictable and organised 
individual is certainly understandable, if not recommended.  Mothers are 
conspicuously missing in the novel: Frankenstein’s own mother dies quite early 
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on in the text; he destroys the female creature before she can reproduce little 
monsters of her own; the Creature murders Elizabeth in the very bed that 
would make her mother to Frankenstein’s children; and, it is an Oedipal mixture 
of Elizabeth and his mother that he dreams of after bringing the Creature to life: 
  I thought I saw Elizabeth, in the bloom of health, walking in the streets 
  of Ingolstadt.  Delighted and surprised, I embraced her; but as I 
  imprinted the first kiss on her lips, they became livid with the hue of 
  death; her features appeared to change, and I thought that I held the 
  corpse of my dead mother in my arms (34). 
 
 This autobiographical rebirth of the self through writing is 
simultaneously a rejection of the physicality of birth and the male appropriation 
of creation from women, which is, it would seem, what Shelley is painstakingly 
emphasising through the narrative of masculine birth and conception.  While 
there are definitive parallels that can be drawn between the carrying and 
delivery of a child and writing, the issue at stake when making this 
metaphorical connection is the loss of the material body.  Betterton writes that 
“the traditional metaphor of creativity in which the (male) artist claims to 
conceive and give birth to imaginative ideas” (84) is paradoxical for female 
artists because their bodies hold the potential for the literal embodiment of this 
ideal, claiming that “the contradiction that the metaphor of male creativity 
conceals [is] that actual conception and pregnancy are bodily conditions that 
cannot be ‘enabled’ by will or desire and, in this sense, are quite unlike the 
practices in making art” (84-5).  This metaphor quite literally comes to life in 
Frankenstein, writing the mother’s body out of the narrative through the 
artificial birth of the Creature and represented by the lack of mothers and 
women, who symbolise this materiality, in the text.  While mothers are missing 
in the text, women, as representations of materiality and the potential for 
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motherhood, are also made absent: Elizabeth is killed by the Creature on her 
wedding night, Safie, along with the De Laceys, runs away from him, effectively 
abandoning him, and Justine is hanged for the Creature’s crime.  At each point in 
the text where there is potential for female creativity, either Frankenstein or his 
Creature quash this potential by usurping the role of creator or reinforcing male 
agency.  This is, of course, excepting the female creativity responsible for 
existence of the novel itself. 
 As a text written by a young woman at a time when writing was still 
considered a discipline to be accomplished under the governance of men,52 
Frankenstein pointedly warns of the dangers inherent in thinking that, as 
masters of themselves, men have sovereignty over their creations.  That it took 
a woman to understand this is no surprise, because only she could comprehend 
the volatility of the sovereign “I” in a way that Shelley’s husband and father 
(who were also both writers) certainly could not.53  Furthermore, as male 
writers, neither Godwin nor Shelley could understand being situated as an 
object of science and art in quite the same way that Mary could, and which the 
Creature embodies in her novel.  Shelley’s mastery of the narrative technique 
and the warning that the novel enacts is, in a sense, the retaking of birth by the 
feminine: if writing, which is a male occupation, dramatizes the male conquest 
of birth, female writing performs its recapture.  There is, however, a difficulty 
with trying to regain birth through the occupation of writing, and I would argue 
that Shelley is aware of this, which is that 
  autobiography consists precisely in the story of the difficulty of 
  conforming to the standard of what a man should be.  The problem for 
  the female autobiographer is, on the one hand, to resist the pressure of 
  masculine autobiography as the only literary genre available for her 
  enterprise, and, on the other, to describe a difficulty in conforming to a 
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  female ideal which is largely a fantasy of the masculine, not the 
  feminine, imagination (Johnson “My Monster/My Self” 251). 
 
Birth without embodiment is, as I have demonstrated here, such a “fantasy of 
the masculine,” and it is precisely the omission of the body in the male fantasy 
of pure birth that is performed by writing that Shelley’s monster warns us of.  
Most importantly, the monster warns us of this with his very body –a body that 
was not born of woman and is thus a warning of what may happen if one is to 
proceed in the business of writing. 
 It may be pointed out that Frankenstein is not strictly speaking an 
autobiographical account of the life of Mary Shelley, even if it is of its three 
narrators – Walton, Frankenstein and the Creature.  However, it is rare to find a 
scholarly text on the novel that does not at least touch on Shelley’s life: it seems 
that the narratives of Frankenstein are inextricably chained to a biographical 
account of its author.  If autobiography is, in a sense, giving birth to oneself, 
does Shelley create herself in Frankenstein, and does she do so by creating a 
literary monster?  By their very designation, each of the novel’s narrators 
creates his “I” by narrating his experiences, effectively talking himself into 
Being.  The Creature, at the novel’s centre, gives his account to Frankenstein, 
from the moment of his “birth” to the moment in which he stands before him on 
Montanvert; Frankenstein gives his account to Walton, who, in turn, gives his to 
his sister, Margaret Saville, who bears the same initials as the novel’s author.  
Each narrator accounts for himself in ways that the other could not, which is 
why the novel is structured in such a way as to allow each narrator to utter his 
“I.” 
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 However, (auto)biography and fiction do not only create the “I”: writing 
also gives birth to a new individual (there is, it can be said, no book that is quite 
like Frankenstein), to a narrative or set of narratives, to ideas, principles and 
philosophies that are sutured together to make a book’s “body.”  This is partly 
why Shelley refers to her debut novel as her “hideous progeny” in the 1831 
edition.  Books do not of course have identities like human beings do –they do 
not think for themselves, they are not organic or sentient –but they can 
constitute our identities in much the same way that seeing, speaking humans 
do.  If performative acts done by and to a body create that body’s “I”, texts act in 
a similar way on the “I”, creating it by mutation, osmosis, influence, and 
parasitism:  I am not the same “I” that I was before reading this book, a reading 
which has performed my Becoming-other.  Few texts demonstrate this 
performative ability of writing quite as plainly as Frankenstein.  Before I move 
on to this literary demonstration, however, it is first necessary to note some of 
Shelley’s biographical details, especially concerning motherhood – her own and 
her mother’s. 
 
The Performative Power of Writing: Texts as Mothers, Mothers as 
Texts 
 Earlier in this chapter I mentioned maternal imprinting, where a 
pregnant woman’s imagination was said to physically affect the child she 
carried, thereby causing the child harm.  These imaginings, longings and 
worries were blamed for the result of a monstrous birth, but were also blamed 
for other physical defects a child might suffer later, such as illness or deformity.  
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Philip K. Wilson cites the case of the nineteenth-century “Elephant Man,” Joseph 
Merrick, whose birth was perceived as normal,54 but who began to display 
bodily abnormalities at the age of two.  He writes that “[a]mong the most 
prominent of the “bizarre distortions” upon his body was an “extraordinary 
mass of flesh” that “continued to force its way from beneath the upper lip,” 
eventually protruding “several inches” from Joseph’s mouth in the form of a 
“grotesque snout” that weighed several ounces” (13).  While the diagnosis of 
Merrick’s condition remains disputed, the contemporary explanation was that 
he suffered from maternal imprinting, a result of his mother being startled by a 
“parading” elephant at a Humberstonegate fair while in her second trimester 
(14). 
 Similarly, Mary Toft, from Godalming in Surrey, who in 1726 claimed 
that she had given birth to rabbits, was able to fool doctors and midwives in 
London not just because she managed to secrete rabbit parts in her body, or 
that she had just miscarried and therefore was still bleeding and able to 
produce contractions, but because “when [she was] five weeks pregnant, she 
had been weeding a field and was startled by a rabbit” (Dennis Todd 7).  Todd 
explains that not only did the rabbit startle her, but on being unable to catch it, 
she developed a craving for rabbit meat (7).  Thus, being both startled by and 
experiencing a longing for a rabbit meant that Toft’s emotions were transferred 
to the foetus in her womb, resulting in the monstrous births of seventeen 
rabbits.  In a comprehensive study of the medicalization of mothers’ bodies in 
Europe, Rebecca Kukla notes that this theory of maternal imprinting came 
about due to an ancient understanding of the womb as permeable and 
susceptible to corrupting influences, an understanding that would transfer to 
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the pregnant body itself, demonstrating that imprinting was the next step in the 
movement of this logic (5).  As well as this, she points out that even more than 
being prone to corruption, the womb itself was seen as a corrupting influence, 
as it was at the root of untoward cravings, the “seat of capricious and forceful 
appetites that beckon foreign substances in,” thereby threatening the 
development of the child in utero (6).  Furthermore, writes Kukla, “[t]he whole 
notion of a craving –so deeply linked in our imagination with pregnancy – is of 
not just any appetite but an appetite that is inherently irrational, unpredictable, 
forceful, and hard to control or deny” (6, my emphasis).  The craving of the 
womb, and, by extension, of mothers themselves, is described here, as it is in 
many other sources, using the language of monstrosity.   
 Both imprinting and the susceptibility of the womb to invite disaster by 
craving are monstrous because of an age old understanding of contagion and 
parasitism.  To be affected by one’s mother’s thoughts, either through her 
longings or frights, demonstrates a belief in an autonomous womb that 
parasitically takes hold of the mother’s ability to produce “normal” births.  That 
is to say, the mother’s thoughts are contagious in that they spread to the child.55  
These beliefs persisted long into the nineteenth century, and, as Rosemary 
Betterton has shown, are at the route of much prenatal care even today.  Joseph 
Merrick, “The Elephant Man”, was born in 1862, which means that during 
Shelley’s life maternal imprinting was still commonly believed to be the cause of 
defects and illness in children, taking place not just during pregnancy but also 
while the child breast-fed (St. Clair 462).  Kukla writes of breast-feeding that 
“[m]ilk was seen [in the seventeenth- and eighteenth-centuries] as a direct 
medium of transference of the nature of the nursing body, not only physical but 
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moral, to the infant,” meaning that the nursing mother was just as much danger 
to her child as she was when pregnant (11).  This belief was evidently still 
widely accepted in Shelley’s lifetime, as St. Clair notes of her moods while 
lactating after the birth of her fifth child.  He writes that Shelley’s anxiety 
regarding her father’s welfare while she was in Italy was blamed for the ensuing 
case of diarrhoea that Percy Florence suffered in the summer of 1820, the same 
illness that had killed his sister Clara and his brother William (462).  St. Clair 
explains that Shelley’s worry and depression were thought by her husband to 
be the fault of Godwin’s letters, which always imparted his often dire need for 
money and his inability to provide for his family, and, by August, he wrote to 
Godwin, “[h]is main point [being] . . . Godwin’s effect on Mary’s milk” (462).  
Mothers’ thoughts were so dangerous, they could not just bring about monsters 
but could, quite monstrously, kill the very child they were expected to 
“naturally” protect and nourish, not only during pregnancy but exceeding that, 
through the child’s nursing and its later life. 
 If we are to take Frankenstein as the mother of his creation, it would 
seem that the logic of maternal imprinting is revealed in the novel’s narrative 
events: before and throughout his “labour,” Frankenstein becomes obsessed 
with the ability to make life in the laboratory, and unhealthily so.  After 
discovering the secret of life and then deciding to make a man, Frankenstein 
describes himself as having “grown pale with study” and “emaciated with 
confinement,”56 because a “resistless, and almost frantic impulse, urged [him] 
forward” and he remembers that he “seemed to have lost all soul or sensation 
but for this one pursuit” (32).  One could certainly read Frankenstein’s desire to 
know and to create as a craving in the sense of a maternal craving, and this 
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craving is passed on to his Creature, whose desire to know manifests itself in his 
education by the unwitting De Lacey family and by the books he reads, Milton’s 
Paradise Lost, Plutarch’s Lives, Volney’s Ruins, Goethe’s The Sorrows of Young 
Werther, as well as some papers of Frankenstein’s that document the Creature’s 
construction.  From all of these texts, the Creature receives an education, not 
just in language but in the creation of humankind and of his own creation (79-
88). 
 However, the Creature learns language by over-hearing the lessons of 
the De Lacey children, making the Creature parasitic in an Austinian sense.  He 
is a “parasite” upon the “normal” forms of dissemination and locution, listening 
in furtively, in the knowledge that his use of what he learns may be 
“inappropriate”, quite simply because of his own “inappropriateness” in using 
the knowledge he, like Prometheus, “steals.”  Peter Brooks writes that language, 
as the Creature encounters it, is “tied to human love and patterns of kinship and 
relation” (86), while, for Shelley, language is tied to authority.  Both are 
excluded from wielding language successfully: the Creature because he feels 
and is excluded from human kinship and relationships, and Shelley because she 
is a woman and thus an “inappropriate” authority on anything, including the 
successful rearing of children.  Perhaps this is also why Grendel’s death song 
(gryre-leoð) sounds like a wail to the men of Heorot: lacking the knowledge of 
language, Grendel is unable to communicate his pain to the Danes because of his 
“inappropriateness” to undertake the task. 
 The craving of knowledge that Frankenstein’s Creature has contracted 
from his creator is that of self-knowledge, of knowing who and what it is he is.  
Braidotti suggests that “[t]he desire to know is, like all desires, related to the 
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problem of representing one’s origin, of answering the most childish and 
consequently fundamental of questions: ‘Where did I come from?’” (Nomadic 
Subjects 90).  This primeval question is born of the condition of being Other, 
which is dramatically re-enacted by the text the Creature comes to love the 
most, Paradise Lost.  In Milton’s epic poem, both Eve and Satan, the two Others 
to Adam and God, ask themselves this question for the reason that they are not 
a given in the way that Adam and God are.  If Adam and God represent the 
universal type, Eve, who is only a derivative of Adam (a mutant, if you will), and 
Satan, who is God’s antithesis, are Other to the inflexible identity that is 
God/Man, or as Brooks puts it, the Creature “radicalizes the situation of Eve, 
who also has no ‘model’ – Adam is created in God’s image, God is male; in whose 
image is Eve created?” (99). 
 The Creature identifies his Otherness through the education he receives 
from textual analysis, including that of Frankenstein’s papers documenting his 
own creation.  The Creature’s “inappropriate” education can be viewed as 
autobiographical, as Shelley would have received her education largely from the 
books she read, which included not just her father’s influential An Enquiry 
Concerning Political Justice and its Influence on Morals and Happiness (1793), but 
her absent mother’s equally influential A Vindication of the Rights of Woman 
with Strictures on Political and Moral Subjects (1792).  Shelley would have also 
come to know her mother through her writing, reading all of her published 
works (Allen Mary Shelley 36-40) as well as Godwin’s published Memoirs of the 
Author of A Vindication of the Rights of Woman (1798).  Wollstonecraft’s identity 
was created for Shelley between these sheets of paper, making Wollstonecraft’s 
identity, in a manner, a ghostly figure built from this series of texts.  In a sense, 
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then, Wollstonecraft’s texts acted as mother for Shelley, educating her not just 
of the woman that Wollstonecraft was, but of what it meant to be a woman, to 
be Other in a world that was made for Adam.  This act of literature, of text as 
mother, becomes literal in Frankenstein, where Volney, Plutarch, Milton and 
Goethe become parents to the Creature just as much as Frankenstein does, in 
that they help to create him.  Frankenstein is not wholly responsible for the 
Creature’s monstrosity – inasmuch as his maternal imprinting and his paternal 
abandonment may have affected the Creature, the texts that the Creature reads 
imprint upon him as well. 
 It is in this sense that texts are not only performative, but monstrative, in 
that they take part in constituting monstrous identity.  The Creature in 
Frankenstein is only able to recognise who he is in relation to humanity by 
seeing examples of the Other, which in this case are tellingly a monster and a 
woman, and it is only in knowing his Otherness that the Creature is able to utter 
his “I,” and thereby constitute it.  It is also crucial that this event takes place 
within the Creature’s own narrative, in that he gives an account of himself, 
meaning not only accounting for his actions, but the double meaning of creating 
himself autobiographically through his narrative.  This is something that we all 
do whenever we utter an “I”: I bring myself into being by uttering my “I,” 
performatively constituting myself as an “I.”  As Brooks expounds 
  [l]anguage by its very nature transcends and pre-exists the individual 
  locutor; it implies, depends on, and necessitates that network of 
  intersubjective relations from which the Monster protests he has been 
  excluded.  That is, in becoming the narrator of his story, the Monster 
  both dramatizes his problem and provides a model for its solution, the 
  solution implicit in the discursive interdependence of an ‘I’ and a ‘thou’ 
  in any interlocutionary situation (84). 
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 The Creature’s “I” differs from the narratives of both Frankenstein and 
Walton, as he knows his “I” as monstrous, having recognised it as so by his 
identification with Milton’s Eve and Satan.  What is also crucial in the scene of 
self-constitution is that in order for one to utter an “I” there must be a “you” to 
listen; as Butler writes “I begin my story of myself only in the face of a “you” 
who asks me to give an account” (Giving an Account of Oneself 11).  This is 
enacted in each of the novel’s narrative frames: the Creature constitutes himself 
before Frankenstein, who constitutes himself before Walton, who constitutes 
himself before his sister/the reader of Frankenstein, each time not just giving an 
account for his actions but for himself.  Thus, telling and reading, both a form of 
narrative, require a “you” in order to exist; as Peggy Phelan writes “[t]he degree 
to which I can sustain my belief in a “me” and a “you” is the degree to which I 
can generate points fixed enough to keep writing” (Mourning Sex 17). 
 However, the Creature’s constitution of his identity through uttering his 
“I” does not give him the freedom to create himself as he so chooses, and thus 
“the solution” to his solitude that Brooks insists is “implicit in the discursive 
interdependence of an ‘I’ and a ‘thou’ in any interlocutionary situation” (84) is 
not in fact a solution at all, because the “I” the Creature utters is not just the “I” 
he has made of his own choosing.  He is already constituted as monstrous by his 
creator, and the monstrosity of his body further constitutes the monstrosity of 
his identity to those who come in contact with him: both the body that 
Frankenstein fashions for him and Frankenstein’s reaction to his sentience are 
monstrative.  He also (re)constitutes himself as monstrous through his 
identification with Satan and Eve in Paradise Lost, which is enacted through his 
exclusion by others.  Moreover, Butler explains that “[w]hen the “I” seeks to give 
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an account of itself, it can start with itself, but it will find that this self is already 
implicated in a social temporality that exceeds its own capacities for narration” 
(Giving an Account of Oneself  7).  What constitutes the “social temporality” 
within which the Creature finds himself, and how does this go towards 
constituting his ability to utter and thus create his “I”?  If we return to Hillis 
Miller’s recognition that the event, the monster, “cannot depend on pre-existing 
conventions, laws, rights, justifications, and formulations, however much it 
characteristically attempts to claim that it does” (Speech Acts in Literature 26-
7), we find that inasmuch as the Creature identifies with Milton’s Satan and Eve, 
he also does not, lamenting that “Satan had his companions, fellow-devils, to 
admire and encourage him; but I am solitary and detested” (Frankenstein 88). 
 Even though he can liken himself to Satan through his feelings of envy for 
the De Laceys’ evident happiness, the Creature, as an anomaly, is not at all like 
Milton’s antihero and therefore is not governed by the pre-existing conventions 
to which the Miltonic Satan is, or to which any of us are; that is, until he starts 
using language.  Elucidating her earlier statement, Butler contends that  
  the very terms by which we give an account, by which we make 
  ourselves intelligible to ourselves and to others, are not of our making.  
  They are social in character, and they establish social norms, a domain 
  of unfreedom [sic] and substitutability within which our “singular” 
  stories are told (21). 
 
Once the Creature is able to utter the “I” that he claims he is, he becomes subject 
to the same norms that govern every speaking person, norms which are 
constituted in and reiterated by the very language that he uses to claim his “I”.  
The Creature has been changed by his interaction with the texts he reads, or as 
Butler says “I am invariably transformed by the encounters I undergo; 
recognition becomes the process by which I become other than what I was and 
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so cease to be able to return to what I was” (27).  The Creature’s identity when 
he speaks to Frankenstein, the identity that he utters to the reader, is not the 
same identity that Frankenstein describes to Walton in his narrative preceding 
the Creature’s: the texts the Creature reads are as much responsible for his 
identity as Frankenstein is. 
 Fred Botting makes an important point, however, about the constitution 
of the Creature’s identity by the texts he reads, stating that his identity 
  remains a purloined one, a subjectivity he can never call his own as it is 
  never recognised by others.  Almost recognised by the blind father of 
  the De Lacey family, the monster is cast out by the son before he can be 
  accepted.  His subjectivity remains a Promethean theft of fire, stealing 
  identity from the ‘godlike science of letters’ in an act which has, for him 
  and others, terrible consequences (Making Monstrous: Frankenstein, 
  Criticism, Theory 16). 
 
This is precisely why the Creature remains monstrous: his inability to be 
recognised as he would like to be constitutes a divide between how the 
Creature would like to be perceived by others and how he is actually seen.  For 
any person who can claim the status of Other, this is a familiar quandary, feeling 
oneself become Other to oneself.  The Creature dramatically re-enacts the 
simultaneity of self-constitution and the constitution of the self by the other, 
where neither is in any sense more “real” than the other and where each haunts 
the other’s performance.  Furthermore, using Julia Lupton’s analysis of the term 
“creature” in her essay “Creature Caliban” (2000), Cohen reiterates the 
etymology of the noun, which Lupton notes  
  derives from the future participle of the Latin verb creare, so that 
  creatura means ‘a thing always in the process of undergoing creation; 
  the creature is actively passive or, better, passionate, perpetually 
  becoming created, subject to transformations at the behest of the 
  arbitrary commands of the Other’ (her emphasis, qtd. in 
  Cohen “The Promise of Monsters” 463:1). 
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 As I have already demonstrated, this Other need not be another person, 
nor does it necessarily perform “arbitrary commands” of the self in order to 
constitute changes in the self; these changes can come about through an 
awakened identification with another’s narrative and the subsequent ability to 
see through another’s eyes.  This identification with a textual Other is what 
Deleuze and Guattari call “minor literature” (A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism 
and Schizophrenia) and what Beth Newman names the “seduction of narrative.”  
Using Shoshana Felman’s The Literary Speech Act (1984), Newman explains that 
the Creature’s narrative “has an immediate purpose: to bind Frankenstein to a 
promise” (“Narratives of Seduction and the Seduction of Narrative” 178).  Being 
seduced by narrative, according to Newman, is dangerous, as hearing or reading 
it poses the threat of having to make a promise, of having to reciprocate by 
making more monsters.  The Creature’s demand, the promise he intends to 
exact from Frankenstein, is for the production of a female creature: if 
Frankenstein is to be seduced by the Creature’s narrative, he must follow 
through with this promise.  However, as Newman points out, Frankenstein 
never actually makes this promise: he does not make the performative 
utterance required for this promise to become binding, at least in such a way 
that Austin would mandate (180), for, according to Austin, for a promise to be 
performed, the person promising must utter the words “I promise” (How to 6-
7). 
 I would argue, however, that by agreeing to listen to the Creature’s tale, 
Frankenstein still binds himself to this promise because of the transmittable 
nature of the frame narrative. Each of the novel’s accounts is passed on to 
another, orally or written in words.  The Creature’s desire for a mate thus elicits 
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Frankenstein’s sympathy, if only briefly, and Frankenstein’s narrative provokes 
Walton’s sympathy, whose plight is read by the reader of his letters, ostensibly 
his sister but in reality anyone who reads the novel.  Thus, the promise that the 
Creature elicits passes from Frankenstein to Walton and on to the reader.  The 
promise of narrative is infectious.  It is not just the narrative events of the novel 
that are passed from speaker to listener, writer to reader, but the transmission 
of the Creature’s 
  desire and lack, through the signifying chain of language and through 
  the interlocutionary relation established in language, with the result 
  that lack and desire come to inhabit the listener.  As a listener or 
  narratee, once you have entered into a narrative transaction with the 
  Monster, you are yourself tainted by monsterism: you cannot break out 
  of the relation established by the pronouns ‘I’ and ‘thou’ once they are 
  seen as complementary (Brooks 95). 
 
 The “narrative transaction” of which Brooks speaks is the transmission 
of the promise to fully sympathise with the Creature, and with which we, as the 
novel’s readers, are now infected.  While Newman asserts that the Creature’s 
narrative loses its “seductive hold, its ability to exact promises” (184) in its 
transformation from speech to the written word, on reading the novel, the 
reader has still “entered into a narrative transaction” with the Creature and 
“cannot break out of the relation established by the pronouns ‘I’ and ‘thou’” 
(Brooks 95).  This is because the reader, while not literally embodying the 
figures of the novel, “mentally pronounce[s] an ‘I’” with which each of the 
novel’s characters speak, mentally reiterating the Creature’s ‘I’ as well as the ‘I’ 
uttered by both Frankenstein and Walton (Poulet  qtd. in Iser “The Reading 
Process: A Phenomenological Approach” 297:56).  The monstrosity that is 
passed from speaker to listener is also transferred by the written narrative to 
the reader, infecting the reader with the Creature’s desire for inclusion, making 
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that desire the reader’s own.  The text elicits one’s sympathy for the Creature 
and thus it also enacts one’s Becoming-monster.  In the same way in which the 
texts that the Creature reads performatively constitute his identity, reading the 
Creature’s narrative informs and mutates our identities.  Reading his narrative, 
we become monsters, mutated versions of ourselves and the Other with whom 
we sympathise. 
 The reason for this is in part because of an archaic use of “monster,” 
which treats the term as a verb.  The OED states that “monster” also means “[t]o 
make a monster of; to make monstrous; (also) to transform (something) into a 
monstrous version of itself” (emphasis in original).  The Creature’s narrative 
thus makes a monster of Frankenstein, not because he was not already one to 
begin with, but because he can now, after hearing of the Creature’s suffering, 
identify with that suffering and acknowledge his monstrosity-by-abandonment.  
Like that of his creation, Frankenstein’s identity is in a constant state of 
Becoming, informed by the discourse that surrounds him.  The Creature is by 
his very designation an unstable identity in a constant state of flux, a process 
rather than a fixed form, and this is played out by his self-education and the 
discourse that Frankenstein and others use when describing him.  His 
monstrosity is not chosen by him but for him, through the reactions of the 
humans he comes in contact with, making those reactions monstrative and 
therefore supplying us with the reason why we are meant to regard the 
Creature as a monster.  However, he is also monstrous in the sense of his 
Becoming, in that he finds himself between ontological categories, a Becoming 
that is itself unstable and fluctuating.  Thus, he is able to view himself as 
“similar, yet at the same time strangely unlike” the humans he watches and 
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reads about, who fill him with sympathy and, simultaneously, with disgust 
(Frankenstein 86).  He finds himself between categories, neither fully human 
nor fully Other, not just biologically but ontologically.  His status as 
simultaneously either and neither is enacted by his exposure to the other 
subjects he comes in contact with, both “real” and literary, rehearsing the very 
Becoming that the Frankenstein text provokes in us and which makes monsters 
of us. 
 The difference between the monstrative acts that ensure the Creature’s 
monstrosity – his abandonment by his Creator, the reactions of fear and horror 
by the De Laceys – and his Becoming-monster through textual osmosis, is 
precisely the difference between enforced subject formation as Other to oneself 
and becoming-Other elicited through one’s sympathy for the Other.  Thus, the 
plot of Frankenstein rehearses the very choice the text gives us in reading it, 
which is to either reject the Creature as Frankenstein does, or to welcome him 
despite his Otherness.  Shelley does not make this an easy choice, either for 
Frankenstein or for the reader: Frankenstein realises that were he to provide 
the Creature with his desired mate, she too might reject him and wreak even 
more havoc on humankind (he is not about to make the same mistake twice) 
but, in so doing, washes his hands clean of the responsibility he has for the 
Creature.  This is not merely the responsibility of creator for creation, or parent 
for child, but the “I’s” responsibility to the Other, regardless of the Other’s 
difference.  Thus, difference itself is not denied in Frankenstein but the 
fundamental difficulty in understanding the Other, in sympathising with 
her/him, is emphasised as a prerequisite for Being.  The only way to counteract 
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the power of this binary system of self/Other is through Becoming-monster 
oneself. 
 As I have demonstrated in my analysis of Frankenstein, our Becoming-
monster is enacted through our reading of the text, as the Creature’s is when he 
reads Volney, Plutarch, Milton, Goethe, and the notes Frankenstein has left him.  
In a similar fashion, then, we are infected with the monstrosity of the creatures 
in the Beowulf text, precisely because the text does not always cast them as 
Other, but provides moments in which we are to sympathise with their plight.  
Thus, in sympathising with Grendel’s exclusion from Heorot, we, too, find 
ourselves out on the margins, and, in sympathising with his Mother’s loss, we 
become the monsters that have taken her son from her.  In this way, the 
creatures act as warnings to the text’s readers, by demonstrating our 
responsibilities towards the Other, whom we should have invited in. 
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Chapter Three: Naming Monsters 
 
  “Finding oneself deprived of language, one loses the power to name, to 
  name oneself, indeed to answer [répondre] for one’s name” (Jacques 
  Derrida The Animal That Therefore I Am 19). 
 
 
 
 
Introduction: What Do Names Do? 
 
 The following chapter advances the analysis of the “monstrativity” of 
discourse, where I analyse the performative function of the name, a signifier 
that categorises bodies according to kinship but which may also offer a 
descriptive function for the expected behaviour of these bodies.  An analysis of 
naming (bodies) points to the performative abilities of the specific signifier, 
taken within the context of the broader discourse from which it hails.  I assess 
both the function of the name and the act of naming, where the name’s function 
is to categorise the body it refers to according to a social hierarchy.  As I will 
prove in this analysis, this categorisation is conditional of both proper names 
and the various other appellations by which we come to know an individual.  In 
“Aphorism Countertime,” Derrida identifies the aphoristic function of names, 
which is that names are a concise execution of a larger discourse that works to 
reiterate social hierarchy.  Thus, the name does not only stand in for the 
individual it ostensibly represents, but in fact signifies the social standing of the 
individual, indicating his/her legitimacy or lack thereof within such a system.  
This implies that the name, regardless of the intention of the person who utters 
it, also “produce[s] an unexpected and enabling response . . . [it] runs the risk of 
inaugurating a subject in speech” (Butler Excitable Speech 2).  The name’s 
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function thus also raises the question of who has the authority to name the 
bodies of others, underscoring the responsibility involved in giving another a 
name. 
 This chapter specifically examines the term “monster” as an appellation 
for the creatures that populate the texts, Frankenstein and Beowulf,57 continuing 
this examination of the 1818 publication of Frankenstein, as well as two 
translations of Beowulf, Seamus Heaney’s (2000) and RD Fulk’s (2010), to 
explore the supposed monstrosity of the creatures for whom the poem’s scribe 
had no common moniker.58  I pay close attention to the precise names used to 
define Frankenstein’s Creature, which are oddly duplicated as descriptions for 
the creatures in Friedrich Klaeber’s translation of Beowulf, the text translation 
that most students of the poem would have read prior to the publication of 
Heaney’s translation in 2000.  I also give special focus to the apparent 
namelessness of the Creature in Frankenstein and Grendel’s Mother in Beowulf, 
asking why it is that these two figures are deprived of legitimate names.  The 
purpose of this study is to build upon the category of the monstrative by giving 
examples of its effect on creatures who otherwise cannot be named.  Because 
this thesis is concerned with the literary rather than the visual, it is crucial to 
note the constitutive effects of discourse on the literary bodies of these texts.  
Analysing the same effects of the gaze is also important, but because these are 
literary texts, the gaze and its effects are always experienced indirectly by the 
reader, and, as such, cannot be critiqued from the reader’s point of view.  For 
this reason, the bulk of this chapter will focus on naming as a type of discourse 
specifically used for the categorisation of bodies, while the performative power 
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of the gaze will be used to demonstrate that what the gaze names is an 
anamorphic construct that haunts the material body. 
 The gaze plays a particularly important part in Frankenstein, as it is in 
moments of looking, watching, and the return of the gaze, that much of the 
monstrativity and Becoming-monster of these characters’ identities take place.  
In Beowulf, the gaze comes under scrutiny in the poet’s recollected tale of the 
queen, Modthryth, whose violent refusal to be constituted by the gaze allows 
her Becoming-monster to transpire.  In Modthryth’s episode, the poet describes 
the queen as beautiful59 but indisposed to being looked at, so much so that she 
has those who look at her killed for their impertinence.  Monstrosity is thus not 
based on the outward appearance of the texts’ characters but on their 
behaviour, whether that is behaviour considered “inappropriate” by the 
individual performing or by the simple act of looking back and refusing to 
remain the static object of a curious and normative gaze, which is itself conduct 
considered “inappropriate” for certain bodies.  Derrida sums up the correlation 
between naming and the gaze in his comments on the balcony scene of 
Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet, writing that “[t]his drama belongs to the night 
because it stages what is not seen, the name; it stages what one calls because 
one cannot see or because one is not certain of seeing what one calls” 
(“Aphorism Countertime” 425).  Naming bodies, naming the “I,” is fraught with 
the possibility of realising the fissure between signifier and signified.  As I will 
demonstrate in this chapter, the severance of the sign and its signified threatens 
the authority of the Symbolic order and thus the authority of those who wield it; 
this threat emerges no more noticeably than from the appellation, “monster,” 
because it is a sign that always circles back on itself.  I use theories on the gaze 
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to sustain this argument because the implied relationship between signifier and 
signified requires the existence of an observing body, or a collectivity of 
observing bodies that see the signified and make the correlation between the 
material object and the audible mark that identifies it. 
 I start with an analysis of injurious names as a means by which to 
demonstrate the performative force of the name, not just as a constitutional 
effect, but as an act of violence that constitutes through injury and which 
continues to injure because of its constitutionality.  This is a crucial aspect of the 
monstrative, as it explains the process by which monsters symbolically come to 
Be, demonstrating the injury we inflict upon them through the specificity of the 
address, and the abject position which they come to inhabit.  This brings me to 
the monstrosity of the act of naming, where I examine the violence that is 
always already inherent in the name, a sign that is used by others to signify 
one’s body and one’s “I” in a singular sense.  Butler’s analysis in Excitable Speech 
focuses on the violence of hate speech, used with the specific intention to injure, 
where Derrida’s view is that the violence of naming is not within the precise 
historicity of the appellation but that all naming is always already indicative of 
an authority who has the right to bestow names and wield the Symbolic 
according to his needs.  “Nomination is important,” writes Derrida, “but it is 
constantly caught up in a process that it does not control” (“Living On” 67): we 
have no control over the names by which we are known, but, as I determine in a 
later chapter, these names also hold the possibility of severance from the bodies 
they endeavour to fix precisely because of the différance between the mark and 
its object.  The monstrosity of naming is compounded by the naming of 
monsters, which is where this discussion proceeds, where I analyse the specific 
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appellations by which we know the “monsters” of the Beowulf and Frankenstein 
texts, including modern translations of these names.  This analysis leads to an 
investigation of the denial of proper names in both texts, which necessarily 
enquires as to whether the violence of naming is perhaps surpassed by the 
violence of not naming. 
 
The Performative Function of the Name: Butler’s Injurious Speech 
and Abject Identity 
 I pointed out in my first chapter that Butler uses Althusser’s theory of 
interpellation to build a thesis on the performative abilities of naming, which 
she begins in Bodies That Matter and later develops in Excitable Speech.  In 
Bodies That Matter, Butler uses interpellation as an example of the ways in 
which speech constitutes gendered identities, speaking of the “founding 
interpellation” that “shifts an infant from an ‘it’ to a ‘she,’” and which “girls” a 
girl child, where the gendered pronoun is a speech act that constitutes the 
child’s gender, thus constituting the child’s identity according to the 
interpellative call (7-8).  She combines this analysis with the anthropological 
account of kinship structures given by Claude Lévi-Strauss in The Elementary 
Structures of Kinship (1949), which states that kinship structures are based on a 
universal incest taboo and the exchange of women.  Butler uses Lévi-Strauss’ 
observations of primordial kinship structures to point out that women’s names, 
like women’s bodies, are never their own but always that of their father or 
husband: 
   [f]or women, then, propriety is achieved through the exchange of 
  names, which means that the name is never permanent, and that the 
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  identity secured through the name is always dependent on the social 
  exigencies of paternity and marriage.  Expropriation is thus the 
  condition of identity for women (Bodies That Matter 153). 
 
Women’s identities are therefore not their own to govern, because their names 
constitute them as the property of their husband or father. 
 Furthermore, the sign that women’s bodies bear, the name of the father 
or husband, is the sign of the exchangeability of women in patriarchy, where the 
bodies of women “yield to [man] their natural and social value as locus of 
imprints, marks, and mirage of his activity” (Irigaray 177).  Woman, in bearing 
the name, becomes sign.  Butler repeats Irigaray’s stance when she writes that 
“the bride functions as a relational term between groups of men; she does not 
have an identity, and neither does she exchange one identity for another.  She 
reflects the masculine identity precisely through being the site of its absence” 
(Gender Trouble 50).  Butler argues that the signifier that woman becomes 
functions not simply as the reproduction of patronymic bloodlines, but for 
“relations among patrilineal clans [which] are based in homosocial desire . . . a 
repressed and, hence, disparaged sexuality, a relationship among men which is, 
finally, about the bonds of men, but which takes place through the heterosexual 
exchange and distribution of women” (52).  By being the signs of interfamilial 
exchange, women also act as acceptable signs for homosocial bonding.  This is 
precisely how women have come to be seen psychoanalytically as a sign of lack, 
where women bear the Phallic signifier but cannot be in ownership of it; as 
Butler writes, “[a]s the site of a patronymic exchange, women are and are not 
the patronymic sign, excluded from the signifier, the very patronym they bear” 
(50). 
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 The disappearance of the feminine through the exchange of women and 
for the purpose of enacting homosocial bonds means that women, like 
monsters, exist only as signs of something else, “unrepresentable except as 
representation” (Schneider The Explicit Body in Performance 23).  The 
enactment of homosocial bonds through the exchange of women is, moreover, 
the very act by which they find themselves excluded from the status of subject, 
made to exist as a reflection of masculine subjectivity and forced to live in the 
opposing realm of abjection, where “the address constitutes a being within the 
possible circuit of recognition and, accordingly, outside of it, in abjection” 
(Excitable Speech 5).  What is made explicit by this statement is that one’s 
recognisability allows one “a certain possibility for social existence” (2), 
whereas to be unrecognisable as subject means instead to be abject.  Kristeva 
explains that living in abjection means that “[i]nstead of sounding himself [sic] 
to his [sic] ‘being’ [the “I”] does so concerning his [sic] place: ‘Where am I?’ 
instead of ‘Who am I?’” (Powers of Horror 8): abjection is a place, one that is 
outside of the realm of the acceptable, but is also external to recognisability.  
Finding oneself in abjection means finding oneself outside of “the possible 
circuit of recognition,” which is precisely where the creatures of Beowulf and 
Frankenstein find themselves, and this is dramatized by their physical exclusion 
from the realm of men.  
 Butler’s analysis of the interpellative function of the name is diverted in 
Excitable Speech to names that are not proper names but injurious names, used 
in order to inflict injury upon the body described, but which, as Butler deduces, 
also result in the abjection of the identity to whom the speech is directed.  
Although “[t]o claim that language injures . . . is to combine linguistic and 
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physical vocabularies,” Butler gives evidence for the trauma inflicted by words 
by pointing out that “physical metaphors seize upon nearly every occasion to 
describe linguistic injury [which] suggests that this somatic dimension may be 
important to the understanding of linguistic pain” (Excitable Speech 4-5).  What 
this suggests to me is that the “somatic dimension” of linguistic injury is in fact 
integral to the affectivity of naming, making explicit the violence of the act.  
While the proper name includes the identified within a kinship group, it also 
excludes him/her from other kinship groups, performing simultaneously the 
acts of exclusion and inclusion.  Injurious names, on the other hand, perform the 
act of injury by describing the identified within derogatory terms, where “[t]o 
be injured by speech is to suffer a loss of context, that is, to not know where you 
are” (4). 
 Butler shows that the name, proper or not, “is also one of the conditions 
by which a subject is constituted by language” (2), where to be called a name 
gives one “a certain possibility for social existence, [allowing one to be] initiated 
into a temporal life of language that exceeds the prior purposes that animate 
that call” (2).  Proper names sanction one’s “social existence” as inclusive of a 
family group, simultaneously excluding others who do not bear the name.  In 
the utterance of the name, this inclusion and corresponding exclusion is 
reiterated, but is also re-effected by the interpellative function of the name, 
which, as Butler concludes, is inaugural, as interpellation “seeks to introduce a 
reality rather than report on an existing one . . . through a citation of existing 
convention” (33).  Thus, “[o]ne comes to ‘exist’ by virtue of this fundamental 
dependency on the address of the Other” (5), meaning that the performative 
function of the name is to animate the subject into existence according to the 
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Other’s interpretation.  Injurious names which categorise the individual with 
the view to wound thus place this individual in abjection, where 
  [t]o be addressed injuriously is not only to be open to an unknown 
  future, but not to know the time and place of injury, and to suffer the 
  disorientation of one’s situation as the effect of such speech.  Exposed 
  at the moment of such a shattering is precisely the volatility of one’s 
  ‘place’ within the community of speakers; one can be ‘put in one’s place’ 
  by such speech, but such a place may be no place (4). 
 
 That one does “not know the time and place of injury” is, according to 
Butler, precisely what makes the injury happen, even if it is not the speaker’s 
intent to injure: the citational quality of language allows the injury – what is 
performative about such speech acts – to be repeated by each new invocation of 
the term.  Moreover, because injurious speech permits one “to be open to an 
unknown future,” placing one in “a place that is no place,” it demonstrates the 
monstrativity of naming.  Being “open to an unknown future” with regard to 
identity is the condition of being Other to oneself, an Other that is impossible to 
predict.  Being in “a place that is no place,” meanwhile, is the condition of 
abjection, a place that borders “legitimate” society and which acts as a reflective 
surface for the legitimation of this society, as Phelan emphasises when she says 
that “those on the margins become the focal point for the center’s self-
definition” (Mourning Sex 16).  Both unpredictability and abjection are 
formative of monstrosity.  Unpredictability stems from the state of 
unrecognizability, where being Other to oneself means existing in a state of 
being unrecognizable to oneself, which Kristeva writes is the experience of 
“[n]ot me.  Not that.  But not nothing, either.  A ‘something’ that I do not 
recognize as a thing” (Powers of Horror 2).  The state of being unrecognizable to 
oneself is circumstantial of abjection, which “places one haunted by it [the Other 
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that one has become] literally beside himself” (1).  Part of what is monstrous 
about naming is that it creates a multiplicity of the self that is not recognisable 
to the self as s/he thinks her-/himself to be, much as Lacan’s mirror stage splits 
the seeing infant from his feeling self.  This is what is known as becoming Other 
to oneself. 
 
Naming Monsters and the Monstrosity of Naming 
 Derrida makes much of the violence contained within the act of name-
giving in Of Grammatology, pointing out that, first, the forename, while given to 
signify the individual who will bear it, is not unique to that individual, because 
of its repeatability (109).  Secondly, violence is instituted by the Law regarding 
names and naming, which in Western culture is the contagion of the surname, 
passed down, like genetic material, from each generation to the next, through 
the legitimation of the masculine by feminine exchangeability (112).  The 
proper name is, thirdly, violent because of the singularity it imposes on the “I” 
(which, itself, is a signifier that imposes singularity), and, fourthly, because it is 
a singularity not chosen by the “I” who bears it (Of Grammatology 112 and The 
Animal That Therefore I Am 32).  The name is monstrous because it constitutes 
the “I” as a singularity that it cannot in fact Be, because it constitutes according 
to the appellation, which decides the fate of the “I” by the outward signs and 
gestures of the body, and, which therefore makes the “I” Other to herself.  The 
propriety of the proper name also (re)aligns us by blood, insisting on our 
allegiance and responsibility to our kin prior to any other person, making the 
proper name crucially undemocratic.  The discrimination of the Other is 
intrinsic to proper names, which, in Frankenstein, is dramatized by 
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Frankenstein’s rejection of the Creature he brings into the world.  Violence and 
monstrosity are therefore already present in the proper name, before names 
are used with the explicit intent to injure. 
 The violence of specific appellations is dependent upon meaning, where 
“[t]he name carries within itself the movement of a history that it arrests” 
(Butler Excitable Speech 36).  Butler clarifies this statement, explaining that 
  [i]f we understand the force of the name to be an effect of its historicity, 
  then that force is not the mere causal effect of an effected blow, but 
  works in part through an encoded memory or a trauma, one that lives 
  in language and is carried in language.  The force of the name depends 
  not only on its iterability,60 but on a form of repetition that is linked to 
  trauma, on what is, strictly speaking, not remembered,61 but relived, 
  and relived in and through the linguistic substitution for the traumatic 
  event” (36). 
 
Because the injury is carried through what is re-membered, responsibility for 
the injury inflicted is “linked with speech as repetition, not as origination” (39).  
The injurious name does not just inflict the bearer with the trauma of past 
events, but categorises her according to the description of that name.  In the 
next chapter, I demonstrate this through an analysis of the injurious and 
constitutional effects of the name “Butterfly” in David Henry Hwang’s play, M. 
Butterfly; for now, however, I focus on the term “monster” as a name that is 
strangely categorical of the uncategorical, as well as an appellation that, due to 
its inability to categorise, also acts injuriously. 
 To recapitulate, “monster” stems from the Latin monstrum, meaning 
portent, omen, or prodigy, with the verbs monere, to warn, presage, or advise, 
and monstrare, to reveal, or show, at its base.  As corporeal manifestations of 
warning and revelation, monsters arrive on the edges of imagination as pure 
signifiers, signifying nothing but their own monstrosity.  Literary monsters 
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reiterate this embodiment of indication by incarnating the “yet to come” of 
identity: because “monster” always means “sign,” it always points to the fact 
that it is not indicative of anything but sign.  Monsters are a bodily 
manifestation of différance, continually differing and deferring their content.  In 
this sense, monsters challenge the Structuralist corollary of signifier and 
signified, because there is no signified to which the sign can refer, and, as such, 
they dramatize the gulf between the Symbolic and the Imaginary orders.  
“Monster” therefore does not categorise a specific nomenclatural group, but is 
used as a “third-term supplement” for miscellaneous anomalies (Cohen Monster 
Theory 6-7).  What groups creatures under this taxonomy is their 
unrecognizability and their utter segregation from the Symbolic order: 
“monster” categorises the uncategorisable, simultaneously categorising it as 
uncategorisable.  What I mean by this is that “monster” is a supplement for the 
name, a term used to signify its anomalousness, which, in its use as an 
appellation, paradoxically inaugurates the anomalousness of the body that it 
categorises. 
 By virtue of its uncategorisability, the monster also embodies the 
performative acts of promising and threatening: because the monster 
dramatizes the “to come” in its appellation, it is always already indicative of 
something else, which is precisely why births that were considered monstrous 
were treated with both suspicion and wonder, as I have already demonstrated.  
It is in their very resistance to categorisation that monsters come to embody the 
performative acts of promising and threatening, by literally Becoming-sign.  
Moreover, their inability to be categorised is doubled by the inability of 
“monster” to categorise: “monster” is a blanket term for beings that are 
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unrecognisable and thus uncategorisable.  While the performativity of monsters 
lies in their embodiment of the threat and the promise, the monstrativity of 
monsters is in their embodiment as signs.  Literally embodying the inauguration 
of the “I” into the Symbolic order by simultaneously confounding this order, the 
monster is “unrepresentable except as representation” (Schneider 23) and is 
thus made monster by such a resistance to categorisation: “monster” is 
monstrative.  The appellation “monster” is, however, far from being on its own 
in this regard, as the history of any repeated mark, such as the injurious name, 
may also make the Other a sign of the unrecognizable, which is precisely what 
monstrous figures are, hence the monstrativity of injurious speech. 
 As Butler has demonstrated in Excitable Speech, injury is carried over in 
the name’s historicity; it can thus be extrapolated that the performative force of 
monstrativity is carried by the name in the same manner in which injury is 
passed from the mouth of the speaker to the body of its victim, which is through 
the repeated utterance of the specific appellation.  Thus, in M. Butterfly, the 
name “Butterfly,” which carries with it the injurious force of Orientalist 
discourse, constitutes the body of the one who bears it according to a 
subjugating Western gaze, which, in turn, makes that body into a recognizable 
sign of Otherness.  Of the anomalous creatures in the Frankenstein and Beowulf 
texts, only one has a proper name, Grendel, while he, his Mother, and 
Frankenstein’s Creature are known by various other appellations, none of 
which can be said to be “proper.”  What often groups Grendel, his Mother, and 
the dragon (the “monsters” of the Beowulf text) together for a modern audience 
is their common taxonomical status as æglæca, 62 a term which has already 
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come under much scrutiny by Beowulf scholars, and for which the translation 
has proved exceptionally challenging.   
 The twentieth-century Anglo-Saxon scholar, Friedrich Klaeber translated 
æglæca as meaning, among other descriptive terms, “wretch,” “monster,” 
“demon,” and “fiend,” (Beowulf and the Fight at Finnsburg 298), while Heaney 
has translated æglæca as “monster” when speaking of Grendel and the dragon 
(433, 816, 1269, 2534, 2557, 2905),63 and “demon” (646), “creature” (739), and 
“fiend” (1000) when speaking of Grendel.  Fulk translates æglæca as 
“troublemaker,” where Grendel’s Mother is referred to as “female 
troublemaker” in 1259.  Andy Orchard also points out that the term is used of 
Beowulf himself in 2592 (Pride and Prodigies: Studies in the Monsters of the 
Beowulf-Manuscript 33).  I return to a detailed analysis of Klaeber’s translation 
of æglæca at a later point in this chapter, but for now, I concentrate on its use as 
an appellation that must have meant something specific for these particular 
beings to be assembled under.  What confounds this reading is that Grendel, his 
Mother, and the dragon are not the only figures to be grouped under the 
appellation æglæca: not only is the text’s hero, Beowulf, referred to by this 
name, but the poet also relates the tale of the renowned warrior, Sigemund the 
dragon-slayer, also describing him as æglæca (893).  Beowulf is also not the sole 
source for æglæca: Orchard shows that the eleventh-century scholar, 
Byrhtferth, refers to Bede, author of the Historia ecclesiastica gentis Anglorum 
(The Ecclesiastical History of the English People), and thus one of England’s most 
important early historians as “se æglæca lareow” in his Enchiridion (qtd. in 
Orchard 33:66).  Klaeber’s translation of æglæca as “wretch,” “demon,” 
“monster,” and “fiend” is unfitting, as this explanation cannot possibly describe 
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the venerable teacher.  It must be noted, however, that these are only the first 
four terms Klaeber’s glossary gives as translations of æglæca, stating that these 
are “used chiefly of Grendel and the dragon,” following these interpretations 
with “warrior” and “hero” for Beowulf and Sigemund.  How can one be both 
“monster” and “hero”?  Unless Beowulf, Sigemund, and Bede are all monsters in 
the classical Hollywood sense of the term, or Grendel, his Mother, and the 
dragon are comparable in some way with Beowulf, Sigemund, and (I think, most 
perplexingly) with Bede, then Klaeber’s translation is simply not sufficient. 
 Many scholars have accounted for this translation by pointing out that 
the heroic warriors, Sigemund and Beowulf, demonstrate a form of monstrosity 
themselves.  Orchard notes that “Beowulf fights monsters because only then is 
he well-matched.  When he does face human champions, like the Frankish 
Dæghrefn, his methods are distinctly inhuman, one might almost say 
monstrous; Dæghrefn is simply crushed to death” (32-3).  How, then, does this 
account for Byrhtferth’s depiction of Bede?  Perhaps it is simply for his 
fierceness, or his formidable nature: certainly, one of Orchard’s translations of 
æglæca is “formidable one” (33).  Described by Orchard as monstrous for his 
outrageous physical strength, Beowulf is perhaps pronounced as æglæca 
because of his prodigious and anomalous strength, but also because he arrives 
like a monstrous birth in Grendel’s Mother’s mere, following this initial 
incursion with a second monstrous arrival in the dragon’s lair.  Grendel’s 
monstrosity is contagious: it moves from him to his Mother to Beowulf himself, 
and its contagion is dramatized by the act of intrusion and the moniker æglæca.  
This monstrous contagion is not assimilated by the Scyldings or by Beowulf and 
his men, but instead assimilates them.  Some critics, Tolkien among them, have 
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noted Beowulf’s progression from defender to interloper, where Grendel’s 
monstrous intrusion has infected the Geat, and which is underscored by the 
appellation æglæca: Beowulf is referred to as æglæca in those moments where 
he arrives like a Derridean event on the territory of those he wishes harm.  
Episodes of Beowulf’s characterisation as aglæca occur at 1512, where Fulk 
describes Beowulf as a “troublemaker” and Heaney as a “gallant man” during his 
descent to the mere, and in 2592, where Beowulf and the dragon are referred to 
as ða aglæcean, which Fulk translates as “the troublemakers” and Heaney as 
“the fierce contenders.” 
 Æglæca itself has become monstrous, as its resistance to translation 
means that it currently exists as pure signifier, without an object or a body to 
which to refer.  Those bodies that are signified by æglæca also come to exist as 
sign, being named as such, and thus become monstrous themselves – at least, 
for a modern audience that cannot properly translate the term.  While Klaeber 
translated æglæca first as “monster,” he probably meant it in its modern sense, 
but it is striking that its very untranslatability brings the term and those who 
bear it back to the Latin roots of “monster,” indicating its own 
demonstrativeness, its unrepresentability “except as representation” 
(Schneider 23).  The resistance of æglæca to translation, its present existence as 
pure signifier, also reveals the curious inability of monstrosity to function as 
anything other than sign.  Æglæca shares its resistance to meaning with the 
Latin monstrum, which has at its base the verb monstrare, meaning to show, 
reveal, or advise.  Each of these translations circle back to monstrosity; each 
translation reiterates the fact that the monster cannot be represented, because 
it exists as pure symbol.  This curious circularity is compounded by the addition 
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of the prefix de-, which, according to the OED, “has the function of undoing or 
reversing the action of a verb” or means to be down from, off, away from or 
aside from the verb it precedes: however, while, the addition of de- to the verb 
“activate” means its exact opposite, the Latin demonstrare has precisely the 
same meaning as monstrare. 
 The proximity of my chosen appellation for the monstrative to the 
adjective “demonstrative” (coming from the verb “to demonstrate”), while 
strangely coincidental, has also been significantly useful in the development of 
this category, having led me to an investigation of the meaning of monstrare and 
demonstrare.  Monstrosity always refers back to itself, where to be a monster 
means being pure sign, one that signifies one’s inability to be categorised by the 
existing Symbolic order.  Those that are named “monster” exist in this way until 
the prevailing order is mutated to accommodate the intelligibility of the 
monster, while those that are named incorrectly or injuriously become Other to 
themselves, become monstrous by being a sign of Otherness.  If naming creates 
categorical boundaries, social hierarchy, inclusion in and exclusion from kinship 
groups, if it injures through repetition, Others, and makes the Other other to 
herself, what effect, then, does the lack of naming have?  
 
(Not) Naming the Monsters of Beowulf and Frankenstein  
 As I pointed out earlier, the only monstrous creature in either 
Frankenstein or Beowulf to have a proper name is Grendel.64  Much scholarship 
(such as Orchard’s) has focused on the meaning of both “Grendel” and 
“Beowulf” as a means by which to explicate their behaviour, especially given 
that early cultures would have often named their children according to meaning 
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or to kinship groups rather than what is pleasing to the ear; this analysis, 
however, concentrates on those creatures without proper names, Grendel’s 
Mother and Frankenstein’s Creature.65  Grendel’s Mother does not have her own 
name; she is known by her description as the mother of a monster, and thus as a 
monster herself.  However, as Gillian Overing indicates, she is not the only 
woman in Beowulf to go without a name: of the eleven women mentioned in the 
text, only five have their own names while the rest are referred to as someone’s 
wife, mother, or daughter (Language, Sign and Gender in Beowulf qtd. in 
Dockray-Miller 85:123).  Mary Dockray-Miller concludes that the omission of 
women’s names from the text reinforces the masculine economy of the poem’s 
Anglo-Saxon audience, where the names of these women are insignificant 
because their deeds are of no consequence to their phallocentric society 
(Dockray-Miller 85).  Grendel’s Mother, who, along with these women, has no 
name of her own, is in no way secondary to the text’s plot progression: even 
Hildeburh, whose tale is used only as a relational tool for the poet’s rhetoric, has 
a name, but, unlike Grendel’s Mother, she is not monstrous. 
 Grendel’s Mother is arguably the most important female figure in the 
text, yet she has no name of her own and is known instead by her relation to the 
first monster that terrorises the men of Heorot.  In addition to this, in what has 
become one of the most influential essays on studying the literary elements of 
the poem (particularly its monsters), J. R. R. Tolkien entirely omits Grendel’s 
Mother from his focus on the monsters in “The Monsters and the Critics”.  
Writing at a time when the Beowulf text was studied primarily for its historical 
value, Tolkien was among the first to underline the importance of the text’s 
monsters to understanding the fears of Beowulf’s Anglo-Saxon audience, yet, in 
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his analysis of these monsters, he utterly neglects any reading of Grendel’s 
Mother, focusing instead on Grendel and the dragon.  While this suits Tolkien’s 
comparison between a young Beowulf who defeats an invading foe and an 
ageing Beowulf who becomes an occupying force and, while this reading is by 
no means ill-fitting, his disregard of Grendel’s Mother means that the change in 
Beowulf’s character is overlooked, as are the textual elements that constitute 
this change.66 
 That Grendel’s Mother is known by this appellation and that Tolkien 
neglects even mentioning her in his article is indicative of the enduring 
entrenchment of the phallocentric project, which either casts women’s lives as 
appendices to those of men or enacts their total disappearance from its 
narrative.  Indeed, what makes Tolkien’s analytical omission of Grendel’s 
Mother perplexing is that her episode lasts from lines 1255-1644, taking up 
over one-eighth of the text.  Moreover, as Jane Chance points out, this episode 
takes place at the very centre of the poem and is preceded by poetic narratives 
concerning most of the other women featured by the poem’s larger narrative or 
mentioned as part of the narrative context (“The Structural Unity of Beowulf: 
The Problem of Grendel’s Mother” 157).  Chance explains that by placing 
Grendel’s Mother at the centre of the poem, after the recollected tale of 
Hildeburh and the depiction of Wealhtheow’s anxiety for her sons, the poet is in 
fact urging a comparison between Grendel’s Mother and the other mothers in 
the text (157).  Grendel’s Mother is contrasted with Wealhtheow, and 
particularly with Hildeburh, because her actions are unbefitting of a woman 
within the context of the poet’s community. 
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 The human mothers in the text exist as symbolic indicators of ideal 
motherhood, and by extension, ideal femininity.67  That Grendel’s Mother is 
known by the signifier “Grendel’s Mother” demonstrates her inability to be read 
as anything other than the sign of motherhood, where her maternal body 
signifies the etymological root of “monster” as demonstration, warning, portent, 
precisely because mothers’ bodies possess the possibility of further 
monstrosity.  But what is it that Grendel’s Mother warns us of?  One reason 
perhaps for structuring Beowulf with Grendel’s Mother’s episode at the centre, 
as Chance suggests, is to emphasise the correct course of action for an aggrieved 
mother of a slain warrior, where we are also regaled with the tale of Hildeburh’s 
grief at the feud between her birth family and the family she has married into.  
Unlike Hildeburh, who loses both her uncle and her son, Grendel’s Mother 
behaves “inappropriately” for an aggrieved mother by avenging the son that 
Beowulf has killed.68  Dockray-Miller makes the assertion that Hildeburh’s son 
may have died in a similar manner to Grendel, also having his arm severed from 
his shoulder, which would give further textual evidence of the distinction we 
should make between Hildeburh’s acts and those of Grendel’s Mother, who, in 
contrast with Hildeburh, seeks revenge for her son’s death (99).  By so doing, 
Grendel’s Mother acts as an exemplum for Anglo-Saxon women by 
demonstrating the aberrance of a woman who retaliates for the deaths of her 
kinsmen, where “[f]or a mother to “avenge” her son as if she were a retainer, he 
were her lord, and avenging being more important than peace-making, is 
monstrous” (Chance 159). 
 By putting her son on the same funeral pyre as her uncle, thereby 
symbolising the coming together of two feuding families in grief (1114-7), 
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Hildeburh’s maternal performance is exemplary, while Grendel’s Mother’s 
revenge demonstrates the embodiment of a masculinity forbidden her by her 
biological sex.  As Dockray-Miller puts it, “Grendel’s Mother is “doing” revenge, 
but she does it wrong.  Her femininity, her maternity, her monstrousness . . . all 
impede her supposed heroism as she avenges her son’s death” (93).  Grendel’s 
Mother is monstrous because she performs her gender “incorrectly,” but she is 
also monstrous because she literally embodies the consequences of this 
performance, at least in the text’s extant translations, which have made a 
monster of her.  Her monstrosity is further indicated by the lack of a proper 
name: while the signifier “Grendel’s Mother” articulates the reason for her 
monstrosity (her deviant maternal performance) it also serves to exclude her 
from the realm of men, who each have proper names and the names of their 
forebears to locate them within a familial group.  The only family that Grendel 
and his Mother have are each other, while their ancestry harks back to Cain and 
his monstrous offspring.  They are excluded from Heorot, not only because they 
are border-wanderers,69 but because they are named as such, kinsmen of the 
outcast Cain and strangers to the world of men. 
 Referring to Grendel’s Mother in this way is not just a reiteration of her 
exile but part of what creates the conditions of her exclusion from Heorot: she is 
a monster because she is called a monster.  Overing’s emphasis on the omission 
of women’s names from the text, where they are instead referred to as wives, 
mothers, and daughters of men, questions what this might mean for Grendel’s 
Mother, whose identity rests on the fact that she is known only as mother, and a 
bad one at that.70  If the address “constitutes a being within the possible circuit 
of recognition, and, accordingly, outside of it, in abjection” (Butler Excitable 
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Speech 5), then calling Grendel’s Mother by this name means that she can only 
be recognised in her status as mother; everything else about her is 
unrecognisable, and thus she enacts the sign of monstrous motherhood.  This 
“incorrect” performance of motherhood makes her completely unrecognisable, 
because she defies the laws that insist she perform in one way and not the 
other, which places her outside of the “possible circuit of recognition . . . in 
abjection,” and in monstrosity (5). 
 Grendel’s Mother is also not the only woman in the text to behave 
inappropriately; Modthryth, who, like Grendel’s Mother, is offered in contrast to 
the other women of the text, is represented as “sinfrea,” sinful, for her refusal at 
being looked at.  Using Overing’s point that the higher-born women of Anglo-
Saxon England would have been regarded as “gold-adorned queens who 
circulate among the warriors as visible treasure” (qtd. in Dockray-Miller 85: 
130), Dockray-Miller argues that Modthryth rebels by violently repudiating her 
status as object by having those who dare look at her executed.  Much of the 
scholarly analysis on Modthryth concentrates on what Dockray-Miller refers to 
as “shrew taming” (80), where the scholarly consensus is that after marrying 
Offa, Modthryth becomes a “good” queen.  However, as Dockray-Miller has 
illustrated, Modthryth “specifically gesohte, sought, Offa’s hall [and] . . . [o]nce 
there, she is in gumstole, on the throne, not walking among the warriors serving 
them drink” (86).  Unlike Freawaru and Hildeburh, Modthryth is not a 
commodity to be exchanged, the freoðuwebbe or peace-weaver whose marriage 
to the enemy ensures peace between feuding families.   
 Her rejection of her status as commodity is also indicated by her extreme 
distaste in being looked at and thus her refusal to be objectified in a culture that 
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sees her as nothing else.  Kristeva reminds us that the abject “can be grasped 
only as a sign.  It is only through the intermediary or representation, hence a 
seeing, that holds it together” (Powers of Horror 46, her emphases), which 
signifies the abject state of a body that is understood only as object.  That 
Modthryth rejects this economy, prohibiting her exchange as commodity by 
choosing her own husband and murdering those who dare look at her, signifies 
an autonomous sovereignty that would be more fitting for a man, at least 
according to the culture in which she finds herself.  By acting like a man, 
Modthryth performs her gender incorrectly and is thus another example of 
feminine monstrosity in the text.  Furthermore, her refusal to be looked at could 
also be read as a rejection of the monstrous feminine, where her demonstration 
as object is invalidated by her refusal to become said object.  Grendel’s Mother’s 
monstrosity has a definite function – to warn Anglo-Saxon women of the 
dangers inherent in performing a masculinity forbidden to them – but 
Modthryth repudiates this functionality, refusing to even conform to the 
monstrosity she should embody. 
 Although Modthryth is a mother, Dockray-Miller states that she is not 
maternal, explaining that “ . . . she is textually separated from her son, who is 
defined as Offa’s son rather than hers” (87).  Dockray-Miller sees this textual 
severance of the child from his mother as an unkindness on the part of the poet; 
I view it as a reinforcement of Modthryth’s monstrosity, of her inability to be 
forced into a monolithic reading of femininity and thus as a site of possibility, an 
embodied promise for later generations.  If the abject must be jettisoned from 
the Symbolic, the world that is structured by sign and language, then it seems 
that Grendel’s Mother fulfils the obligations of the abject through her death, 
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being thrust from the world of the living.  Modthryth, however, seems to be fully 
integrated into this society of men – she has her own name, she is clearly 
defined within the Symbolic category of feminine royalty – but her very 
existence in the text suggests a phallocentric interpretation of her masculine 
behaviour as event-ful and anomalous. 
 Dockray-Miller also seeks to reclaim a Symbolic identity for Grendel’s 
Mother that does not rest on her kinship to Grendel, by referring to her, as the 
poet does in 1506 and again in 1599, as the Sea-wolf (seo brim-wylf).  Instead of 
reading this as a description of Grendel’s Mother’s prowess in battle, Dockray-
Miller chooses to regard the appellation as a proper name that lends Grendel’s 
Mother more autonomy than merely being known as a monster’s mum, claiming 
that “just as the humans Beowulf and Eofor have names derived from animals, 
so might she have an animal epithet or name that suits her fierceness in 
defending her home” (94).  As tempting as it is to give Grendel’s Mother an 
autonomous identity through the appellation Sea-wolf, this would then mean 
that we would have to also know her by further descriptive terms by which the 
poet portrays her, which include “slaughtering spirit” (wæl-gæst 1331, trans. 
Fulk), her and Grendel as “alien spirits” (ellor-gæstas 1349, trans. Fulk), and the 
famously problematic ides aglæc-wif (1259), which Fulk translates as “lady, 
female troublemaker.”  While Dockray-Miller gives a convincing argument for 
renaming Grendel’s Mother the Sea-wolf, asserting that the appellation 
functions as a name due to its uniqueness in the Beowulf text, we would then 
also have to treat Grendel and Frankenstein’s Creature with the same courtesy, 
calling them by the various other descriptions afforded them in each text (94). 
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 This is particularly pertinent in the case of Frankenstein’s Creature, who 
is known only by the expressions of disgust with which Frankenstein assaults 
him, where the most neutral appellations by which we come to know him are 
“creature” and “being.”71  The most common names Frankenstein calls his 
creation are, coincidently, precisely the same descriptive terms Klaeber uses to 
translate æglæca: “monster,” “demon,” “wretch,” and “fiend.”  It would seem that 
while the Beowulf poet means us to link Grendel, his Mother, and the dragon 
thematically through “aglæca,” Klaeber’s translations would have us interpret 
these creatures in the same manner in which Frankenstein views his creation.  
It is uncertain that what Klaeber means by “monster” is as broad as its 
etymology; he may have only meant “monster” in its modern sense.72  A closer 
look, however, at the etymology of the three further names may serve as a way 
to better understand (certainly) how Shelley meant for us to interpret the 
monstrosity of Frankenstein’s Creature and (perhaps) what the poet meant for 
us to realise in the three monstrous creatures Beowulf faces in the epic. 
 In the 1818 edition of Frankenstein, the term “fiend” occurs as an 
interpellative description of the Creature twenty-five times; “monster” occurs 
twenty-four times, demon (or dæmon) nineteen times, and “wretch” eleven 
times.73  The OED defines “fiend” as “enemy,” from the Old English feond 
(“Fiend,” def. 1):  Grendel and his Mother are both described as “God’s enemy,” 
“Godes andsacan” and “Godes andsaca” (786, 1682) and as the “enemy of 
mankind,” “feond man-cynnes” (164, 1276), and Frankenstein often refers to his 
creation as “my enemy” (127, 139, 140, 143, 144 (twice), 145, 151).  “Fiend” 
constructs the creatures as Other to the texts’ protagonists, making opposing 
forces of them.  In the case of Beowulf, the Othering of Grendel and his Mother 
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signifies not only their enmity to Beowulf, or even to the men of Heorot, but to 
all humankind.  Furthermore, by way of the description, “God’s enemy,” Grendel 
and his Mother are featured as opposing any human conception of goodness, 
where the appellation places them in a binary system of good and evil.  In such a 
system, the description of the creatures as “fiend” or “enemy” of the 
protagonist, of humankind, and, above all, of God, means that they are 
constructed as agents of evil.  In their representation as the enemies of God, 
Beowulf’s subjugation of the creatures ensures that they are “exorcised from 
the right order of things and sent to some sort of Hell.  ‘Our’ order is identified 
with the sacred over against a diabolically monstrous chaos” (Timothy Beal 
Religion and its Monsters 6).   
 By the same token, after destroying the Creature’s would-be bride, 
Frankenstein claims that his reasons for doing so are because he is afraid that 
the Creatures will procreate and thus forge a new species that will become the 
enemy of humankind:  
  Even if they were to leave Europe, and inhabit the deserts of the new 
  world, yet one of the first sympathies for which the dæmon thirsted 
  would be children, and a race of devils would be propagated upon the 
  earth, who might make the very existence of the species of man a 
  condition precarious and full of terror (Frankenstein 114). 
 
The name “fiend” is aphoristic of the discourse that both inaugurates and 
supports the claim that the creatures in both texts are enemies and must be 
treated with violence.  It is thus also monstrative, because it enacts and ensures 
their rejection from the society of men, which, in turn, makes the creatures 
living signs of their Otherness and enmity to humanity.  However, Orchard 
points out that what obfuscates this binary code is that in lines 2287-9 of the 
poem Beowulf is referred to as feond, while the dragon is described as “the 
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stout-hearted one” (stearcheort, Orchard 30, his translation).74  While it stands 
to reason that if the dragon is Beowulf’s enemy then Beowulf is the dragon’s – 
the term signifying a binary system – that Beowulf is named “the foe” and not 
“his foe” (that is, the dragon’s) means that he, too, is Othered by the description.  
Orchard builds the case that it is because of the reversal of invaders that 
Beowulf becomes known by this appellation, because he is now the interloper 
and not the defender against intrusion that he is “the foe,” which raises the 
question whether it is by performing the part of the unwelcome guest that one 
becomes a monster (30). 
 Cast as the fiend from whom the dragon must defend his home, Beowulf 
undergoes the process of Becoming-monster, which Braidotti states is a 
deconstructive step “across the boundaries that used to separate qualitatively 
self/same from others” (Metamorphoses 119).  For Braidotti, this process “is not 
about signification, but rather the opposite: it is about the transcendence of the 
linguistic signifier,” a transcendence which is enabled by the inability of the sign 
“monster” to signify anything but itself (119).  The other signifiers that are used 
to describe the creatures in Beowulf and Frankenstein further indicate their 
monstrosity, for reasons that only each specific signifier can point to.  In the 
case of the appellation, “fiend,” their monstrosity is in their enmity to man, 
which sets the creatures and the world of men against one another within a 
binary logic.  This name is monstrative because it constitutes those who bear it 
as sign, a sign that is specifically one of difference.  It must also be noted that 
while Frankenstein christens the Creature with the name “fiend,” cementing his 
monstrosity through binary difference, Grendel and his Mother are given the 
appellation indirectly, through Klaeber’s translation of aglæca.  Grendel is, 
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however, referred to as “fiend” (feond) several times by the poet, in 102, 143, 
279, 725, 962, 970 and 1273, which is perhaps one of the reasons Klaeber 
adopted this term as a convenient translation.  The creatures’ monstrosity is, 
furthermore, contagious, as it mutates the men with whom they come in 
contact, and this is illustrated by the name’s movement from Grendel to 
Beowulf, once Beowulf becomes the aggressor.  “Fiend” is also only one of four 
repeated appellations by which we come to know the creatures in both texts; as 
I pointed out earlier, after “fiend,” the three most common names for 
Frankenstein’s Creature, echoed by Klaeber’s translation of aglæca in Beowulf, 
are “monster,” “demon,” and “wretch.”  As I have already considered the myriad 
meanings of “monster” and its pertinence to this thesis, I will move on to a 
discussion of “demon” and “wretch” and their importance to our understanding 
of the creatures in these texts. 
 The name, “demon,” which appears nineteen times in the 1818 edition of 
Frankenstein, is derived from the Greek daimon, which the OED describes as a 
“supernatural being of nature intermediate between that of Gods and men; an 
inferior divinity, spirit, genius (including the souls or ghosts of deceased 
persons, esp. deified heroes)” (“Demon,” def. 1a).  Frankenstein’s Creature 
certainly fits the description in terms of his physical strength: he is of “gigantic 
stature” (Frankenstein 48), he moves at “superhuman speed” (65) and he is 
“capable of scaling the overhanging side of Mont Salêve” (49), like an inverse 
Hercules.  The Creature is not quite human in his abilities or stature, yet neither 
is he divine, as his enmity to Frankenstein and mankind therefore ensures his 
enmity to the divine.75  That he relates himself to Milton’s Satan is further 
indication of this interstitiality, as Satan, a former angel and, thus, a former 
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divine being, has been cast out of Heaven and is now the enemy of God.  The 
Creature’s liminal state is also indicative of his monstrosity, as it specifies the 
multiplicity of his identity.  Lorenzo Lorenzi points out that “[t]he demon was 
an indeterminate power, whereas a god was a completed individual”: to be 
complete means to be one or the other, not fragmentary of both categories (qtd. 
in Kearney 31:50). 
 Graham Allen demonstrates that the Creature’s ambivalence is further 
symbolised by his actual physical makeup in that he is not merely a corpse 
brought to life, but is instead created from the combined remains of both human 
and animal bodies (“Jacques Derrida and Monsters” 3): 
  I collected bones from charnel houses; and disturbed, with profane 
  fingers, the tremendous secrets of the human frame.  In a solitary 
  chamber, or rather cell, at the top of the house, I kept my workshop of 
  filthy creation . . . [t]he dissecting room and the slaughter-house 
  furnished many of my materials . . . (Frankenstein 32, my emphasis). 
 
The Creature’s body is not merely a sutured patchwork of human remains, but 
is a hybrid form of human and animal parts that come from both “charnel 
houses” and the “slaughter-house.”  Anne K. Mellor is therefore mistaken when 
she writes that “Mary Shelley saw the creature as potentially monstrous, but 
she never suggested that he was anything other than fully human” (Mary 
Shelley: Her Life, Her Fiction, Her Monsters 63).  Because the Creature is 
hybridised, he is, by definition, a monster.  Basing his work on the Aristotelian 
law of non-contradiction, Allen writes that “we do not normally expect a human 
being also to be a dog, or a cat also to be in some way a fish.  Even if all human 
beings, all dogs and all cats are hugely different, there are, we would want to 
say, limits beyond which species cannot cross” (2).  Yet, he explains, much of 
our DNA is shared with those very animals from which we would like to differ 
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ourselves, where “[n]inety-nine percent of our genome is shared with 
chimpanzees” (2: qtg. Jamie Shreeve).  Through language, we make animals our 
Other, performatively constituting them as something outside of humanity, 
where the very definition of “inhuman” spells out what we expect from 
ourselves as well as what we expect of our Others: inhuman, meaning “destitute 
of natural kindness or pity; brutal, unfeeling, cruel” (“inhuman” def. 1a) .  As we 
share so much on a cellular level, animals are also literally in-human: what 
constitutes our bodies also constitutes theirs, and the gulf that separates us 
Symbolically is largely made up of words. 
 As a body that is made from both animal and human parts, 
Frankenstein’s Creature is dangerous not only because his body includes parts 
of the animal Other, but because it is “a form suspended between forms that 
threatens to smash [the] distinctions” between the superior human and the 
inferior animal (Cohen 6).  Hybridity reflects “a human preoccupation with 
retaining mastery over the animal kingdom,” refusing to acknowledge that 
humans form part of that kingdom (Christopher Dell 115).  Similarly, in being 
constituted as “demon,” the Creature is not only a human-animal hybrid, but a 
hybrid force of good and evil, somewhere between divinity and monstrosity: the 
very liminality of his position further constitutes the Creature as monstrous as 
he becomes by this definition undefinable.  Allen believes that this hybridity is 
symptomatic of the Creature’s humanity, where to be human means to be 
always already divided in oneself: 
  [l]ike the De Laceys in relation to the wider human society, the 
  creature, reading Goethe’s Werter, finds himself ‘similar, yet at the same 
  time strangely unlike the beings concerning whom I read, and to whose 
  conversations I was a listener’. If human beings are essentially 
  ambivalent, a mixture of good and evil, rational and yet irrational, 
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  virtuous and yet corrupt, then this sense of being ‘similar’ and yet 
  ‘unlike’ is in fact an accurate impression.  You cannot simply be like 
  creatures who are so radically divided within themselves, since there is 
  not a singular essence or characteristic to uncomplicatedly resemble or 
  from which to differ (Mary Shelley, original emphasis, qtg. Frankenstein 
  27-8:86). 
 
However, I find that human hybridity is symptomatic of our monstrosity, rather 
than the other way around.   This view opens the possibility not just for the 
comprehension of monsters but for our assimilation by them.  By being 
uncategorisable events, monsters change the shape of the world in order to be 
understood: their hybridity challenges order and thus calls Symbolic difference 
into question and we become hybrid because they are hybrid.     
 Frankenstein’s Creature physically embodies the ambivalence of the 
human psyche in his very genetic makeup, reminding us that as human animals 
we are also always already genetically Other, down to the very cells from which 
we are built.  Allen points out that perhaps this is why Frankenstein uses so 
many monikers to describe the Creature, even as he simultaneously refuses him 
a legitimate proper name: because the Creature is not “one” means that he 
requires many names to describe his multiplicitous identities (“Jacques Derrida 
and Monsters” 4).  Refusing the Creature a proper name means that 
Frankenstein does not view him as a legitimate member of the community of 
men; indeed, his actions in the novel confirm his complete disregard for the 
Creature’s place in society, and clearly demonstrate the objectification of the 
scientific gaze.  That Frankenstein instead chooses to address the Creature with 
a series of appellations that are tantamount to abuse76 illustrates the 
taxonomical difference with which Frankenstein desires to separate himself 
from the Creature.  However, his assorted use of names and of “demon” 
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challenges the binary code he imagines to divide himself from the Creature, as 
this points to the multiplicity of the Creature’s identity: in a binary system, One 
is separate from Other, the Other cannot already be Other to himself.   The 
deconstruction of this binary by signifier also reveals that Frankenstein’s 
identity is also always already Other: the Creature’s monstrosity rubs off on him 
and he becomes aghast at the former self that so willingly wrought the Creature 
in the first place.  The hybridity of the “I” is further demonstrated by a second 
definition of “demon”: the OED also defines “demon” as a spirit, usually of the 
deceased, something that returns to haunt the living.  The Creature, whose body 
is comprised of the decomposing flesh of the dead, certainly haunts the living 
Frankenstein, and he does this literally, by following him to the ends of the 
earth and, metaphysically, through Frankenstein’s fear of what he may have 
unleashed upon the world.  Although the Creature is composed of the dead, 
Frankenstein’s alchemy makes him a living being, and one whose bodily 
existence is by its very composition abject: “[t]he corpse, seen without God and 
outside of science, is the utmost of abjection” (Powers of Horror 4). 
 He is, however, made incorporeal by the designation “demon,” and this is 
further compounded by the other appellations by which Frankenstein refers to 
him, including “spectre” (37) “spirit” (49) and “vampire” (49).  These 
descriptions of his ghostliness, as well as his patch-worked body, make him a 
hybrid mix of corporeality and incorporeality, which Kristeva writes is a 
condition of abjection: “[e]lusive, fleeting, and baffling as it is, that non-object 
[the abject] can be grasped only as a sign.  It is through the intermediary of a 
representation, hence a seeing, that holds it together” (46, original emphases).  
As I have said before, to be a monster means existing as sign, monstratively 
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manifested through combined performative forces.  Here, Kristeva views 
representation constructed solely by the gaze, but representation is also 
produced by discourse, where names, proper or not, are aphorisms of the larger 
discourse that serves to classify bodies according to a patriarchal and 
heteronormative hierarchy. 
 The ambiguous mix of corporeality and immateriality that is written 
across the Creature’s body is also manifested in the descriptions given to 
Grendel and his Mother in Beowulf.   Heaney’s translation of the lines of the 
poem in which we first encounter Grendel reads: “Grendel was the name of this 
grim demon haunting the marches, marauding round [sic] the heath and the 
desolate fens” (Heaney 102-4, my emphasis).  This translation, while not 
necessarily inaccurate, takes certain liberties by adding the concept of haunting 
through the description of Grendel as ghost.  Untranslated, this line reads: “wæs 
se grimma gæst Grendel haten, mære mearc-stapa, se þe moras heold, fen ond 
fæsten” (102-4).  Here, the poet names Grendel a “grimma gæst,” which can be 
literally translated as “grim ghost.”  Heaney instead refers to Grendel as a “grim 
demon” whose ghostliness is signified through his haunting.  What is more, 
“gæst” also means “spirit,” a term that is used as an appellation for God, as in 
“holy spirit,” as well as meaning “guest” (hence the modern similarity between 
“ghost” and “guest”).  Neither of these uses signify haunting in the sense in 
which Heaney has used it. 
 That they are specifically marches that Grendel haunts in Heaney’s 
translation is important, as well as being a particularly clever rendition of the 
original meaning.   Grendel’s monstrosity is not reduced to mere ghostliness in 
this line (translated or not), and this is because of his positioning: Grendel is a 
133 
 
“mearc-stapa,” a “march-stepper” or a “border-wanderer.”  The marches that 
Heaney retains in his translation are border lands, lands that lie in a state of 
liminality with regard to the laws of men, because borders are areas that in 
Anglo-Saxon England remain regions of disputed ownership (Noetzel 107).  
Grendel therefore wanders in areas that are lawless, slinking around the edges 
of the map, neither belonging to the world the Anglo-Saxons inhabit nor to the 
world of their enemies.  Heaney’s interpretation is not inappropriate, as it is not 
the translation that first calls the corporeality of Grendel into question: the 
poet’s description of Grendel in these lines is “grimma gæst” (102) and both 
Grendel and his Mother are referred to as “gæst,” “ellor-gæstas” (as in 1349) or 
“ellor-gast” (as in 807).77  Both creatures, it would seem, take the form of 
immaterial spirits, ghosts or apparitions.  We also know, however, that both 
Grendel and his Mother have material bodies, as Beowulf fights both of them in 
physical combat and because both of them can be and are eventually killed by 
Beowulf.  Andy Orchard writes that “[w]hat bursts into Heorot is not a 
nightmare, but a monstrous terror made flesh” (37), suggesting that while 
Grendel certainly embodies the stuff of nightmares, he is also corporeal.  
Through the various descriptions of Grendel and his Mother and the 
borderlands they inhabit, it can be established that they are neither and both 
material bodies and immaterial spirits, which places them between ontological 
categories.  That they are also referred to as demons in both translations of the 
text (Heaney’s and Fulk’s) means that they are further constructed as 
ambivalent creatures whose ontological status remains liminal. 
  Finally, the term “wretch,” which Frankenstein uses to define his 
creation and which Klaeber uses as a translation of aglæca also has its roots in 
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Old English: “wretch” comes from the Old English, wrecca, which, as well as 
describing an unfortunate person, also means “[o]ne driven out of or away from 
his native country; a banished person; an exile” (OED, def. 1).  That Grendel and 
his Mother are located as “mearc-stapan” (1348), those who wander the 
borders of legitimate realms, is because they are exiled from these territories by 
virtue of their inability to assimilate.  These creatures cannot be assimilated by 
Anglo-Saxon society because of their Otherness, which is explained in part by an 
early depiction of Grendel as one of “Caines cynne” (107) or “among the race of 
Cain” (trans. Fulk), the very same Cain who committed the first murder in the 
Old Testament.  According to the book of Genesis, Cain’s punishment for killing 
his brother is that he is banished to the land of Nod to forever wander the 
desert in atonement for his crime.  For an Anglo-Saxon audience, the idea of 
exile is worse than death,78 first because while there can be honour in death 
there is none in banishment, and also because the focus of heroic life is on the 
mead hall (Hugh Magennis Images of Community in Old English Poetry 35). 
 The mead hall forms the centre of the community, both physically and 
conceptually (Magennis 35-6): it is where the warriors feast after battle, their 
king distributing gifts to those who have fought valiantly (as in Beowulf lines 
80-1, 491-8, 611-28 and 991-1250 especially) and, it is here that the expected 
roles of young men and women are communicated through song and poetry.  
The mead hall symbolises the heart of the Scylding community, so when 
Grendel (and, later, his Mother) attacks the hall (Heorot) he is in fact attacking 
everything this community stands for.  As I already pointed out, in each battle 
that Beowulf fights the interloper is subverted, until it transpires that Beowulf 
himself becomes the trespassing foe who “steadily shifts from a primarily 
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defensive role to an aggressive one” (Orchard 29): while Grendel seeks carnage 
by intruding upon Heorot, his Mother only intrudes to avenge her son; Beowulf 
then becomes the interloper when he pursues Grendel’s Mother to her own lair 
and again when he encroaches on the dragon’s cave.  To become the intruder is 
to become the exile, where the exile is the unwelcome guest par excellence.  The 
intruder is never welcome and his/her place is always on the outside, looking in 
at what s/he cannot have or be a part of. 
 For Grendel and his Mother, that essentially means not being a part of 
the known world; for Beowulf it (eventually) means death, which is itself not a 
part of the known world.79  Grendel and his Mother are also excluded from the 
men of Heorot taxonomically, which means that they only have each other, and 
no mead hall with songs and stories regaling their heroic feats, no loving lord to 
give them riches, no freoðuwebbe to hand them cups of mead, and, significantly, 
no male authority to guard them from Beowulf’s attack.  In an earlier chapter I 
discussed Jeffrey Jerome Cohen’s analysis of Grendel’s pain at hearing the music 
coming from Heorot: this pain, as Cohen explains, is derived from his exclusion 
from the hall and what it represents –family and companionship.  In 
Frankenstein, the Creature is also excluded from companionship, but specifically 
from having family, others of his kind.  Because of this, he is effectively in exile, 
since, like an exile, he has no-one with whom to relate his experiences (Allen, 
for example, reads the text(s) of Frankenstein as the profound desire for 
friendship80).  The Creature is also banished from the realm of humanity for, 
although he may resemble us, his stature frightens any humans he encounters 
in the novel, including Victor’s younger brother, William, who becomes the 
Creature’s first victim (Frankenstein 45). 
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 Writing Frankenstein in the wake of the French Revolution and as a 
student and inheritor of both her parents’ idealised visions of the future, 
Shelley’s novel questions the role of responsibility in friendship and kinship, or 
the brotherhood (fraternité) that was expressed by followers of the Revolution.  
David A. Hedrich Hirsch explains that the kind of “[m]etaphorical brotherhood” 
that was expressed by advocates of the Revolution is dangerous because it 
“threatens to dissolve the naturalness of literal, descent-based concepts of kith, 
kin, and kind,” demanding of humanity equal treatment for strangers as for 
family (“Liberty, Equality, Monstrosity: Revolutionizing the Family in Mary 
Shelley’s Frankenstein”118).  This means that the unwelcome guest must now 
be welcomed with open arms, whether or not s/he poses the possibility for 
eating one out of house and home, or, more ominously, of actually imbibing 
his/her host.  Shelley’s novel epitomises the deep ambivalence of this 
democratic model of hospitality by presenting us with the arrival of such a guest 
and the repulsion with which he is treated upon his arrival into the world of 
men.  Frankenstein also eventually comes to embody the wretchedness of the 
exile, as his pursuit of the Creature for the deaths of William, Henry, Justine, and 
Elizabeth leads him far from the company of humanity.  That he imposes exile 
upon himself during the period in which he constructs the Creature is curious, 
because it is suggested that he actually shirks the company of his peers, 
preferring to keep his own company: “ . . . the same feelings which made me 
neglect the scenes around me caused me also to forget those friends who were 
so many miles absent, and whom I had not seen for so long a time” 
(Frankenstein 33).  Creating the Creature finally ensures the fulfilment of this 
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wish, as his family and companions are either killed by the Creature or die from 
natural causes (his mother from illness and his father from a broken heart). 
 Exile and exclusion are also not limited to the “monsters” in Beowulf.  
Orchard points out that Beowulf is also “described as a ‘wretched and solitary 
figure’ (earm anhaga, line 2368), a term which might have well been used of 
Grendel, the ‘wretch’ (earmsceapan, line 1351) twice described as a ‘solitary 
traveller’ (angenga, lines 165 and 449)” (Pride and Prodigies 32).   The 
wretchedness of Grendel, and thus of Beowulf, is attributed by Orchard to their 
loneliness and singularity; both Grendel and Beowulf are remarkably different 
from the men of Heorot, which is precisely what makes one a hero and the other 
a monster, and which is why we remember their names.  Fulk translates the 
description for Grendel, “angenga” (165 and 449), as “loner,” while Heaney 
takes a more poetic route and writes that Grendel’s conflict with the Scyldings is 
a “lonely war” (165), and that if he wins in his battle with Beowulf, Grendel will 
feed on Beowulf “alone” (449).  While Orchard describes Grendel as a “wretch” 
(earmsceapan 1351), Fulk writes that he “trod the paths of exile” and Heaney 
that he “moves beyond the pale.”  What each translation agrees upon is that 
Grendel is a solitary figure who wanders the heaths. 
 
Conclusion 
 The impression we are left with of the creatures in Beowulf and 
Frankenstein, whether due to authorial intent, creative interpretation, or the 
loss or change of meaning of words, becomes more complex on a closer 
inspection of lexical choice (authorial or translatory).  Where, at first, their 
monstrosity seems taxonomic or biological, what it fact makes Grendel, his 
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Mother, and Frankenstein’s Creature monstrous is that they are linguistically 
constituted in this way.  The speech acts that make up the monsters’ “names” 
act more as categories than familial signifiers, and, certainly in Shelley’s 
Creature’s case, while perhaps only arguably in the case of Grendel and his 
Mother, are intended to indicate their exclusion from humanity.  Most 
interestingly of all, particularly with regard to its significance to this thesis, is 
the circularity of the term “monster,” which, using Cohen’s phrase, acts as a 
“third-term supplement” to temporarily designate the as yet unnameable 
(Monster Theory 6-7).  No other term in the English language seems to function 
as this kind of “stand-in” or supplement for something we do not yet have a 
name for.  What is equally remarkable is the monster’s ability to mutate that 
which it comes in contact with, so that it might assimilate rather than be 
assimilated: where we might monstratively constitute the monster, s/he, in 
turn, will mutate into Becoming-monster.  The following two chapters are case 
studies that exemplify the monstrativity of linguistic and bodily acts in its 
relation to the contagion that is our Becoming-monster through literature. 
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Chapter Four: “Butterfly” and the Monstrous 
Orient: David Henry Hwang’s M. Butterfly 
 
Introduction: The Monstrative and David Henry Hwang’s M. 
Butterfly 
 Premiering in Washington, DC in February of 1988, David Henry 
Hwang’s play, M. Butterfly, was written in response to a real-life case of 
mistaken gender identity, retelling the story of French diplomat, Bernard 
Boursicot’s affair with Chinese opera singer and spy, Shi Pei Pu, who, after more 
than 40 years, was revealed to be a man.  In its retelling of the affair, M. Butterfly 
demonstrates the intensity of monstrative (speech) acts, which have the power 
to create monsters because of their basis in self-perpetuated mythologizing, but 
which also provides a model for their deconstruction.  The play is closely based 
on the Boursicot-Shi affair, presenting the tale of French diplomat, Rene 
Gallimard and his tryst with Chinese actor, Song Liling, who exploits Gallimard’s 
feeble grasp on reality in order to spy for communist China.  The real-life events 
that led to the trial and incarceration of both Boursicot and Shi in 1986 have 
never been fully disclosed by either party and have compelled followers of the 
trial to wonder what it was that made Boursicot believe that Shi was a woman 
for the twenty years that their affair lasted.  In the play’s notes, Hwang explains 
that he realised almost immediately what it was that Boursicot thought he had 
found in Shi, and that was the living embodiment of Madame Butterfly (author’s 
notes 86), the titular character of Giacomo Puccini’s famous opera (1903). 
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 M. Butterfly combines the narratives of the opera and the Boursicot-Shi 
affair not just to explain how and why Boursicot could be so easily manipulated 
by the Chinese spy but to deconstruct the monstrative forces that created the 
fiction with which he had been duped.  This chapter examines these forces in 
order to develop the category of the monstrative, demonstrating that there are 
various types of acts that can be named monstrative because of their 
performative ability to create monstrous Others.  The particular monster that I 
examine in this chapter is the fictional character, Butterfly, who was first given 
“body” by Puccini’s opera81 and who is embodied by the play’s two protagonists.  
Butterfly is monstrous because she is a sign of Oriental Otherness, which means 
that I start this chapter with an analysis of a specific type of monstrative 
discourse, that which Edward Said names “Orientalism.”  Explaining how 
Orientalism is monstrative, that its discursive use is a performative act that 
creates monsters, I show that it is a discourse that relies on the gaze and 
recognisability in order to work, which itself is based on a binary system always 
already in motion.  This analysis paves the way for a close examination of the 
particular names that the bodies in the play come to embody, where these 
names are aphoristic of the larger discourse of Orientalism and thus the power 
relations between those who are named and those who have the power to 
name. 
 This leads to a detailed analysis of what the name does in its utterance: it 
is, as I have already shown in an earlier chapter, constitutional, but in the 
utterance of a name that is not “proper” or “legitimate,” it can also inflict the 
bearer with linguistic injury.  This argument thus develops the conceptual 
slippage between linguistic and bodily injury that was initiated in the last 
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chapter and which Butler examines in Excitable Speech, where I analyse not just 
the ability of words to wound but the ability of physical injury to act as 
discourse, to have as its raison d’être the constitution of the Other through 
injury.  I continue to use M. Butterfly as a textual example of monstrative acts, 
demonstrating that monstrative acts do not only take a linguistic form but are 
also manifested as physical violence, where both kinds of acts have the same 
effect on identities.  From this, I will turn to an inquiry as to how the 
monstrative acts in the play are deconstructed, where I assess the structural 
flaw of both performative and monstrative acts and which, in turn, deconstructs 
the binary that Austin inaugurates between “serious” and “non-serious” acts.  As 
such, I argue that the “unhappy performatives” that Austin dismisses for their 
“failure” to properly enact the intended performative, while not producing the 
intended act are not unproductive either.  Thus, I explore what is created by 
those acts in the play that Austin would see as “miscarriages,” and how these 
acts may be used to deconstruct the phallogocentric, heteronormative, and 
racist premises of monstrative discourse.  Furthermore, because M. Butterfly is 
a play, it is already a form of discourse that Austin would find to be “non-
serious,” which means that the production of performative acts in the play, 
whether or not they perform the intended act, irrupt Austin’s distinction by 
having effects in the “real” world.  This means that the “miscarried” 
performatives in the play affect bodies outside the play. 
 One of the ways that bodies are affected (or infected, if you will) is 
through the moment of the monstrous birth of the self that Gallimard enacts by 
becoming Butterfly, which, I will argue, is analogous to the moment of 
recognising the anamorphic image.  As I argued in my first chapter, recognising 
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the anamorphic image for what it is rather than what it appears to be requires a 
shift in perspective, so that the viewer literally puts him-/herself in the position 
of the object to properly see it.  The moment of recognition is a birth of the self, 
as the viewer becomes the object by changing his/her position.  In M. Butterfly, 
the monstrous anamorphic image is Butterfly, who Gallimard must Become in 
order to finally see Song for who he really is, a man who manipulated him with 
the intent to dominate him in every way possible.  The anamorphic image is a 
compelling metaphor for the moment of realisation of the self-as-Other, because 
its operation rests on the constitutional properties of the gaze.  This is part of 
the reason for choosing M. Butterfly as a textual example of the monstrative, as 
the gaze, while playing a crucial part in the sexualisation of the female image for 
the purposes of feminine subjugation, is also of fundamental importance to the 
constitution of a feminized Oriental Other.  The anamorphic image is thus an 
important visual metaphor for the development of the monstrativity of the 
constitutional gaze, as it explains how the gaze creates monsters. 
 
Orientalism and the Monstrativity of Discourse and the Gaze 
 As Hwang explains in his notes following the play, Boursicot’s apparent 
confusion with regard to his lover’s anatomy stemmed from “the fact that he 
had never seen his ‘girlfriend’ naked” (Notes 85).  A New York Times article 
quotes Boursicot’s own admission of “his sexual misidentification of Mr. Shi,” 
stating that “Mr. Boursicot said their meetings had been hasty affairs that 
always took place in the dark.  ‘He was very shy,’ Mr. Boursicot said.  ‘I thought 
it was a Chinese custom’” (“France Jails 2 in Odd Case of Espionage”).  Hwang 
writes that “this is not a Chinese custom, that Asian women are no more shy 
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with their lovers than are women of the West . . . [and] that Bouriscot’s [sic] 
assumption was consistent with a certain stereotyped view of Asians as bowing, 
blushing flowers” (Notes 85).  M. Butterfly points out the flaw in this logic by 
critiquing the West’s relationship with the East, demonstrating that the concept 
of a gender binary does not merely mirror the power dichotomy of Occident 
and Orient, but is played out in tandem with it, so that the East comes to 
symbolise femininity and the West masculinity.  There is, therefore, a history of 
the East being set up as delicate, submissive, and mysterious, an enigmatic 
“nature” for Western science to discover, where the West has concurrently been 
portrayed as strong, dominant, and rapacious.  The play’s “female” lead, Song, 
demonstrates this in 3.1, stating that the West’s masculinity is symbolised by its 
“big guns, big industry, big money.”  At the same time as subverting these 
binaries, Hwang also problematizes the simplicity implied by the gay/straight 
binary, emphasising that there is much more to the performativity of desire 
than genital reality.  The subversion and obfuscation of opposite pairs is also 
underlined by textual form, as theatre necessarily stages the layered meanings 
of the verb “to act.”  From its opening pages, then, the play draws one’s 
attention to the combination of binary pairs and the discourse that is used to 
inaugurate and perpetuate their economy. 
 A large part of this discourse is what Edward Said refers to as 
“Orientalism,” a “style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological 
distinction made between ‘the Orient’ and . . . ‘the Occident’” (Orientalism 2).  
Such a distinction takes the form of binary pairs, like those between other 
ontological categories, male/female, gay/straight and so on.  Said writes that 
this distinction is the initial point at which discourse on “the Orient” is formed 
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(2), discourse that has as its focus the descriptive constitution of “the Orient,” 
which makes Orientalism a “Western style for dominating, restructuring, and 
having authority over the Orient” (3).  This domination and authority works 
through discursive practices that hinge on difference, much as narratives 
concerning women’s roles have used gender difference as a starting point from 
which to launch the detailed inauguration and perpetuation of feminine 
subordination.  Orientalism is a discourse, one that perpetuates the political 
subservience of “Oriental” countries and the dominance of Western cultural 
constructions of the East as a geographical, cultural, and political space.  In his 
end notes, Hwang explains that he uses the term ““Oriental” specifically to 
denote an exotic or imperialistic view of the East” (85), which signifies a 
category that has been created from outside the cultural and geographical 
spaces this discourse determines, and that it is wielded by a violent Western 
authority.  Iain Chambers explains that the constitutional discursive practices of 
imperialism were fuelled in part by “the spreading power of writing secured 
through the rise of the mass medium of print,” writing which assured its 
authority through a “self-assured tone, critical distance and academic or 
‘scientific’ neutrality . . . that purports to describe and explain the world [and 
which] flowed without interruption towards meaning” (“Signs of Silence, Lines 
of Listening” 47). 
 What is more, Orientalist discourse works in tandem with the gaze, 
which Said corroborates when he writes that the “Orient” is one of the West’s 
“deepest and most recurring images of the Other” (Orientalism 1, my emphasis).  
The “Orient” is an image fabricated from disparate Asian aesthetic objects, 
including stylized artwork and everyday cultural artefacts, as well as the flora 
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and fauna native to the “Orient.”  Each of these objects, plants, and animals, as 
well as the ethnic features of “Orientals” build a tableau of images that 
perpetuate the narratives of exoticism, adventure, and danger posed by 
Orientalism, serving as a further constitutional tool of this discourse.  In his 
guiding notes to the play, Hwang suggests that for future productions of the 
play the set and costumes should reflect this aesthetic: “[w]e in the West have a 
certain ‘vision of the Orient’ which revels in exotica and lush beauty . . . it seems 
to me more subversive to present this chinoiserie in its full glory, and then to 
question the reasons for the audience taking pleasure” (90).  The kind of 
pleasure that Hwang mentions here is scopophilic, pleasure that fetishizes 
according to the gaze, and which, in turn, is intertwined with an Orientalist 
narrative that constitutes this aesthetic not just as exotic and alluring, but as 
shy, submissive, intuitive, and quasi-magical. 
 Hwang requires his audience to question the scopophilic satisfaction that 
they derive from watching the play, not merely to recognise the imperialist 
discourse that the play deconstructs, but to understand the interweaving of 
various discourses of power that are at play within Orientalism.  What I mean 
by this is that Orientalist discourse does not only classify according to race or 
ethnicity, but, because it is articulated by authorities that already have 
patriarchal power, as well as having had economic and technological 
advantages that their various colonies in the Far and Middle East did not have,82 
Orientalism combines discourses of racial superiority with misogyny and 
heteronormativity.  Orientalism is thus not only racist, in that it presupposes a 
hierarchical “value” for ethnically diverse groups, but is also phallogocentric, 
patriarchal, and heteronormative.  The interdependency of authoritative 
146 
 
discourses is entrenched in the historicity of the metaphorical associations 
between racist, sexist, and heteronormative discourses, which is played out in 
the various repetitions the characters of M. Butterfly embody.  Hwang achieves 
this by simply exchanging the material sex expected of the bodies playing 
masculine and feminine parts.  In an earlier chapter, I analysed Grendel’s 
Mother masculine performance in Beowulf; that I could do so rests on the 
assumption that gender exists as a binary, where masculinity and femininity are 
opposing styles of identity practice.  If we employ Butler’s characterisation of 
gender as a distinct style of identity practice that does not hinge upon biological 
sex, that certain features can be considered feminine or masculine is decided on 
according to material markers and thus encoded in practice.  To name an act 
masculine, then, does not mean that the act necessarily follows from a 
biologically male body; that I name Grendel’s Mother’s act of vengeance 
“inappropriately” masculine is because the binary of masculine/feminine has 
traditionally followed from the binary male/female, where masculine is to male 
as feminine is to female. 
 Both Gender Trouble and Bodies That Matter explain that stylistic 
practices that have been encoded as masculine or feminine are arbitrarily 
selected to mirror various bodily realities, so that women come to be seen as 
naturally nurturing and caring because they carry and deliver children, and men 
come to be seen as protectors because of their physical strength.  That either 
sex can successfully embody attributes considered masculine or feminine is 
clearly demonstrated in M. Butterfly, not only by the acts of Song Liling, who 
purposefully pretends to be a woman in order to gather intelligence from the 
play’s European protagonist, but that this protagonist, Rene Gallimard, is cast as 
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feminine by the various events that happen to him in the play.  Compounding 
the subversion of feminine and masculine acts is the destabilization of the 
West/East boundary, where the feminization of the “Orient” is not only 
deconstructed by the play’s concluding acts but is actively made fun of.  For the 
play to mock the feminization of a racial or ethnic group means that certain 
structures need to already be in place: the feminine must always already be a 
sign of difference and one that is treated as abject, while paradoxically regarded 
with suspicious awe and set up as an object of desire.  As I pointed out in an 
earlier chapter, this contradiction is based on women’s capacity to produce 
children, where their fecundity has been viewed as both magical and dangerous, 
requiring careful regulation through bodily discipline and the creation of 
discursive parameters. 
 The historicity of racial feminization has furthermore complicated the 
binary categories of masculine and feminine, so that men and women in 
different racial and ethnic groups are made to embody extreme versions of 
gendered attributes according to the rhetorical purpose that animates their 
social existence.  Asian men are thus feminized by their comparison to 
European men, but are represented as hypersexual and dangerous to white 
women, especially, as Ann Laura Stoler writes, “during real and perceived crises 
of control” (“Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power: Gender, Race, and Morality 
in Colonial Asia” 21).83  As Stoler points out, the “analytic slippage between the 
sexual symbols of power and the politics of sex . . . was more than just a 
convenient metaphor for colonial domination; it was . . . a fundamental class and 
racial marker implicated in a wider set of relations of power” (15).  The “wider 
set of relations of power” to which Stoler refers includes gender, the oldest, 
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most entrenched binary hierarchy that has come to be used as a metaphor for 
race relations.  Sau-ling Wong writes that “[e]thnicity is, in some sense, always 
already gendered, and gender always already ethnicized” (qtd. in Wong and 
Santa Ana “Gender and Sexuality in Asian American Literature” 171: 126):  
while I agree with the first part of Wong’s statement that racial power relations 
hinge upon an already established gender binary, stating that gender is always 
already ethnicized is problematic because the subject first comes into contact 
with an Other who may differ sexually but does not differ ethnically.84  While 
Orientalist representations have cast Asian men as either effeminate or 
dangerously hypersexual, Asian women, particularly East Asian women, have 
been portrayed either as submissive beauties or aged, nagging wives, where 
appellations such as “lotus blossom” and “dragon lady” perpetuate these 
depictions (Wong and Santa Ana 185).  In the following section, I analyse some 
of these appellations to demonstrate the monstrativity of this discourse, but for 
now I make explicit the monstrativity of Orientalism itself. 
 Orientalism is clearly a monstrative discourse, one that works in tandem 
with the gaze to denote Asian bodies as signs of Oriental Otherness.  These 
bodies become signs of the Orient by way of recognisable ethnic and cultural 
markers, which makes the existence of “Orientals” possible “not only by virtue 
of being recognized, but, in a prior sense, by being recognizable” (Butler 
Excitable Speech 5, her emphasis).  While the gaze ensures the recognisability of 
Oriental Otherness, Orientalism equates this recognisability with narratives of 
“natural” subservience, so that recognisable aesthetic features become signs of 
this clearly fictional stereotype.  However, the pervasiveness of Orientalist 
discourse is also unmistakable, which is precisely why Gallimard believes 
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Song’s masquerade in the play, and why the real-life Boursicot believed that Shi 
Pei Pu was a woman for almost forty years.  The signs of Oriental 
submissiveness, femininity, and mystique that M. Butterfly plays on are that of 
Butterfly herself, and, the use of “lotus blossom” as an appellation 
representative of Asian femininity. 
 
“I am your Butterfly”: Naming the Oriental Monster 
 The stereotypes of Asian femininity that the play repeats exemplify the 
use of an Asian aesthetic that is interwoven with Orientalist discourse, an 
interweaving that solidifies the interdependence of the gaze and discourse as 
constitutional forces.  The aesthetic that stereotypes such as “lotus blossom” 
and “dragon lady” conjure is of Eastern exoticism, which, through language, is 
intertwined with the twin discourses of fetishism and peril.  “Lotus blossom,” in 
particular, signifies what Said refers to as a “detailed logic” that is “governed not 
simply by empirical reality but by a battery of desires, repressions, investments, 
and projections” by the West (Orientalism 8).  The name denotes Asian 
femininity not only because lotus flowers are beautiful and delicate (and thus 
Asian women should be beautiful and delicate) but because the history of 
Chinese patriarchy is carried by this name and affords the one who uses it with 
the same power by subjugating the one who is named.  As Butler writes in 
Excitable Speech, the use of the name, one that is not proper, is “not a 
momentary happening, but a certain nexus of temporal horizons, the 
condensation of an iterability that exceeds the moment it occasions” (14), 
where “lotus blossom” condenses a history not just of naming Asian women but 
of centuries of physical trauma inflicted on Chinese women’s bodies.  While this 
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is not immediately obvious to those unfamiliar with Chinese cultural practices, 
the fact remains that “lotus blossom” carries with it the violence of Chinese 
patriarchal control by condensing its history for practicing foot binding, the 
effects of which were often referred to as “lotus feet” for imitating the shape of a 
lotus flower bud.   
 Reaching its height in popularity during the Song Dynasty,85 foot binding 
resulted in the severe deformity of women’s feet and a lifetime of pain and 
disability, but became popular because it decreased foot size, as well as making 
Chinese women sway and hobble in a fashion that was considered desirable by 
Chinese men.  Importantly, foot binding also signified class status, as only richer 
families could afford the loss of a daughter’s physical labour.  Bound feet thus 
came to represent an ideal form of femininity, because it not only signified an 
upper class sexual fetish, but the submissiveness and obedience of these prized 
brides, as a woman with “lotus feet” was unable to run away from either her 
father or her husband and was therefore literally imprisoned within her own 
home.  The term “lotus blossom” has thus come to imply the submissiveness 
and obedience thought to be a “natural” state of Chinese women, and of all East 
Asian women for their ethnic similarities and the Western propensity to 
confuse and conflate “Oriental” cultural practices.  The colonial control of the 
Far East by European imperialism in the nineteenth century resulted in the 
exchange of one patriarchy by another, so that Asian women became the 
fetishized objects of white men’s desires.  The use of “lotus blossom” to denote 
the fetishized bodies of Asian women has thus become aphoristic of imperialist 
discourse in that it signifies the movement of property from one centre of 
control to the other, but is also aphoristic of patriarchal discourse because it 
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signifies the concept of women as property, especially the highly prized fetish 
that Asian women’s bodies came to be. 
 The term is used twice in M. Butterfly, first in 1.8 by Song, when she 
describes the economy of Asian women’s bodies in imperialist China, and then 
by Toulon, Gallimard’s boss, in 2.3, when he learns of Gallimard’s affair with 
Song.  Both instances in which the term is used suggest that Asian women are a 
commodity prized by European men: in 1.8, Song explains that although 
Chinese men were not allowed into European clubs in imperialist China, 
women, “especially . . . delicate Oriental wom[e]n” were permitted entry 
because they were desired by European men.  “Could you imagine it 
otherwise?” she asks of Gallimard, “Clubs in China filled with pasty, big-thighed 
white women, while thousands of slender lotus blossoms wait just outside the 
door?  Never.  The clubs would be empty” (Song 1.8).  The sexual 
commodification of Asian women’s bodies is inextricably tied to the perception 
of their “natural” subordination to men in the use of the name “lotus blossom,” 
which is precisely what Hwang implies through its use in the play.  In 2.3, 
Toulon uses “lotus blossom” to congratulate Gallimard for “keeping a native 
mistress” who “must be gorgeous,” before consulting with Gallimard for his 
“inside knowledge” on the Chinese position on Vietnam.  As such, Gallimard’s 
perceived ownership of Song makes him, in Toulon’s eyes, an authority on what 
the Chinese think – an irony that is not lost on the play’s audience who know 
that the Western conflation of this apparent Chinese subordination with a 
Vietnamese desire to “submit to a greater force” is vastly mistaken.  “Lotus 
blossom,” while already injurious for bringing with it the violence associated 
with the guaranteed subordination of Asian women by Asian men, is made 
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doubly injurious in its adoption by Western control that already feminises the 
East.  “Butterfly,” on the other hand, is a name that reiterates the inauguration 
of Asian women’s subservience to Western men in a move that is 
simultaneously misogynist and imperialist. 
 The importance of the construct “Butterfly” to the play is signified not 
just by its title but by the play’s parodic representation of Asian exoticism, 
surrender, and obedience to Western maltreatment in Puccini’s opera, Madama 
Butterfly (1907).  “Butterfly” is a specifically Orientalist concept that, while not 
created by the opera, is perpetuated by its (continued) popularity, where 
Puccini bases his portrayal of Eastern femininity on a Western perception of 
“natural” Asian subservience.  In Puccini’s opera, Cio-Cio-San, or “Butterfly,” is 
purchased by the American sailor, Benjamin Franklin Pinkerton, who abandons 
her and their infant son; arriving back in Japan years later with an American 
wife, Pinkerton takes the child from Butterfly, who kills herself in disgrace.  M. 
Butterfly subverts this narrative arc by ending with the suicide of the disgraced 
Gallimard, who has been conned by Song into thinking that his lover is a woman 
who has also given birth to “their” son.  Gallimard first meets Song during a 
private performance of the opera’s death scene, during which Song plays 
Butterfly.  Gallimard tells her that he finds her performance “utterly convincing” 
because “it’s the first time [he’s] really seen the beauty of the story,” explaining 
that he thinks of Butterfly’s death as “a pure sacrifice.  He’s [Pinkerton’s] 
unworthy, but what can she do?  She loves him . . . so much.  It’s a very beautiful 
story” (Gallimard 1.6).  The “purity” of Butterfly’s sacrifice can only transpire 
because she is specifically an Asian woman; when Song suggests a reversal of 
the racial binary, the “purity” of the sacrifice sounds utterly ridiculous: 
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  SONG.  Consider it this way: what would you say if a blonde 
   homecoming queen fell in love with a short Japanese businessman?  
   He treats [her] cruelly, then goes home for three years, during which 
   time she prays to his picture and turns down marriage to a young 
   Kennedy.  Then, when she learns he has remarried, she kills herself.  
   Now, I believe you would consider this girl to be a deranged idiot, 
   correct?  But because it’s an Oriental who kills herself for a Westerner 
   –ah! –you find it beautiful. (1.6) 
 Song’s pronouncement foreshadows the eventual “sacrifice” that 
Gallimard will come to embody at the play’s close, where, in place of a “blonde 
homecoming queen,” the white, Western man becomes the “Butterfly” who kills 
himself for the love of a cad.  Thus, the play narrates Gallimard’s metamorphosis 
into “Butterfly,” which is animated by a complex layering of monstrative forces 
hinged upon the monstrosity of the Oriental Other.  “Butterfly” is a construct 
that reiterates the Orientalist assumptions of Puccini’s opera, which is that 
Asian women, and, by extension, all Asians, are naturally submissive, both 
sexually and politically.  M. Butterfly reiterates the narrative of Oriental 
submissiveness in its punishment of Gallimard, simultaneously recasting the 
white Westerner into the feminised role of “Butterfly,” and it achieves this 
through the use of various monstrative forces that are usually applied to Asian 
bodies.  Orientalist discourse of Asian subservience is condensed in the name 
“Butterfly,” but it is not the only monstrative force at work in the perpetuation 
of this ideology: in order to make Gallimard “Butterfly,” he needs first to be 
feminised.  I will shortly examine the other monstrative forces at work in the 
play that constitute Gallimard as Butterfly, where now I want to turn briefly to 
Song’s embodiment of the ubiquitous character, which he dons in order to 
manipulate Gallimard. 
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 That Song can play at being Butterfly is precisely because the foundation 
of Western racial misogyny is already laid down; as Song quips during the trial 
scene, “ . . . being an Oriental, [means he] could never be completely a man” 
(3.1).  The feminization of the “Orient” is so entrenched in the Western cultural 
imagination that it takes very little effort from Song, who is already an actor, to 
convince Gallimard that he is the “perfect woman.”  The plausibility of Song’s 
performance rests on this cultural construction as well as on the fact that the 
play is based on the very real life situation that the Boursicot-Shi trial brought 
to light.  What this construction depends on, as Song points out in the trial 
scene, is that Asians are always already feminized by the Western imagination, 
which is precisely why both Song and Shi could “get away with” their 
performances.  However, Song does not embody Butterfly the same way that 
Gallimard comes to by the end of the play; Song is able to discard Butterfly once 
the purpose of his enactment has been fulfilled, which means that in his 
conscious performance of the character he never really embodies her to begin 
with.  He does, however, realise that it is only in this incarnation that he is able 
to seduce Gallimard and thus gain the information he requires for his espionage, 
where this incarnation is an extreme version of the feminine “virtues” Gallimard 
desires in a woman.  The point is that Song never becomes Butterfly, even if that 
is how Gallimard and the audience see him to begin with, because we only see 
him like this to begin with precisely because of the monstrativity of Orientalism. 
 By the play’s close, the audience come to realise that Butterfly is an 
unrealistic construct, albeit an enduring one, and that the use of her name to 
describe Asian women is not only monstrative, in that it constitutes them as the 
sign of Asian subservience and Western dominance, but is also injurious, 
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because of the linguistic and physical violence that it takes to ensure Western 
dominance.  “Butterfly” is violent not because it restates Western dominance 
but because it performatively (re)enacts the violence of this dominance, where 
it “carries within itself the movement of a history that it arrests” (Butler 
Excitable Speech 36).  The name (Butterfly) is an aphorism of the history of 
Western dominance and violence, but, because this history has been 
documented by the West, the “‘pain of violence’ is written out of the narrative 
and forgotten,” at least by those whom the name does not affect (Chambers 48).  
The play thus inflicts Gallimard, who symbolises the West, with the pain of the 
name, rewriting the historical narrative from the point of view of the injured 
and thus demonstrating exactly how painful the trauma of Orientalism is.  The 
pain of linguistic injury, as Butler shows in Excitable Speech, is that it re-enacts 
the physical violence exerted by dominant forces.  However, at the same time as 
speech performs violence, physical acts of violence can also act as discourse, 
which means that monstrative acts include acts exerted by the body. 
 
Speech as Acts, Acts as Speech: Feminization, Queering, and the 
Violence of Rape, Castration, and Sterilisation  
 That Gallimard can become Butterfly means that, like his Asian 
counterpart, he must first be feminised.  The play achieves this through the 
monstrative forces of rape, castration, sterilisation, and the queering of 
Gallimard’s body, acts which all work to make Gallimard feminine and thus strip 
him, and the West that he symbolizes, of his privilege.  These forces require 
discourse to inaugurate and repeat their ideology, simultaneously acting as this 
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discourse, as bodily equivalents of the discourse that creates the Other as other 
to herself.  Butler writes that 
  [i]f we understand the force of the name to be an effect of its historicity, 
  then that force is not the mere causal effect of an inflicted blow, but 
  works in part through an encoded memory or a trauma, one that lives 
  in language and is carried in language.  The force of the name depends 
  not only on its iterability, but on a form of repetition that is linked to 
  trauma, on what is, strictly speaking, not remembered, but relived, and 
  relived in and through the linguistic substitution for the traumatic 
  event” (Excitable Speech 36). 
If “Butterfly” is a “linguistic substitution” for and repetition of imperial injury, 
then bodily violence such as rape, castration, and sterilisation, while certainly 
performing injury, also act as physical signifiers of the discursive practices that 
give certain bodies the power to injure others.  My argument here is that bodies 
which are injured through the physical acts of (particularly) rape and castration 
are made feminine by these acts, because the feminine is always already 
represented and understood as the weaker half of a binary pair, where its 
weakness is used to justify the use of dominance and force.  The bodies that 
perform these acts of violence are thus simultaneously made masculine through 
the act itself, where violent bodily acts, like interpellative language, 
performatively produce the subject’s masculinity through the feminisation of 
the act inflicted on the body of the Other. 
 If we agree on a binary principle that separates masculinity and 
femininity as performative acts that can be performed by any body, it then 
becomes possible to conceive of the feminisation of one body by another having 
the inverse effect not just of reaffirming but actually producing the masculinity 
of that other body.  In other words, the feminisation of the “Orient” as a political 
space and of “Orientals” as representative of this space, has also had the equal 
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effect of masculinising white Westerners, where, as Elaine Kim remarks, “Asian 
women are only sexual for the same reason that Asian men are asexual: both 
exist to define the white man’s virility and the white race’s superiority” (qtd. in 
Wong and Santa Ana 70:173).  In M. Butterfly, the affirmation of binary 
opposites is played out by the masculinisation of the One and the feminisation 
of the Other, but the materiality of the bodies who enact these effects is 
reversed.  The unfortunate effect of this reversal, however, is the confirmation 
of feminine denigration, through acts of bodily violence that simultaneously 
inaugurate and perpetuate this denigration, whether or not the body enacting 
femininity is biologically female.  Thus, while the usually emasculated Queer 
Asian man is masculinised through the feminisation of the white European man, 
the feminine, as a conceptual space of Becoming, is still an unoccupiable place of 
abjection.  Acts of violence in the play are comprised of the linguistic injury of 
being named “Butterfly,” but also the bodily trauma of rape, castration, 
sterilisation, and queering, which are often physical acts, but which also take 
the form of linguistic acts that perform the same function and therefore have 
the same effects as their physical counterparts. 
 In my M. A. thesis, I argued that the flashback scene of Gallimard’s first 
sexual encounter in 1.11 reads like rape, rather than as Andrew Shin views it, 
which is as a material consummation of homosexual desire (“Projected Bodies 
in David Henry Hwang’s M. Butterfly and Golden Gate” 185).  Stating that 
“Gallimard clearly occupies the feminine position in this parody of a woman’s 
sexual initiation as the passive, sexually disenfranchised partner” (185), Shin 
suggests that Gallimard’s desire is to be dominated by a man, but this reading 
rests on the assumption that “the feminine position” is always already beneath 
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that of a man (sexually or otherwise) and that all women’s sexual initiations are 
disenfranchising.  It is not an empowering view of female sexuality or sexual 
control; in fact, it almost reads as if rape is the “natural” way in which to initiate 
sex and that feminine consent is irrelevant.  The scene is as follows: 
  GALLIMARD.  You told me to wait in the bushes by the cafeteria that 
   night.  The next thing I knew, she was on me.  Dress up in the air. 
  MARC.  She never wore underwear. 
  GALLIMARD.  My arms were pinned to the dirt. 
  MARC.  She loved the superior position.  A girl ahead of her time. 
  GALLIMARD.  I looked up, and there was this woman . . . bouncing up 
   and down on my loins. 
  MARC.  Screaming, right? 
  GALLIMARD.  Screaming, and breaking off the branches all around me, 
   and pounding my butt up and down into the dirt. 
  MARC.  Huffing and puffing like a locomotive. 
  GALLIMARD.  And in the middle of all this, the leaves were getting into 
   my mouth, my legs were losing circulation, I thought, “God.  So this is 
   it?” (1.11) 
 The scene reads like a classic case of predatory rape, except that the 
material sex of attacker and victim are reversed.86  Isabelle pounces on 
Gallimard in a public place, a space that has traditionally been associated with a 
masculine autonomy and, which contrasts with later scenes of sexual privacy in 
Song’s apartment.  Space, in fact, plays an important part in M. Butterfly, 
because it not only emphasises the binary opposition of the conceptual spaces 
of public and private and their association with masculinity and femininity, but 
of the political spaces of Orient and Occident, which have come to further 
symbolize the feminine/masculine binary.  Space is also a crucial element of 
what has lately become a hotly debated topic of global discussion: rape.  Rape 
has traditionally been viewed as an act of violence perpetrated in public spaces 
by strangers to the victim, but its definition is currently under ardent review in 
the light of various global incidents, which do not easily fit this traditional 
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representation.  I analyse this more closely in the following chapter, which 
focuses on the monstrativity of rape in the “new” South Africa.  The rape scene 
in M. Butterfly closely resembles traditional representations, emphasised by the 
scene’s imagery, where “on me,” “pinned,” “breaking,” and “pounding” paint a 
scenario of attack rather than of consensual sex.  What makes rape monstrative 
is that it has the effect of situating the victim as the weaker half of a gender 
binary, where s/he becomes a sign of femininity and Otherness.  Rape thus 
performs the act of putting the victim, as Pamela Cooper writes, “in her place” 
(“Metamorphosis and Sexuality: Reading the Strange Passions of Disgrace” 31, 
my emphasis). 
 Coupled with the feminisation of the victim, rape also performs the act of 
masculinising the perpetrator.  Because rape is an act of violence that has as its 
aim the specifically sexual subordination of its victim, it performatively 
constitutes both the victim and the perpetrator according to the violence of its 
logic, which is that gender is necessarily divided into complementary pairs of 
submission and dominance.  That half of the pair has come to be “feminine” and 
the other half “masculine” is based on the material reality of physical strength, 
where the prevailing attitude has been that dominant forces deserve the 
rewards they reap by virtue of their dominance and their ability to perpetuate 
violent acts.  This is echoed in a number of statements that Gallimard’s school 
friend, Marc, has to say about women in the play.  In 1.4, telling Gallimard of the 
parties he has during the summer, he explains that their late night swimming 
with girls is a “grab bag,” where “You don’t have to ask! That’s the beauty – 
don’t you see?  They don’t have to say yes”: Marc’s attitude reflects rape 
apology, which consists of discourse that excuses this kind of behaviour for the 
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belief that women are asking for it and that “no” actually means “yes.” Again, in 
1.9, when watching Song through her window during a dream sequence, 
Gallimard admonishes Marc, saying “I won’t look.  It’s not respectful,” to which 
Marc replies “We don’t have to be respectful,” following this with rape apology 
that clearly signifies the intersection of gendered denigration with colonial 
attitudes: “We’re foreign devils” (1.9).  One can certainly understand this 
overlap between sexual imagery and imperialist discourse when one considers 
the shared language used to describe relationships with a similar dialectic of 
dominance and submission.  As Song points out in 3.1, “The West has sort of an 
international rape mentality towards the East,” built on the feminisation of the 
East but which simultaneously performs the act of feminisation.  Ann Laura 
Stoler explains that “gender inequalities [are] essential to the structure of 
colonial racism and imperial authority” (13), because the West is already 
patriarchal and thus uses its self-definition as masculine to feminise those it 
wants to subject to its control.  Control is meted out by physical force such as 
rape, which is also already sexual, to both inaugurate and support the rhetoric 
of imperialist patriarchy. 
 Rape is not just physically violent, its violence is specifically sexual, 
where its objective is to reaffirm a gender binary that not only injures by 
definition but situates subjects according to its logic, which, as Butler reminds 
us, is either “within the possible circuit of recognition [or], accordingly, outside 
of it, in abjection” (Excitable Speech 5).  Because rape feminises its victim it also 
constitutes him/her as abject, as Other to him-/herself.  In M. Butterfly, the 
Otherness that Gallimard comes to embody is Butterfly, and his rape by Isabelle 
is the first physical contribution to this embodiment.  The second occurrence of 
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Gallimard’s metamorphosis into the Oriental Other is during a scene in which 
Renee, his first “extra-extramarital affair,” regales him with her views on 
Western civilisation: 
  RENEE.  I guess.  But, like, it just hangs there.  This little . . . flap of flesh.  
   And there’s so much fuss that we make about it.  Like, I think the 
   reason we fight wars is because we wear clothes.  Because no one 
   knows –between the men, I mean –who has the biggest . . . weenie.  So, 
   if I’m a guy with a small one, I’m going to build a really big building or 
   take over a really big piece of land or write a really long book so the 
   other men don’t know, right?  But, see, it never really works, that’s the 
   problem.  I mean, you conquer the country, or whatever, but you’re 
   still wearing clothes, so there’s no way to prove absolutely whose is 
   bigger or smaller.  And that’s what we call civilized society.  The whole 
   world run by a bunch of men with pricks the size of pins. (She exits.) 
  GALLIMARD.  (To us.) This was simply not acceptable (2.6). 
Gallimard is vice-consul of the French embassy in China, at a time in which the 
US is moving in on Vietnam in an act that has been described as neo-
imperialist,87 and which resulted in unforeseeable losses by the U. S.  By 
delivering this diatribe, Renee calls Gallimard and the government that he 
represents out for their involvement in the Vietnam War, while concurrently 
pointing out that the reason for their involvement is a violent attempt at 
reifying Western masculine superiority. 
 Renee effectively castrates Gallimard in this scene by comparing phallic 
lack with imperialist expansion; while he is physically undamaged, the Western 
investment in masculine superiority and its metaphorical association with 
colonial force means that Gallimard, and thus the West, is politically gelded by 
Renee’s observations.  Gallimard is castrated because Renee’s speech is 
performative: while it does not literally perform the physical act of castration, it 
has the same effects, which is to emasculate him and, by proxy, the Western 
world that he represents.  This emasculation transpires because of a complex 
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layer of metaphorical associations between immaterial masculine attributes 
and the physicality of the male body, where the masculine virility is connected 
to physical size, especially of the male member.  That it is Renee who has this 
effect on Gallimard is important: Renee is a woman (albeit Western), which 
means that she should already represent feminine lack herself, but by castrating 
him through speech, she reaffirms his femininity and her own masculinity.  
Gallimard even comments on her masculine behaviour after he meets her, 
asking the audience if it is “possible for a woman to be too uninhibited, too 
willing, so as to seem too . . . masculine?” (2.6).  Western women’s masculinity is 
part of what drives Gallimard’s desire for an Asian woman, because he believes 
that Asians are already feminine.  To be gelded linguistically as Gallimard is by 
Renee also imitates and subverts the castratory force that is the myth of 
Oriental diminutiveness, where the power of discourse to create is clearly 
demonstrated in the continued perpetuation of this myth. 
 The emasculation of Asian men through their Symbolic castration, 
monstratively performed through discourse that perpetuates the mythic 
correlation between masculinity and penis-size, is part of the Orientalist 
discourse that enabled the colonialist expansion of Western government in the 
nineteenth-century, also continuing to serve as a powerful metaphor for white 
male self-assurance in the face of Asian migration to the U. S.  This discourse is 
monstrative because it has ensured that Asian men, particularly East Asian men 
such as Song in M. Butterfly, have become signs of lack, and thus, signs of 
femininity.  This discourse works particularly well as a colonial tool because it 
prepares the colonial subjects as feminine and thus unable to defend 
themselves, as well as providing a ready excuse for their exploitation.  This 
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discourse is, in a sense, rape apology, as it provides a neat basis upon which to 
carry out its plunder of both land and resources.  The conceptual slippage 
between the physical act of castration and the gelding force of imperialism is 
further played out in the scene during which Toulon informs Gallimard of the U. 
S. involvement with the assassination of Vietnam’s President Diem, during 
which Song, who is standing upstage, clips the head from a flower.  The flower’s 
decapitation indicates the removal of the head of the Vietnamese state, where 
decapitation and castration are symbolically linked by the psychoanalytic 
association between these two acts of violence.   
 For Freud, castration and decapitation find their commonality in the 
Medusan myth, where the sight of female genitalia invokes the fear of castration 
in the male subject, effectively forming his subjectivity: “[t]o decapitate = to 
castrate.  The terror of Medusa is thus a terror of castration that is linked to the 
sight of [the mother’s genitals]” (“Medusa’s Head” 84).  Women, as Hélène 
Cixous explains, lack this fear: “[t]hough masculine sexuality gravitates around 
the penis, engendering that centralized body (in political anatomy) under the 
dictatorship of its parts, woman does not bring about the same regionalization 
which serves the couple head/genitals” (“The Laugh of the Medusa” 889).  As 
such, feminine castration anxiety finds its form in the fear of decapitation: “[i]f 
man operates under the threat of castration, if masculinity is culturally ordered 
by the castration complex, it might be said that the backlash, the return, on 
women of this castration anxiety is its displacement as decapitation, execution, 
of woman, as loss of her head” (Cixous “Castration or Decapitation?” 43).  Cixous 
explains that this feminine fear for losing one’s head is in fact the fear of losing 
one’s tongue, of one’s ability to speak and make a different reality through 
164 
 
feminine discourse, which is precisely what women have suffered through the 
Law of the Father and their banishment from the Symbolic order (“Castration or 
Decapitation?” 43-5). 
 Furthermore, as Sally Robinson points out, castration fear is a masculine 
fear not for the body but for the preservation of the phallus and what it stands 
for,88 which is the control of the Symbolic order and the perpetuation of a 
phallogocentric economy that values the masculine and derides the feminine 
(“Misappropriations of the ‘Feminine’”49).  Discourse such as psychoanalysis, 
which is an “exclusively masculine theoretical economy” perpetuates the 
preservation of masculine power by prioritizing “the phallus as standard of 
meaning and value” (Robinson 49).  If the phallus is lacking, as it is in a 
Freudian and Lacanian view of female sexuality, then it stands to reason that 
femininity has no value in such an economy.  Thus, the decapitation of the 
Vietnamese state “allowed” by the U. S. neatly sums up the feminization of the 
Orient by the West, as the use of decapitation through Song’s symbolic gesture 
not only indicates the gelding of Vietnam, but demonstrates the West’s regard 
for the East as always already feminine.  Importantly, castrating one’s foe leaves 
them unable to retaliate for raping them, which is precisely the desired effect; 
moreover, castration constitutes the already feminised rape victim as symbolic 
of lack, reiterating their femininity.  That these acts are instead performed on 
Gallimard in the play means that the West is symbolically raped and castrated, 
and thus made feminine.  Significantly, his feminisation occurs at the hands of 
the women with whom he has any form of sexual relationship, including his 
wife, Helga. 
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 In 2.5, Helga asks Gallimard to visit a fertility specialist, after pointing out 
that she has been cleared by the same specialist as physically able to bear 
children.  The implication is that Gallimard is infertile, which emasculates him, 
as masculinity has been traditionally associated with virility and the ability to 
produce children in abundance.  Song knows precisely what to say in order to 
assure Gallimard of his masculinity and thus procure from him the intelligence 
she requires as a spy: 
  SONG.  You men of the West –you’re obsessed by your odd desire for 
   equality.  Your wife can’t give you a child, and you’re going to the 
   doctor? 
  GALLIMARD.  Well, you see, she’s already gone. 
  SONG.  And because this incompetent can’t find the defect, you now 
   have to subject yourself to him?  It’s unnatural. 
  GALLIMARD.  Well, what is the “natural” solution? 
  SONG.  In Imperial China, when a man found that one wife was 
   inadequate, he turned to another –to give him his son. 
  GALLIMARD.  What do you –?  I can’t . . . marry you, yet. 
  SONG.  Please.  I’m not asking you to be my husband.  But I am already 
   your wife. 
  GALLIMARD.  Do you want to . . . have my child? 
  SONG.  I thought you’d never ask. 
  GALLIMARD.  But, your career . . . your– 
  SONG.  Phooey on my career!  That’s your Western mind, twisting itself 
   into strange shapes again.  Of course I love my career.  But what would 
   I love most of all?  To feel something inside me –day and night  
   something I know is yours.  (Pause.)  Promise me . . . you won’t go to 
   this doctor.  Who is this Western quack to set himself as judge over 
   the man I love?  I know who is a man, and who is not.  (She exits.) 
  GALLIMARD.  (To us.)  Dr. Bolleart?  Of course I didn’t go.  What man 
   would? (2.5) 
 A child, especially a boy, would give Gallimard material “proof” of his 
masculinity; because Helga’s fertility has been confirmed, Gallimard’s virility is 
in question, and thus, so is his masculinity.  Song is acutely aware of this as well 
as her need to reassure Gallimard of his masculinity in order to keep up her 
charade.  This is precisely why, when Gallimard orders her to strip, she tells him 
that she is pregnant (2.6), explaining to Comrade Chin in the following scene her 
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reasoning: “ . . . Suddenly, it hit me – ‘All he wants is for her to submit.  Once a 
woman submits, a man is always ready to become “generous.”’ . . . And it 
worked!  He gave in!  Now, if I can just present him with a baby.  A Chinese baby 
with blond hair –he’ll be mine for life!” (2.7).  Helga’s words have the same 
effect on Gallimard as Renee’s do, they geld him symbolically by calling his 
virility into question, thereby emasculating him and performing the act of 
feminization.  Song’s “pregnancy” reassures Gallimard of his virility, if only 
briefly, as she undercuts this encouragement in her naming of the child: 
  SONG.  I’m going to call him “Peepee.” 
  GALLIMARD.  Darling, could you repeat that because I’m sure a 
   rickshaw just flew by overhead. 
  SONG.  You heard me. 
  GALLIMARD.  “Song Peepee”?  May I suggest Michael, or Stephan, or 
   Adolph? (2.8) 
What is implied by this exchange is that the Chinese name Song chooses for the 
child is effeminate, as it is immediately compared by Gallimard to three Western 
boys’ names that carry with them a long association with masculinity.  That 
Gallimard chooses “Adolph” in particular demonstrates a specific 
conceptualisation of Western masculinity that is premised on imperial 
domination and racial superiority. 
 Gallimard’s dislike of the name, “Peepee” is because of its association 
with a Western colloquialism for urination as well as being a diminutive for the 
male member.  If Gallimard is to embody masculine virility, then his son must 
also express manliness, down to his very name; because his name echoes 
Renee’s comments on Gallimard’s “weenie” (2.6), the child’s masculinity is 
questionable, and, therefore, so is his father’s.  The masculinity of a boy child 
acts as an extension of the father’s in Western patriarchy, which is precisely 
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why a male child’s effeminacy has historically been a source of shame for his 
father.  This has been particularly true for male children that have expressed a 
form of sexuality that deviates from heteronormativity, or who have merely 
appeared to have done so, where behaviour or stylistic acts that have been 
traditionally associated with femininity have been translated into a sign of 
same-sex desire.  Because gender has been conceived of in binary terms, the 
expression of desire outside of the heterosexual norm has resulted in the 
grouping of deviant sexualities according to this imperative, so that identities 
are constituted as either feminine or masculine despite bodily realities.  In other 
words, homosexuality does not make sense in a binary system until bodily pairs 
are categorised as either masculine or feminine, which is precisely why 
lesbians, for example, may find themselves questioned as to who the “man” is in 
the relationship, even if it is precisely because there is no man in the 
relationship that it is lesbian at all. 
 The incongruity of bodily reality and gender performance is often what 
makes Queer bodies monstrous, where bodies resist the categorisation that a 
binary gender system attempts to enforce.  These bodies become signs of the 
unrepresentable and thus exist as living signs of their resistance to the Symbolic 
order.  The same incongruity is embodied by Gallimard, who, having been 
feminised by each encounter he has with women in the play through rape, 
castration, and sterilisation, is once more made feminine by his relationship 
with Song.  As Song is, in fact, a man, the nature of his relationship with 
Gallimard is such that Gallimard is queered by his affair with Song.  It is 
important to note that Song is not trans*; he does not identify as a woman but, 
instead, consciously performs this role for the purpose of spying.  Song’s 
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embodiment of Butterfly thus constitutes a theatrical performance in the purest 
sense of the term, which is that it is done with the intent to portray someone 
else, as she remarks to Gallimard: “I’m an artist, Rene.  You were my greatest . . . 
acting challenge” (2.7).  As such, Song does not really embody Butterfly at all, 
but only wears her like a cloak; embodiment suggests a Becoming that cannot 
be discarded quite as easily as Song discards Butterfly, which is precisely why it 
is Gallimard who finally comes to embody her. 
 The queering of Gallimard through Song’s exposure as a man is also 
indicative of the transfer of Orientalism to white queer desire.  Wong and Santa 
Ana describe the emergence of a queer white privilege that translates itself as a 
desire to dominate a group already feminised and fetishized by white 
masculinity.  This is commented on in particular, they write, by Asian American 
gay male writing, which criticises the white fetish for the fictional role of “rice 
queens,” who are seen as submissive “bottoms” in relation to white male “tops” 
(Wong and Santa 205).  As such, M. Butterfly has received criticism from some 
writers who view it as a “fulfillment of white male homosexual fantasy,” (qtd. by 
Wong and Santa Ana 210: xiii) particularly with regard to Gallimard’s position 
during coitus, which Song suggests during his trial: “Of course we did enjoy 
more . . . complete union, and I suppose he might have wondered why I was 
always on my stomach…” (3.1, emphasis in the original).  It is only fair, however, 
to remember that Gallimard does not know that Song is a man, and thus the 
fantasy of white homosexual dominance cannot properly be played out: 
homosexual dominance is not the issue here, as Gallimard thinks he is 
dominating an Asian woman.  To call Gallimard’s sexual union with Song 
homosexual is to deny the brilliance of Song’s performance as well as the 
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philosophical message of the play, which is that immaterialities are no more or 
less “real” than the physical reality of bodies. 
 The result of Song’s metamorphosis is that Gallimard is queered by the 
nature of their past relationship, meaning that he is emasculated further, even if 
the positioning of their sexual union says otherwise.  In the case of the rape 
scene with Isabelle, bodily position is what emasculates Gallimard, but in his 
affair with Song, it is his inability to recognise bodily reality that he is feminized.  
Each sexual liaison he has brings Gallimard closer to Butterfly, but not as he 
wishes: instead of dominating the prized sexual Other, Gallimard comes to 
embody her.  Butterfly is monstrous precisely because she is a sign of Asian 
passivity, femininity, and exoticism, not an actual complex human identity.  She 
is purely Symbolic; she exists only as a symbol that ensures the perpetuation of 
Western masculine dominance, alluded to by Gallimard at the play’s close when 
he says to the disrobed Song: “You, if anyone, should know – I am pure 
imagination.  And in imagination I will remain” (3.2).  The “I” that Gallimard 
utters here is Butterfly’s, as he has now completed his transformation, 
confirming this embodiment with his last words: “My name is Rene Gallimard –
also known as Madame Butterfly” (3.3).  That he claims to be both Rene 
Gallimard and Madame Butterfly is not an incongruity on his part but the 
embodied reality of Otherness, of living as Other to oneself, where his “truth is a 
foreign body inhabiting [him], speaking from within, but finding articulation 
only through externalisations that are no longer true renditions of the feminine 
condition but are only true because the act of public performance performs 
them as truths” (Elisabeth Bronfen “Performing Hysteria: Anne Sexton’s 
‘Business’ of Writing Suicide”131).  This Other is, moreover, monstrous, as she 
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exists as pure representation even as she takes solidity through Gallimard’s 
performance. 
 Gallimard’s Becoming-Other-to-himself can only take place through the 
repetition of acts that have in the first instance produced Butterfly.  Butterfly 
exists, even if only in an immaterial form, because of the repeated feminisation 
of the “Orient,” carried out through the monstrative acts of discourse, rape, 
castration, sterilisation, and queering.  Like performative acts, monstrative acts 
in M. Butterfly only produce the effect of feminisation because of their 
citationality: these acts repeat prior acts of domination and control already 
perpetrated by the masculine One against the feminine Other, thus repeating 
this binary logic.  In the following section, I explain how the iterability of 
monstrative and performative acts, their propensity to mutate, not only ensures 
their continued survival but also produces the possibility of their 
de(con)struction.  I demonstrate that the possibility of deconstruction lies in the 
production of what Austin names “unhappy performatives,” or performatives 
that misfire because they are enacted by “inappropriate” bodies or because they 
are used “non-seriously,” where I show that unhappy performatives do not fail 
but produce something other than what was intended.  M. Butterfly is an 
excellent example to use because it takes the form of the “non-serious” that 
Austin so dearly wishes to separate from the “everyday” use of performative 
utterances, while its content shows that “inappropriately” performed acts also 
produce something, not just in the world of the play but, also, in the “real” 
world. 
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The Unhappy Performative: Play, Parody, and the Subversion of 
Monstrative Acts 
 Song’s theatrical enactment of Butterfly poses the question: why is he so 
easily able to discard Butterfly while Gallimard is doomed to die as her physical 
embodiment?  Why does Gallimard, who does not fit the descriptive 
constitution of Butterfly, identify with her, when Song, who, because he is 
“Oriental” and therefore always already feminine, does not?  This happens 
precisely because of the levels of meaning ascribed to the verb “to act,” which 
the play text actively tampers with, where boundaries that ostensibly divide 
fiction from “reality” are confused by both plot developments and 
metatheatrical devices.  The character of Song, for instance, is a Chinese man 
playing at being a Chinese woman, but, because he is a “character,” the 
complexity of his act is doubled by the fact that he is part of a work of fiction.  
That a play is a work of fiction designed to be viewed by an audience, in the way 
that a scientist might observe something under a microscope, is destabilised by 
the levels of fiction at work in M. Butterfly, compounded by various moments in 
the play where the fourth wall is broken.  Instances of metatheatre call attention 
to the fact that what one is watching is a fictional representation, where the 
audience89 finds itself addressed at various moments by almost every member 
of the play, breaking the immersion that lulls each audience member into a state 
of passive watching. 
 The use of this device in the play requires the audience to reflect on what 
might separate the fictional world on the stage from the “real” world that they 
inhabit, as well as asking them to review the various fictional discourses that 
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have constituted the “real” world and which the actors of M. Butterfly 
reproduce.  The interweaving of levels of fiction is put into practice by the 
layers of acting that are going on in the play as well as those that are occurring 
in reality.  Therefore, where Song’s performance is that of a man playing a 
woman, doubled by the performance of an actor who plays Song in the first 
instance, the plausibility of his performance makes apparent Butler’s premise 
that gender is itself a performance.  That gender is a performance, a set of 
learned behaviours and gestures that are mimicked by the body, is not the same 
as saying that gender is performative, something Butler underlines repeatedly 
in her work, from Bodies That Matter onwards.  What makes gender 
performative is that it constitutes the “I,” where gestures and stylised acts that 
establish a person’s gender also inaugurate a speaking “I” into the Symbolic 
order.  M. Butterfly re-enacts this by literally constituting “Butterfly” through 
the repetition of Song’s bodily performances, simultaneously emphasising the 
performativity of race and ethnicity and its intertwinement with gender.  Song’s 
performance as Butterfly could not, however, be successful if it were not for 
Butterfly’s recognisability (Butler Excitable Speech 5), which rests on certain 
material markers that identify her.  As such, the various levels of theatricality 
that occur in the play can only do so because of a recognisable materiality, even 
if the signs that identify that materiality are fictional. 
 In Theatre Audiences: A Theory of Production and Reception, Susan 
Bennett explains that there are two frames within which a theatrical 
performance can take part: an “inner frame” that consists of the play 
performance itself and an “outer frame” that allows the performance to be 
culturally intelligible to its audience (139).  The outer frame is comprised of 
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various discourses and ideologies that shape the way an audience views 
material bodies and objects, while the inner frame compounds these discourses 
by containing visual signs that ratify the presupposed ideologies with which an 
audience arrives in its viewing of a play: “the combination and succession of 
visual and aural90 signs which the audience receives and interprets, some fixed 
but the majority in flux . . . permits the audience to posit the existence of a 
fictional world on stage with its own dynamic and governing rules” (140).  
Those signs that are in flux are necessitated by the performance of bodies on 
stage, while those that are fixed make up the sets and backdrop. 
 I pointed out earlier in this chapter the requirements laid out by Hwang 
for future productions of the play in the play’s end notes, which suggest 
backdrops, settings, and costumes that revel in the expected “exotica and lush 
beauty” of the Orient (90).  These stylistic elements are “expected” by the 
audience because of the play’s name, which makes obvious the connection 
between the play and Puccini’s opera: that the play makes use of an Asian 
aesthetic consolidates this connection because the audience already knows that 
opera is set in the East.  The adaptation of the opera’s narrative as a parody is 
successful because of its repetition of these aesthetics, but also because of the 
repetition involved in performance.  In an earlier chapter, I explained that in 
order for something to be communicated it needs to be both repeatable 
(citational) and subject to change (iterable).  This is as true of performance as it 
is of the written word on which Derrida bases his argument in Limited Inc, 
which is precisely what enables Butler’s analysis of gender as both performance 
and performative: “[g]ender is the repeated stylization of the body, a set of 
repeated acts within a highly rigid regulatory fame that congeal over time to 
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produce the appearance of substance, of a natural sort of [B]eing” (Gender 
Trouble 44).  While gender performance “conceals its genesis” (“Performative 
Acts and Gender Constitution” 522) and gives the impression that it is the 
expression of an interior gendered substance, Butler consistently points out 
that these are learned performances, stylized acts, and gesticulations that we 
learn to repeat and are forced to repeat from the moment of birth.  Because we 
are social animals, human beings rely on mimicry, imitation, and repetition in 
order to be integrated within the social group; mimicry is precisely the method 
by which we come to learn anything communicative, including language. 
 Repetition is incorporated in the play for various reasons, but is 
especially used to emphasise the repetition involved in theatre and gender 
performance, the differences between which the play purposefully obfuscates.  
Examples of emphasised repetition occur in 1.8 when Song tells Gallimard that 
she wishes there were still cafes to sit in with “cappuccinos, and men in tuxedos 
and bad expatriate jazz.”  Gallimard mimics this wish almost word for word 
during his consultation with Toulon in 2.3, explaining that the Vietnamese will 
“want the good things [the West] can give them,” saying that the Chinese “miss 
the old days.  You know, cappuccinos, men in tuxedos –”.  This demonstrates the 
conviction Gallimard has in Song’s performance but also that the cultural script 
is present before Song’s masquerade, which is precisely what enables him to 
take advantage of Gallimard’s ignorance.  This becomes clear in the final 
repetition of this line, after Song has performed his transformation: 
  SONG.  Then again, maybe I’m just playing with you.  How can you tell? 
   (Reprising his feminine character, he sidles up to Gallimard.)  “How I 
   wish there were even a small cafe to sit in.  With men in tuxedos, and 
   cappuccinos, and bad expatriate jazz.”  Now you want to kiss me, don’t 
   you?  (3.2) 
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What this final repetition proves is that there is no elementary origin upon 
which identity acts are based, as all performance is citational, meaning that it 
requires repetition to be reproduced but also to be recognisable.  What this 
suggests is that aberrant identity practices are considered monstrous because 
they are unrehearsed, arriving seemingly out of nowhere on the horizon of 
collective knowledge.   
 Aberrant identity practices in M. Butterfly are, however, monstrous not 
because they are unrehearsed, but because they are performed by 
“inappropriate” social actors, suggesting that they are unrehearsed only by 
certain bodies.  Song’s embodiment of Butterfly is “inappropriate” because it 
hinges on a repetition of bodily acts that are recognizably feminine.  Gallimard’s 
embodiment of Butterfly occurs, however, because of acts that are done to him, 
rather than being performed by him, demonstrating that the affectivity of 
performative acts is that they are done both by bodies and to bodies, requiring 
the repetition of recognisable acts in order to do so.  Theatre rehearses 
repetition because its performance would be unrecognisable if it did not, while 
parody exploits repetition in order to emphasize the connection one is meant to 
make between the “original” performance and the parodied act.  What M. 
Butterfly parodies is not merely the absurdity of Orientalist discourse and the 
self-certainty in Western power relations, but that the matching of binary 
categories where Orient is to feminine is to submissive are broken down by the 
very presence of bodies performing “inappropriate” acts.  This can only be 
produced through repeated acts that are recognisable as “feminine” and 
“Oriental” because of the acts that have preceded them.  While Butler’s early 
work in “Performative Acts and Gender Constitution” states that there are 
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“strict lines” that separate theatrical performances such as plays from those that 
are expressed in “reality” (527), M. Butterfly is a clear example of how these 
lines are often blurred.  As I mentioned above, there are countless moments in 
the play where characters address the audience, disrupting the imagined 
boundary between fiction and life.  For example, Gallimard, who acts as the 
play’s narrator, ostensibly re-enacts his demise for the benefit of the audience.  
His role as “author” is then usurped by Song who takes over in order to perform 
his transformation, to which Gallimard (without a scrap of irony) beseeches: 
“You have to do what I say!  I’m conjuring you up in my mind!” (2.11). 
 Theatricality, by which I mean exaggerated stylistic performance and/ or 
self-conscious performance practised in awareness of its status as act, is thus 
simultaneously set up and broken down by the play, achieving this 
deconstruction through the various levels of fiction and of acting that take place 
during its performance.  Normative gender practice eschews theatricality where 
non-normative or “inappropriate” gender acts often employ a conscious 
theatricality in order to emphasise the imitational nature of normative practices 
and the fact that these practices disguise this nature.  Butler analyses drag as an 
instance of this kind of theatricality in Bodies That Matter, and, taken in this 
light one could certainly read Song’s performance as Butterfly as a drag act.91  
The use of theatricality in “inappropriate” gender acts also deconstructs the 
dialectic of “serious” and the “non-serious” that Austin would so dearly like to 
keep separate in How to Do Things with Words.  Theatricality, which is present 
in exaggerated acts delivered with pomp and ceremony, is clearly not only the 
domain of the “non-serious” as its use in ritual suggests.  In fact, many of the 
examples of felicitous performative utterances that Austin utilizes in his thesis 
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form the pivotal act within a larger ritual that rests on theatricality to convey its 
importance and solemnity.  Thus, a marriage ceremony does not merely exist of 
a bride and groom exchanging their vows, even if the illocutionary utterance 
forms the actual act: the life-changing importance of the ritual could not be 
successfully expressed without a certain amount of theatricality, hence the 
symbolic import given to the various props, costume, and actions of those 
taking part. 
 What theatre and ritual share in their use of theatricality is the visible 
manifestation of the result of both performative and monstrative acts.  In 
theatre, the performances and gesticulations of the actor performatively 
constitute his or her character, and the lighting, costume, sound, and mise-en-
scène of the play create the fictional world in which the actor performs.  The 
very same thing can be said for ritual practices, which, along with their actors, 
include props and costumes to signify both that the ritual is taking place and its 
import to the actors taking part.  Notably, both theatre and ritual also require 
witnesses in order to accomplish the act around which its theatricality is 
formed: the performance, “serious” or otherwise, could not be said to have 
taken place with the absence of witnesses.  The theatricality of the event, its 
repeated gestures and its visual and aural signs, make visible the modifications 
to the bodies taking part.  In the marriage ceremony, the fact that it is a 
marriage ceremony is made visible by the theatricality of visual and aural signs, 
such as the bridal gown and the use of music to indicate the bride’s arrival.92  
While these signs do not perform the act itself, they instead perform the act of 
making obvious to others that this ceremony is taking place, as Parker and 
Sedgwick note when they write that “like a play, marriage exists in and for the 
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eyes of others” (Performativity and Performance 11).  The slippage between 
theatre and ritual is also monstrative as the metamorphoses of the bodies 
taking part is visibly manifested in the theatricality of the space that forms the 
proscenium arch of each performance. 
 In M. Butterfly, Gallimard’s embodiment of Butterfly is facilitated by the 
monstrative force of physical and discursive practices discussed above, but this 
embodiment is made visible by the theatricality of the event.  This theatricality 
is evidenced by the use of aural and visual signifiers that represent the 
audience’s view of Oriental exoticism and which support its expectations for 
Oriental submission, as well as the use of bodily signifiers to indicate its 
presuppositions of femininity in Song, signifiers that are presupposed because 
“she” is Asian and because “her” behaviour is feminine.  As the play shows, 
however, performance does not necessarily reflect bodily reality, but is instead 
a recognisable repetition of expected behaviour.  While Butler considers the 
parodied performance of drag acts a serious commentary on the constructional 
nature of gender practices, she does not focus on the further ways in which such 
performances can be used “seriously.”  In the play, Song’s “non-serious” 
performances do not only demonstrate the performativity of gender, but result 
in the “serious” manipulation of Gallimard for his ambassadorial secrets.  “Non-
serious” acts such as those enacted by Song become political weapons as they 
take advantage of a debilitating flaw in Western patriarchal heteronormativity, 
which is that, in its reliance on gendered and racial binaries, it is subject to 
having these binaries exploited by the very people it seeks to subjugate. 
 Most importantly, the play itself is an example of Austin’s “etiolated” 
speech, where performative utterances that are said on stage are “in a peculiar 
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way hollow or void” (How to 21-2, emphasis in the original).  Does this mean 
that we should read the performative acts that take place during the play as 
“non-serious,” as “etiolations” of the “real” thing?  Austin’s regard of speech acts 
uttered onstage as etiolated, as sickly, anaemic, weaker versions of the “real” 
thing, is because he understands these acts as not having taken place in the 
“real” world, but in a “pretend” world that happens on stage for the purposes of 
entertainment.  A marriage ceremony performed on stage does not, of course, 
result in the lawful binding of the two people who take part,93 but that does not 
mean that the “unhappy” performative performs nothing either.  The principal 
performative in M. Butterfly is Song’s performance as Butterfly; while he may be 
considered “inappropriate” to enact the role because of his male anatomy, the 
performance does not misfire at all, as Gallimard believes it wholeheartedly, 
thanks to the Orientalist discourse that is already in place to vindicate Song’s 
femininity.  If, however, we read Song’s performance against a much larger 
tradition of drag acts, particularly those that have been performed on stage,94 
we find that what is performed is not merely an “unhappy” expression of gender 
but the exposure of an originating gendered core, as Butler expounds: “ . . . drag 
fully subverts the distinction between inner and outer psychic space and 
effectively mocks both the expressive model of gender and the notion of a true 
gender identity” (Gender Trouble 174).  The reason for this is because “[w]hat is 
‘performed’ in drag is, of course, the sign of gender, a sign that is not the same as 
the body it figures, but that cannot be read without it” (Butler Bodies That 
Matter 237, her emphasis).  What happens, instead of the belief that what one is 
watching is the expression of the bodily reality of a biological woman, is that 
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gender is exposed as performance and, thus, the “serious” act of Being is 
irrupted by the “non-seriousness” of theatricality. 
 The enactment of unhappy performatives may result in the miscarriage 
of the intended or expected act, but that does not mean that it fails to produce 
anything.  As Phelan points out in Mourning Sex, repetitive acts produce the 
effect of Becoming by indicating their possibility, where, “[a]s theatrical 
performances, they stage the phantasmatic becoming indicative.  That is, as the 
‘as if’ of the phantasm takes a place on a stage larger than the architecture of a 
single imagination, it carries the remains of a collective reality, however 
illusionary or material such remains may be” (16).  As well as this, writes 
Phelan, the unhappiness of the theatrical performative also produces a 
linguistic promise of something yet to come (16).  The promise enacted by 
Song’s drag performance is the eventual banishment of Butterfly through her 
embodiment by Gallimard, where the play not only rehearses, but ensures, 
Butterfly’s expulsion from the Western imagination by subverting her “pure” 
Oriental sacrifice into a ludicrously lampooned performance.  If we understand 
the performative as a birth, in that it produces something in its invocation, the 
unhappy performative, while not producing the expected act, produces another 
act altogether, one that is unexpected and unpredictable.  Taken in this sense, 
the unhappy performative is a monstrous birth because it produces unexpected 
effects, simultaneously acting as a promise (or a threat) of something more to 
come.   
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The Anamorphic Image as a Monstrous Birth: The Canny Moment 
of Song’s Disrobing 
 As I explained earlier, the uncanniness of birth has been associated with 
the Becoming-seen of the previously unseen, of the moment of awareness of the 
Other’s “I/eye.”  The visual technique of anamorphosis is a striking metaphor 
for what Nicholas Royle names the “canny moment,” an archaic term for birth, 
but also the moment of being able to see what was unseen, of the inside coming 
out, of the emergence of something hidden (The Uncanny viii).  Using Daniel L. 
Collins’ essay, “Anamorphosis and the Eccentric Observer,” I explained that 
what occurs at the moment of recognition, the “canny” moment, if you will, is 
that the viewer of the image becomes what the image stands for – the Other – on 
seeing it correctly.95  Seeing the anamorphic image correctly by literally 
changing his point of view, the viewer becomes Other to himself.  In M. Butterfly, 
Gallimard, a stand-in for Western patriarchy, becomes the anamorphic image 
when his point of view is changed by Song’s nakedness.  Earlier, I pointed out 
that the play constitutes a series of monstrative acts that mutate Gallimard into 
Butterfly, shaped by every sexual encounter he has.  His full metamorphosis 
from the self-professed (1.5) “ugly” caterpillar into submissive Butterfly in 3.3, 
however, occurs immediately after Song’s exposure of his “real” sex in 3.2.  This 
metamorphosis occurs here precisely because Gallimard finally sees the 
anamorphic image straight on, seeing Song for what he is rather than what he 
has appeared to be.  This can only happen when Song demonstrates the reality 
of his material sex. 
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 On witnessing Song’s genital reality, Gallimard cannot possibly see him 
as Butterfly anymore, and thus Gallimard takes his place, becoming the physical 
embodiment of Butterfly by literally seeing things from Song’s point of view.  
This final act of Becoming has everything to do with the gaze and with the 
physical position of the one who does the gazing, which Gallimard ratifies in his 
final speech: “Tonight I realize my search is over.  That I’ve looked all along in 
the wrong place” (3.3).  If he looks in the “wrong” place, that is, straight on from 
a position of power, the Butterfly he finds is one that takes advantage of his 
desire; if he positions himself so that he is seeing from the point of view of the 
disempowered, he becomes that which he desires, something he can only do by 
experiencing the same disempowerment that he has subjected his “Oriental” 
Other to.  This moment comes like a monstrous birth where Gallimard delivers 
himself-as-Butterfly, an effect which is unpredictable to the incredulous Song, 
who believes he has Gallimard right where he wants him.  Gallimard has finally 
realised, however, that Butterfly is completely immaterial: 
  GALLIMARD.  Get away from me!  Tonight, I’ve finally learned to tell 
   fantasy from reality.  And, knowing the difference, I choose fantasy. 
  SONG.  I’m your fantasy! 
  GALLIMARD.  You?  You’re as real as a hamburger.  Now get out!  I have 
   a date with my Butterfly and I don’t want your body polluting the 
   room! (3.2) 
It was never Song’s body that Gallimard wanted to dominate, even if its material 
markers were what initially sparked his interest.  The material markers that 
signify Song as Asian only serve as visual indicators of Western discourse, not of 
any characteristic intrinsic to Asian bodies, while the markers that indicate his 
femininity are revealed to have nothing at all to do with his material sex. 
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 Thus, as Gallimard admits, Butterfly exists only in the Western 
imagination, where her physical indicators really have nothing to do with her 
existence.  It is for precisely this reason that Gallimard is able to embody her, as 
neither gendered nor ethnic performances follow from materiality but are 
constructions that are developed and enforced discursively.  The agreement 
between signifier and signified is disrupted by the sudden recognition of the 
anamorphic image, which happens when the viewer positions himself so that he 
can see from the object’s point of view.  The sudden fright that occurs when one 
recognises the anamorphic image is not just from being able to see what was 
previously unseen, but because of the implications involved in realising that 
one’s gaze is being returned.  For Freud, the returned gaze results in one’s 
petrification, symbolically manifested in the myth of the Medusa.  However, 
Freud’s metaphorical association is between Medusa and female genitalia, 
which means that what Freud suggests by the male child’s castration anxiety on 
seeing his mother’s phallic lack is in fact the anxiety of losing power over the 
phallus and what it symbolises, the Law of the Father and authority to wield the 
Symbolic order.  Castration anxiety is thus not about the fear of losing the male 
member but the fear of losing what it stands for, the authority to use the 
Symbolic order and to use it to control others.  Where Freud asserts that the 
sight of the mother’s genitals induces castration anxiety, writing that “[t]he 
terror of Medusa is thus a terror of castration that is linked to the sight of 
something” (“Medusa’s Head” 84), what he forgets about the Medusan myth is 
that it is not the sight of the famous Gorgon that turns men into stone, but the 
return of her gaze, which is precisely why Perseus’s shield petrifies her, as she 
returns her own gaze.  The castration anxiety that Medusa prompts is therefore 
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not caused by gazing at her but by having that gaze returned.  If we understand 
castration anxiety as a fear not of losing male genitalia but of male power over 
the Symbolic Order, then this makes perfect sense, because, as a female 
monster, Medusa wields the gaze “inappropriately”: women are to be looked at, 
they are not the ones to do the looking. 
 What the Medusan myth suggests is that the female gaze is dangerous 
and that a feminine use of the Symbolic order will turn men into stone.  Women 
have thus had to be looked at from a point at which they cannot return the gaze, 
where they are watered down by representation or dissected into parts which 
represent their “whole.”  The anamorphic image is a fitting metaphor for the 
tension between looking and being looked at in the Medusan myth, because 
looking at Medusa straight on, that is, having her return one’s gaze, is recipe for 
disaster.  Medusa must be looked at from another angle so that she cannot 
return the gaze, and thus her power is stripped from her by Becoming-looked-
at, where she embodies the sign of the dangerous feminine gaze.  Medusa can 
only safely gaze at one when one cannot see her and thus be in danger of 
turning into stone.  However, silencing women by making them representations 
of the Symbolic and not masters of it means that they become warped images of 
patriarchal authority that can only look back when they are not recognisable, 
because gazing back is itself an unrecognisable trait in a woman.  “You only 
have to look at the Medusa straight on to see her,” writes Cixous, “And she’s not 
deadly.  She’s beautiful and she’s laughing” (“The Laugh of the Medusa” 885).  
The anamorphic image is unrecognisable when viewed from a position of power 
but becomes clear when man changes his viewpoint: will having the feminine 
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gaze returned really turn man into stone, or is it a lie to keep our eyes averted 
and thus have the power to look continue to rest in patriarchal hands? 
 The threat Medusa embodies, that her gaze will mutate the one who 
gazes at her into stone, is the same threat that all monsters engender, which is 
the possibility for unpredictable effects.  Medusa’s gaze makes the one she gazes 
at Other to himself, a stony self, an Other that he cannot possibly predict but 
that lives within his skin.  In M. Butterfly, the Becoming that the anamorphic 
image engenders is such that the figure in power, Gallimard, comes to embody 
its Otherness, where he becomes Other to himself, existing simultaneously as 
both Gallimard and Butterfly.  For Cixous, the threat of Medusa’s gaze to turn 
her viewer into stone is a metaphor for the admixture of a masculine fear of 
feminine power and the erotic impulse to dominate what it fears, finding its 
symbolism in the erect phallus: “  . . . [men] need femininity to be associated 
with death; it’s the jitters that gives them a hard-on!  [F]or themselves!  They 
need to be afraid of us.  Look at the trembling Perseuses moving backward 
toward us, clad in apotropes96” (885).  While this is a compelling approach to 
Freud’s reading of the Medusan myth, it is the power to impose the Becoming-
Other through the gaze that I find most interesting about Medusa and which is 
aptly re-enacted by the positioning required to view the anamorphic image.  It 
is precisely because Medusa is female that her gaze turns men to stone: erotic 
subtext notwithstanding, her “inappropriateness” at being the subject of the 
gaze rather than its object is what mutates men into monstrous versions of 
themselves, where they are literally made powerless to act because their role as 
lord of the transcendental signifier has been usurped by the threatened 
authority of the feminine gaze. 
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 Finding himself able to see from the point of view of the anamorphic 
image by the play’s close, Gallimard is not turned into stone but is instead 
turned into something worse – woman.  In psychoanalytic terms, being petrified 
and being turned into a woman are the same thing, as each have the same effect 
of taking phallic authority from man, hence Freud’s boy child’s castration 
anxiety at seeing his mother’s vulva: it is not the loss of the thing itself he is 
afraid of, but the loss of his power.  The sudden fright Gallimard gets when faced 
with an accurate view of the anamorphic image, corrected by the removal of 
Song’s briefs, is not just coming to the realisation that the object he held in his 
gaze was all along looking back, but that he has now become the object of the 
gaze and has lost his phallic power.  Every sexual encounter Gallimard has leads 
him to this moment of revelation, where it is not just Song’s true identity that is 
revealed, but also Gallimard’s.  This realisation of the self is a monstrous birth 
as it arrives seemingly without warning – at least, it does for Gallimard, who, 
thinking he had dominated Song, also thought that he had finally become the 
man he always wanted to be, and, instead, finds himself embodying the woman 
he always wanted to have. 
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Chapter Five: The Monstrative and Becoming: 
Rape and Atonement in J. M. Coetzee’s Disgrace 
 
  “Animal is a word that men have given themselves the right to give” 
(Derrida The Animal That Therefore I Am 32, his emphasis). 
 
  “ . . . recognition becomes the process by which I become other than 
what I was and so cease to be able to return to what I was” (Butler Giving an 
Account of Oneself 27). 
 
  “All becoming is becoming monster; even the desire to want to become 
is monstrous, because all becoming is about an ambiguity between, but never 
attaining either of, two points” (Patricia McCormack “Perversion: Transgressive 
Sexuality and Becoming-Monster” 11). 
 
 
Introduction: Rape and Becoming-Animal in Coetzee’s Disgrace 
 In this chapter, I deal with two major theoretical concerns as they relate 
to the category of the monstrative: the constitutionality of rape and the process 
of Becoming-animal.  These themes come together in this chapter as they relate 
to identity formation, specifically as a process that produces an “I” always in 
relation (and often in opposition) to a “you.”  Such a process invariably 
produces ethical questions that concern human relationships, as well as our 
relationships with other beings, so that ontological queries always already 
presuppose not just the “I’s” rights but its responsibilities towards the Other.  
As Butler writes, “Nietzsche did well to understand that I begin my story of 
myself only in the face of a ‘you’ who asks me to give an account” (11), where 
accounting for oneself has the double meaning of self-constitution before the 
Other and of defending one’s actions.  J. M. Coetzee’s 1999 Booker Prize winning 
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novel, Disgrace, can be understood as the attempt by its white, male protagonist 
to account for his actions.  However, unlike Vladimir Nabokov’s Lolita, to give a 
similar example of narrative accountability, Disgrace is written in the third 
person but is focalized through its protagonist, David Lurie, allowing him a 
degree of distance from the accountability of first person confessional 
narratives such as Lolita.  Instead, Disgrace posits a narrative situation in which 
the constitutional effects of rape indirectly affect Lurie (who is himself 
accountable for rape), which is played out by his Becoming-animal as the novel 
progresses. 
 At the fore of Coetzee’s philosophy in Disgrace is a deeply ethical concern 
for the individual’s responsibilities towards the Other, which in the novel takes 
the form of the absolute Other, an Other whose will cannot be known because of 
its total inability to use the Symbolic Order.  In Disgrace, as with Derrida in The 
Animal That Therefore I Am, the absolute Other arrives in the form of the animal 
– the silent, impenetrable Other that has been subject to centuries of human 
violence and neglect.  Thus, the ethical questions with which Coetzee is engaged 
in this novel, and with which this chapter will be concerned, emphasise 
moments of human silence and refusal that take place in the novel and 
juxtapose them against the Other’s absolute silence and inability to 
communicate.  The Other’s silence, whether a conscious choice or the absolute 
inability to communicate, is also contrasted with the human propensity to use 
narrative as a form of justification, as well as highlighting the constitutional 
effects of narrative and literary discourse.  In Disgrace, the literary canon is very 
clearly demonstrated as a performative force that constitutes the bodies it 
describes and is also very clearly presented by the novel as a system of 
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representation that can be and has been wielded by a self-serving androcentric 
authority. 
 I start this chapter with an analysis of rape as it occurs in the novel, 
continuing with the interpretation of rape as performative and monstrative.  In 
addition to this analysis, I investigate the linguistic power carried in the act of 
defining rape, and how the resulting definitions have perpetuated feminine 
oppression.97  The conceptual definition of rape is a crucial aspect of the novel 
but it is also key to this thesis as it exemplifies what is at stake in the use of 
monstrative language, demonstrating how those with the authority to wield 
language use it to corroborate their innocence, vilify the victims of sexual 
violence, and perpetuate their power and the cycle of oppression and violence.  
This chapter examines both the performativity of rape and the performativity of 
defining rape, and how these acts interrelate, serving as a point from which to 
discuss the monstrativity of (specifically) rape and (generally) of violent bodily 
and speech acts.  From this, I turn to a discussion on responsibility to the Other 
as it figures in Disgrace and how it relates to violent acts that do not only cause 
injury, but constitute identities through the act of injury. 
 At all times, I use Coetzee’s novel to illustrate the broader discussion on 
rape but also to read the violence of these acts against the specific backdrop in 
which Coetzee has set the novel, that of the post-apartheid, “new” South Africa.  
My reasons for this are that South Africa’s new constitution, which was drawn 
up in 1995, was the first constitution in the world to include non-discriminatory 
laws with regard not just to race, ethnicity, religion, and gender, but to sexuality 
and trans* rights.  In the twenty years since the inauguration of the new 
constitution, much scholarly attention98 has been given to what appears to be a 
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widening gap between the constitution and the realities that South Africans face 
in their everyday lives, particularly with regard to issues centring on violence 
against women and crimes targeting South Africa’s LGBTQ communities.  Very 
little criticism on the novel has focused on the point that Lucy Lurie’s rape is in 
fact a punishment for her “crime” of being a lesbian.  In this chapter, I 
demonstrate the critical importance of Lucy’s sexuality to the altering ethnic 
landscape of the new South Africa, where she is raped not because she is Lucy, 
but because of what she stands for, because of what, in her attackers’ eyes, her 
materially female body is a sign of.  Monstrative acts are the process whereby 
bodies are made into signs, and rape is such an act.  The monstrativity of rape 
lies in its ability to feminize its victim’s body, simultaneously masculinizing the 
body/ies of the perpetrator/s.  Thus, what this analysis demonstrates is that 
while speech can be an act, acts can also perform as speech. 
 Silence plays a crucial role in the representation and justification of all 
violent acts, where it is often the reclamation of the victim’s once-silenced 
narrative that is used to redefine these acts as violent and transgressive.  
Whether silencing has been enforced or is a symptom of trauma, its existence 
has been taken as consent for the violence committed against the “I” and used 
as part of the justificatory narratives for bodily violence.  This stands 
particularly true for rape, and Disgrace goes so far as to use silence as a literary 
device, where Lucy’s refusal to narrate her rape becomes one of the major 
ethical points in the protagonist’s redemption arc.  The choice Lucy has in 
remaining silent about her rape, however limited that may be, is juxtaposed 
against the absolute narrative silence of the animals that populate the novel, 
reinforcing Coetzee’s ethical concerns with regard to silence, consent, and 
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responsibility to the Other.  Silence is figured in the novel not just as “not 
telling,” but as a refusal to narrate, to represent.  While the events of Lucy’s rape 
are left absolutely unrepresented by the novel (we only know it is rape because 
the narrative is focalized through Lurie and because Lucy falls pregnant), 
Melanie’s rape by Lurie is aestheticized and fetishized to the extent that it is 
(more often than not) not regarded by the novel’s critics as a rape.  
Furthermore, we are not offered Melanie’s perception of the events as she is the 
object of Lurie’s narrative focus, that is, she is the focalized to Lurie’s focalizer.  
That she is made the object of the narrative focus in this way is precisely 
because we are meant to regard Melanie as an object, not merely of lust and 
sexual conquest, but, specifically, as an exemplified object of patriarchal 
narrative practice, which has the simultaneous effect of (re)constituting her as 
an object. 
 The performativity of narrative to shape the “truth” of events is indelibly 
tied to the manner in which rape is interpreted as rape, which, in turn, 
perpetuates the constitution of a culture of rape.  Rape culture is narrowly 
defined as a cultural acceptance of rape, but is gradually also coming to mean 
the acceptance of the ownership of women’s bodies within public spaces, a 
narrative that is enacted not just through rape but through various practices 
that perpetuate the self-regulation of women’s bodies in public spaces, 
including street harassment, sexual harassment, assault, and the normalising of 
a sexuality that is not in ownership or control of itself.  I analyse this more 
closely further on in this chapter.  The narratives of ownership and control, the 
total of female and animal narrative voice, and the focalization of the narrative 
through Lurie are used by Coetzee not just to critique misogynist practices, but 
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to demonstrate the interrelation between a phallocentric view of the world and 
androcentric, technocratic, planet-harming practices.  Much of Coetzee’s writing 
has been noted99 as focussing on the slippage between a European 
conceptualisation of land ownership and the misuse of women’s bodies, and 
Disgrace continues this slippage in the form of Lucy’s rape and her ownership of 
the farm.  This slippage is further disrupted by the addition of the misuse of 
animals’ bodies in the novel, both physically and discursively.  As the novel’s 
title suggests, its narrative events concentrate on the protagonist’s fall from 
grace into a state of abjection, only finding a shaky redemption once he accepts 
his utter powerlessness, which is characterised in the novel as his Becoming-
animal. 
 Tom Herron (2005) has already pointed out that Disgrace takes the form 
of a narrative metamorphosis, where the novel’s protagonist literally becomes a 
“dog-man” (Disgrace 64).  This metamorphosis is always already incomplete: 
Lurie does not become a dog, but becomes some sort of hybrid, a monstrous 
version of himself and the dogs that come under his care in the second half of 
the novel.  In order to explain this metamorphic process, I employ Deleuze and 
Guattari’s concept of Becoming-animal, which they explain 
  is to participate in a movement, to stake out the path of escape in all its 
  positivity, to cross a threshold, to reach a continuum of intensities that 
  are valuable only in themselves, to find a world of pure intensities 
  where all forms come undone, as do all the significations, signifiers, and 
  signifieds, to the benefit of an unformed matter of deterritorialized flux, 
  of nonsignifying signs” (“Becoming-Animal” 96). 
To become animal, then, is to become something that exists outside Symbolic 
meaning, and to be something that sees the absolute Other as him-/herself and 
him-/herself as the absolute Other.  James Urpeth offers another account: 
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  In logical terms the notion of “becoming-animal” challenges the 
  primacy traditionally accorded to negation, a claim concerning the 
  nature of thinking by both Aristotelian and Hegelian philosophy.  The 
  significance of such a displacement is clear if it is recalled that it is via 
  negation that self-identity and indeed all distinctions in kind, including
  the opposition between “man” and “nature,” are established (“Animal 
  Becomings” 104). 
If we recall the definitions of monstrosity made earlier in this thesis, the 
monstrous creatures of antiquity are often hybridised forms of other animals, 
including animal-human hybrids, such as mermaids, centaurs, Pegasus, and so 
on.  These creatures exist under the appellation, “monster,” because they do not 
obey the categories nature has ostensibly set out for them.  Of course, as we 
now know, the in-between is precisely the state in which every living thing on 
the planet exists, as we constantly evolve to adapt to our changing 
environments.   In Coetzee’s novel, this state is represented as Becoming-
animal. 
 David Lurie’s Becoming-animal occurs through his state of disgrace: the 
event in which he is attacked and Lucy raped leads to his eventual atonement, 
which is meant in the sense of redemption for his wrongdoings against Melanie 
but also in the sense of being at one with those he shares his abject state.  In 
Disgrace, these are the dogs that he and Bev Shaw euthanize because nobody 
else can or wants to care for them.  His at-one-ment with these animals is what 
makes Lurie a monster, a “dog-man,” but this Becoming-animal does not occur 
in one single event; instead, Lurie’s Becoming is a series of events that accrue to 
make him at one with the Other he has up to this stage treated as secondary and 
inferior.  Furthermore, it is through this Becoming-animal that Coetzee invites 
us to meditate on our relationship with the Other as Other, and to reflect on 
similar tropes regarding human (mal)treatment of animals, colonialism, and the 
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patriarchal control of gendered arrangements and expectations.  Disgrace thus 
questions our responsibilities to the Other while suggesting that it is only 
through Becoming-Other that we can atone for the vast inequalities and 
oppressive systems to which we have subjected the other beings with whom we 
share this planet. 
 This chapter focuses a good deal on the ethics of performative acts, on 
our responsibilities to the Other that we linguistically constitute, to the 
monsters that we create with our performative acts.  The concept of Becoming, 
particularly in its relation to the static philosophical and psychoanalytical 
notion of Being, necessarily invokes an ethics, because it is always already 
about becoming Other than what one already is.  Becoming also situates the 
performative within an ethical framework: Becoming is constitutional, as well 
as being a physical and psychical doing, which means that it is performative.  
Butler’s scholarly concern for the ethics of performative acts was already clear 
in Excitable Speech, and much of her later work100 has focussed on the 
responsibilities we undertake when, as social actors, we act in and upon the 
world.  Because the monstrative is a performative force (the force that makes 
the Other into sign), I also discuss the ethical implications of making monsters, 
with the help of Disgrace.  The ethical concerns of this analysis are not just to 
question what responsibilities we have to our (linguistic) creations, but to 
interrogate the right to narrate in the first instance.  If narrative creates 
Symbolic meaning and the ordering of the world according to the narrator’s 
tenets, what right does s/he have to wield the word, especially when an 
irresponsible use of language can injure, traumatise, and create identity through 
injury or trauma?  Moreover, what right do we have to demand narrative in the 
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wake of a traumatic event?  Finally, using Disgrace as a narrative template that 
posits the “what if?” of monstrous birth, I examine the ethical concerns 
surrounding the Derridean event, and our responsibility to welcome the 
absolute Other, even if that means inviting in a most unwelcome and 
unmitigated disaster. 
 
The Performative Rhetoric of Rape Culture/The Performative Act 
of Rape 
 In a recent article, I wrote about the two performative acts that take 
place when rape is committed: the rape itself, which creates and reifies gender 
binaries, simultaneously placing categories within a hierarchical structure, and 
the rhetoric that supports the act, either by claiming that it is not rape, or 
through victim-blaming (“Disgrace: Rape Culture Rhetoric in the New South 
Africa” 2013).  I pointed out that while rape is itself a performative act, the 
rhetoric that surrounds it is also performative because it creates rape culture 
(101-2).  Rape culture has been defined as a culture that condones or 
normalises rape, but in reality is as complex as the definition of rape itself, 
because rape culture does much more than just condone physical assault.  It 
also perpetuates a narrow definition of rape, tolerates various types of public 
harassment of women,101 reifies gender binaries by insisting on strict defining 
differences between men and women, normalises victim-blaming, and passes 
rape off as seduction or normal, healthy sex.  While rape culture affects men 
adversely, and in varying ways, for the purposes of this argument I will be 
focussing on the negative effects of rape culture on women’s lives.  I am 
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especially concerned in this analysis with definitions of rape and their 
connection to the production of rape culture, particularly with regard to 
aestheticized narrative representations such as those we find in literary texts. 
 I moreover use “narrative” rather than “discourse” to describe these 
representations, as “narrative” implies an element of storytelling, an artistic 
weaving of events, and a making of representation that “discourse” does not 
necessarily express.  The definition of rape is contingent on storytelling, as Lynn 
A. Higgins and Brenda R. Silver explain in Rape and Representation, stating that 
“who gets to tell the story and whose story counts as ‘truth’ determine the 
definition of what rape is” (1, emphasis in the original).  As they point out, the 
person narrating is who gets to retrospectively define the act as rape or not, 
where “representations of rape after the event are almost always framed by a 
masculine perspective premised on men’s fantasies about female sexuality and 
their fears of false accusation, as well as their codified access to and possession 
of women’s bodies” (2).  Examples of this kind of retrospective delineation find 
themselves reiterated not only in backwater fundamentalist contexts but are in 
fact enunciated by personalities in leadership positions all over the world, 
where recent instances include comments by the ex-Representative for the 
State of Missouri, Todd Akin, and British M. P., George Galloway.  What is 
important is not just that these are people in leadership positions whose public 
comments are read and heard by hundreds-of-thousands of people (if not 
millions), but that they are men, and that they are in positions of privilege, with 
considerable influence and resources at their disposal.  While Akin’s comments 
were certainly baffling in their misunderstanding of basic human biology, what 
concerns this analysis is that in order to put forward his peculiar view on the 
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logistics of insemination,102 Akin promoted rape apology by using the rhetoric 
of “legitimate rape.” 
 Akin uses the term “legitimate rape” as a way in which to delineate rape 
from false accusations, but what is reiterated by this rhetoric is the implication 
that some rape is not really rape, but something else altogether.  Galloway’s 
comments on the Julian Assange case103 echoed these sentiments by eloquently 
asserting that “[n]ot everybody needs to be asked prior to each insertion” (qtd. 
in Williams 2012), which, in other words, means that it is not really rape if you 
have just had consensual sex with that same partner.  Higgins’ and Silver’s 
statement that retrospective comments on rape are often made by men is 
certainly validated by these two examples, while their point that the person 
“who gets to tell the story and whose story counts as ‘truth’ determine the 
definition of what rape is” concludes that both Galloway’s and Akin’s comments 
are performative.  A performative speech act does not just report on an existing 
truth but brings into being that which it describes: thus the proposal that there 
are certain types of rape that are not “legitimate” performatively constitutes the 
definition of rape, doing so in a manner that excuses certain types of rape 
because it is believed that it is not rape at all.  If we are to define rape according 
to Akin, then women who seek abortions due to rape have not been raped 
(because rapists’ sperm is apparently rejected by women’s bodies), and if we 
accept Galloway’s definition, then spousal and partner rape are non-existent.  
That there are thirty countries in the world that do not count marital rape a 
crime and that many rapes committed by partners go unreported on a global 
level makes Galloway’s statement highly problematic, because it suggests that a 
man who is already in a sexual relationship with a woman has absolute right to 
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her body.  This kind of thinking belies the underlying point that women are 
often regarded as property and pervasively so. 
 The definition of rape is a major conceptual conundrum in Disgrace.  
Where Lucy’s rape is rape in the classic sense – enforced and violent 
penetrative sex by three total strangers – it is not the only rape that occurs in 
the novel.  Lurie’s “affair” with his student, Melanie, is not the consensual 
contract between two adults that a sexual relationship should be, and, as such, 
their sexual union is complicated by the imbalance of power between them.  
This imbalance is constituted not just of a student-teacher dynamic, but by that 
of race (Herron writes that there is a strong possibility that Melanie is 
coloured,104 while Lurie is definitely white), affluence (Lurie is not 
uncomfortable, while Melanie is a student on a scholarship), and, especially, by 
that of gender (Herron 477).  Furthermore, as the following scene 
demonstrates, the power dynamic between Lurie and Melanie culminates in 
rape: 
  He has given her no warning; she is too surprised to resist the intruder 
  who thrusts himself upon her.  When he takes her in his arms, her limbs 
  crumple like a marionette’s.  Words as heavy as clubs thud into the 
  delicate whorl of her ear.  ‘No, not now!’ she says, struggling.  ‘My 
  cousin will be back!’  But nothing will stop him.  He carries her to the 
  bedroom, brushes off the absurd slippers, kisses her feet, astonished by 
  the feeling she evokes . . . She does not resist.  All she does is avert 
  herself: avert her lips, avert her eyes.  She lets him lay her out on the 
  bed and undress her: she even helps him, raising her arms and then her 
  hips.  Little shivers of cold run through her; as soon as she is bare, she 
  slips under the quilted counterpane like a mole burrowing, and turns 
  her back on him.  Not rape, not quite that, but undesired nevertheless, 
  undesired to the core.  As though she had decided to go slack, die within 
  herself for the duration, like a rabbit when the jaws of the fox close on 
  its neck (Disgrace 24-5). 
 
 An extraordinary passage, this is nonetheless one of the most 
problematic moments in the novel, not only because of what it depicts and the 
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way in which it is depicted, but because of who narrates the moment; as Higgins 
and Silver write, in deciding if rape is rape, “who is speaking may be all that 
matters” (1, emphasis theirs).  Although this is a third person narrative, Lurie is 
its focalizer, which means that the narrative goes some way to vindicate his 
actions.  The focalized narrative gives us insight into his motivations, but it also 
makes us aware of the ideology to which Lurie is heir, that is, white European 
patriarchy.  Furthermore, by writing in the third person, Coetzee is distanced 
from the narrative that would otherwise perhaps conflate him with his 
protagonist.  Like Lurie, Coetzee is a privileged, educated, white South African 
man; thus, his treatment of such contentious subject matter, not only with 
regard to race relations but as a male writer writing rape, has to be delicate and 
cautious.  While Higgins and Silver question the role of male authors in 
representing rape (5), they do not discourage male writers from discussing the 
subject; indeed, at least one of the writers contributing to their edited collection 
is male.  Neither does Coetzee shy away from the subject, although he does treat 
it with the respect due of a man representing an act that has an aesthetic 
tradition of being represented as masculine seduction, which is precisely why 
the narrative, while focalized through Lurie, is written in the third person.  By 
writing this scene from Lurie’s perspective, Coetzee represents rape from the 
point of view of a man who believes he is the “servant of Eros,”105 whose “case 
rests on the rights of desire” no matter who is affected (Disgrace 89).  Lurie 
does not think that what he has done is rape and cannot make the comparison 
between this scene and the later one in which his daughter is raped by three 
strangers. 
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 He knows, however, once it is over that he has done something wrong, 
that what happened in Melanie’s apartment was “done to her” (25, my 
emphasis): 
   . . . when he reaches his car, [he] is overtaken with such dejection, such 
  dullness, that he sits slumped at the wheel unable to move.  A mistake, a 
  huge mistake.  At this moment, he has no doubt, she, Melanie, is trying 
  to cleanse herself of it, of him.  He sees her running a bath, stepping into 
  the water, eyes closed like a sleepwalker’s.  He would like to slide into a 
  bath of his own (25). 
However, both during and after the episode, he is characterised by a lack of 
autonomy, overtaken instead by a desire planted in him by ancient (European) 
Gods: “Strange love!  Yet from the quiver of Aphrodite, goddess of the foaming 
waves, no doubt about that” (25).  What is more, Melanie is represented in the 
episode as not completely unwilling; she “does not resist,” she “helps him, [by] 
raising her arms and then her hips” (25).  Higgins and Silver explain that in the 
literary representations of rape that make up their study, substantiating the 
rape claim often means that the victim has to prove their “innocence” by 
exhibiting resistance during the assault, demonstrating a chaste sex life, or 
other such forms of victim-blaming (2), where it is the victim who is implicated 
and not the perpetrator.  Unfortunately, this is not an unusual phenomenon: 
just a quick Google search results in three separate rape trials between 2007 
and 2014 in which judges in the U. K. and the U. S. have blamed victims for being 
raped because they did not demonstrate “enough” resistance or because they 
were regarded as sexually promiscuous and thus open to attack.106 
 Disgrace muddies the waters of definition in its depiction of Melanie’s 
compliance with Lurie’s acts, but it does this precisely because the historic 
definition of rape is not clear cut.  Women may submit to their rapists for any 
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number of reasons, chief among them the fear of physical injury or death, but 
this does not mean that what they have suffered is not rape.  Narratives that 
employ victim-blaming such as the real-life cases cited above and such as 
Melanie’s in Disgrace are precisely the kinds of representation that constitute 
rape culture.  Victim-blaming is, moreover, complemented by the surrender of 
autonomy by rapists: Lurie is not accountable for his actions because he is 
“servant of Eros,” because the god “acted through” him (89), and, in an effort to 
explain his actions to his daughter, he compares himself to a dog whose 
instinctual urges could not be helped (89-90).  The representation of rape as an 
act that cannot be helped not only creates rape culture but disguises the fact 
that it is rape, even from those doing the raping.  In an article on rape, race, and 
gender in the new South Africa, Helen Moffett imparts the story of a televised 
interview with a South African taxi driver, who openly described his weekend 
activities with his friends as “gang-banging.”  Moffett writes that when told that 
what he was doing was in fact rape, his surprised rebuttal was “‘But these 
women, they force us to rape them!’” (qtd. in Moffett 138).  She continues: “He 
followed this astonished disavowal of male agency by explaining that he and his 
friends picked only those women who ‘asked for it’.  When asked to define what 
this meant, he said, ‘It’s only the cheeky ones – the ones that walk around like 
they own the place, and look you in the eye.’” (138). 
 As Moffett points out in this passage, the cultural narrative of men such 
as this is that what they are performing is not rape, but the “teaching” of a 
lesson and the disciplining of those they deem in need of correction (138).  This 
narrative is very different to the one that Lurie uses to convince himself that his 
liaison with Melanie is seduction, but it is voiced for precisely the same reason: 
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it is an attempt by the rapist(s) to (re)claim a masculinity being denied them 
through the feminisation of the victim.  In Lurie’s case, his failed seduction of 
Melanie is a result of the emasculating effects of aging; where his early self-
description as classically good-looking meant that “[i]f he looked at a woman in 
a certain way, with a certain intent, she would return his look, he could rely on 
that” (7). 
 However, he finds that as he ages, his allure dwindles and he must find 
other ways in which to assure himself of his manliness.  Lurie’s masculinity is 
absolutely tied to his self-image as a seducer of women, as an active force that 
pursues women as trophies.  When his powers of seduction fade with his looks, 
he “exist[s] in an anxious flurry of promiscuity” (7) and he finds himself in a 
position he regards as abject, as unwanted, at least, sexually.  His abject state is 
made up of a diminished masculinity, where he imagines the conversations had 
by women in his absence: “He has a shrewd idea of how prostitutes speak 
among themselves about the men who frequent them, the older men in 
particular.  They tell stories, they laugh, but they shudder too, as one shudders 
at a cockroach in the washbasin in the middle of the night.  Soon, daintily, 
maliciously, he will be shuddered over” (8).  His abjection is symbolised in this 
passage by a cockroach, an insect that lives on the effluence of others, especially 
of humans, which is why they are often found in bathrooms and kitchens.  Later 
in this chapter, I go into more detail on Lurie’s use of animal symbolism, 
whereas now I concentrate on his motives for pursuing Melanie. 
 Importantly, Lurie’s emasculation is tied not to his inability to please 
women, but to their sexual conquest: when he takes the new secretary of his 
department home for sex, he describes it as a “failure” because of the degree to 
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which she seems to enjoy it, where “[b]ucking and clawing, she works herself 
into a froth of excitement that in the end only repels him” (9).  Thus, his pursuit 
of Melanie is coloured by his self-image as a conquistador rather than an 
attentive lover, where women are regarded as objects to be won and then 
discarded.  The way in which his affair with Melanie is narrated only adds to his 
emasculation; although he “wins” her sexually a number of times, he is always 
left wanting more from her; moreover, his seduction techniques, while resulting 
in the desired finale, do not wholly captivate her.  It is as if he wants not just to 
conquer her body but to make her as obsessed with him as he is with her.  
Lurie’s description of the encounters he has with Melanie also demonstrate that 
his emasculation is indelibly tied to his strange new moribundity, where his 
techniques at seduction fail due to the almost visible age gap between them.  
When he first invites her to his apartment, he shows her a film by Norman 
McLaren, probably Pas de Deux (1968), where his hope is that Melanie will feel 
as “captivated” by McLaren’s dancers as he is: 
  Two dancers on a bare stage move through their steps.  Recorded by a 
  stroboscopic camera, their images, ghosts of their movements, fan out 
  behind them like wingbeats.  It is a film he first saw a quarter of a 
  century ago but is still captivated by: the instant of the present and the 
  past of that instant, evanescent, caught in the same space.  He wills the 
  girl to be captivated too.  But he senses she is not (Disgrace 15). 
 Having thus far garnered little attention from critics, this passage is 
crucial to understanding the existential crisis Lurie finds himself in.  This crisis 
is existential precisely because the “I” “ . . . cannot be said to have a signifiable 
existence prior to the mark of [its] gender” (Butler Gender Trouble 13), which 
means that in finding himself “losing” his masculinity through the waning of his 
seductive powers, Lurie is losing himself, losing his self-understanding as man.  
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Because he lives within a system of binaries, this can only mean that he is 
Becoming-woman, a Becoming that he will later try to actively perform.  The 
significance of this passage is that first, the dancers are described in precisely 
the same manner in which Lurie has only just described himself, where his 
declining magnetism has left him a “ghost” of his former self (7).  Lurie is a 
ghost because he is not seen by the gaze he wishes returned, where “[g]lances 
that would once have responded to his slid over, past, through him” (7); 
moreover, like the dancers, he is a ghost because he exists simultaneously as his 
old self, the young seducer, as well as this new self that has lost his powers to 
captivate.  Like the dancers, old Lurie and young Lurie, masculine Lurie and 
emasculated Lurie, are “caught in the same space” of his desire, and the film 
only serves to visualise this moment of Becoming.  Second, Melanie is quite 
obviously (to everyone but Lurie) not about to be captivated by the scene of 
evanescence precisely because she has not lived it yet; Lurie recounts that it 
was twenty-five years since he first saw the film, where Melanie cannot even be 
that old yet (she is probably somewhere between eighteen and twenty-two).  
Lurie’s use of the verb “captivate” is deliberately chosen by Coetzee in this 
moment, where its etymological relationship with the verb “to capture” signals 
his actual motives in inviting Melanie into his house, but instead, he finds 
himself captured by his desire and by his aging body. 
 What is more, there is a subtle indication in this passage towards the 
animal symbolism with which he will regard Melanie in subsequent chapters, 
where the “wingbeats” of the dancers’ movements foreshadow his eventual 
portrayal of her as his “[p]oor little bird” (32), and his “little dove” (34).107  The 
image of Melanie as a caged bird is not a far leap to make.  Animal imagery is 
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used consistently through the novel for a number of reasons, not least of which 
is the language of seduction that Lurie borrows from his literary forebears.  As 
an academic well-versed in English literature,108 Lurie adopts the language of 
the English poets as a means by which to seduce Melanie, inviting her to submit 
to this seduction by saying that “a woman’s beauty does not belong to her alone.  
It is part of the bounty she brings into the world.  She has a duty to share it” 
(16).  In order to ring this truth home, he quotes from Shakespeare’s “Sonnet 1”: 
“From fairest creatures we desire increase, that thereby beauty’s rose might 
never die” (1-2); however, this only serves to further alienate her by reinforcing 
the various divides between them.  His role as Melanie’s teacher is suddenly 
emphasised in this moment, which in his mind furthers the age-gap between 
them, but what he does not realise is that he is also reifying the strangeness of 
his master tongue, the English language with which his ancestors have 
subjugated much of the African continent.  In History of the Voice, the Barbadian 
poet, Kamau Brathwaite, writes of the unfamiliarity felt by children in the 
colonies on learning English poetry in school, explaining that “[w]hat English 
has given us as a model for poetry . . . is the pentameter” (9) yet, to a child living 
in the Caribbean, this meter sounds odd and unnatural, for the “hurricane does 
not roar in pentameters” (10).  Similarly, the subject matter of English poetry is 
often a world away from the experiences of people in the (ex)colonies, which is 
partly why Lurie’s words serve only to alienate him from Melanie. 
 Lurie’s mastery of the English tradition performatively constitutes his 
masculinity, a masculinity that is specifically contingent upon a European 
poetics of seduction that is made up of centuries’ worth of masculine wooing 
techniques and into which Coetzee weaves a complex layer of intertextual 
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material.  Lucy Valerie Graham explains that the history of the Western artistic 
tradition has had “a fraught relationship” with the representation of rape 
(“Reading the Unspeakable: Rape in J. M. Coetzee’s Disgrace” 439), where the 
poetics of seduction and aesthetic renditions of rape intersect in worrying ways.  
Higgins and Silver, meanwhile assert that “the politics and aesthetics of rape are 
one” (1), and it would certainly seem that Coetzee means for us to make the 
same connection between Lurie’s privileged use of seductive poetics and the 
performative speech act that his daughter’s rape represents.  Pamela Cooper 
writes that “Lurie’s sense of sexual right rests on his mastery of the symbolism 
of desire and otherness entrenched within the Anglo-European aesthetic 
tradition,” where “in contemporary South Africa, the erotic conventions of 
Western art split off from their referents to drift among alien signifiers” 
(“Metamorphosis and Sexuality: Reading the Strange Passions of Disgrace” 25).  
Like Brathwaite’s contention that English poetic modes ultimately fail in a 
colonial setting, Lurie’s performative speech act misfires, as it does not convince 
Melanie to fall in love with him.  However, like many unhappy performatives, 
this does not mean that Lurie’s iteration of the Western aesthetic does not 
produce a performative act: what it does instead is reproduce the conventions 
of rape culture, which is intonated by Lurie in the same aesthetic as his old 
masters.  Thus, saying that “[b]eauty does not own itself” (Disgrace 16), while 
lofty sounding, ultimately has the performative effect of absolving Lurie of the 
crime he later commits, permitting him to become the owner he thinks she 
lacks. 
 While Lurie alludes to the English tradition in many of the lines he feeds 
Melanie, in his private thoughts, which we are privy to through the use of 
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italicization, and in his hopes to produce an opera on Byron, the literary 
allusions Coetzee makes in and through the novel’s plot point to a far deeper, 
more insidious tradition in the West of representing rape as courtly love, as 
women’s fate, and as men’s due.  For example, Graham points out that the two 
women raped in Disgrace have names that echo literary forebears: Lucrece 
(Lucy) in Shakespeare, and Philomela (Melanie) in Ovid (439).  What is more, 
Coetzee’s intersection of Western aesthetic traditions with the (post)colonial 
conflation of bodies and land echo Western poetic modes of seduction as well as 
the tradition of the English pastoral.  Much postcolonial feminist theory is 
concerned with the conceptual slippage between imperial expansion and the 
bodily violations of those being subjugated by its rule, in both imperialist 
rhetoric and in the acts carried out in its name.  Coetzee’s writing focuses quite 
often on white South Africans’ relationship with the land,109 and Disgrace is no 
different; in this novel, however, Coetzee conflates notions of land ownership 
and boundaries with women’s rights to bodily sovereignty, comparing the 
patriarchal modes of the white settlers, who cling to their European heritage, 
with those of the rising black power in the new South Africa.  With regard to 
Coetzee’s postcolonial stance, Rita Barnard names the genre that novels such as 
Disgrace challenges the “South African Pastoral,” a genre of white (often 
Afrikaans) writing that praises the beauty of the land and the simplicity of 
pastoral life, while omitting the theft of land and living space that colonialism 
ensured. 
 Graham explains that the South African Pastoral “presents a vision of the 
‘husband-farmer’ as custodian of the feminine earth [which] has been 
discursively implicated in the colonial appropriation of territory” (438).  Using 
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Coetzee’s White Writing: On the Culture of Letters in South Africa (1988), 
Barnard offers more on the “husband-farmer,” whose “dream topography” is 
“the family farm, ruled by the patriarch and inscribed (albeit by the invisible 
labor of black hands) as a legacy for his sons, theirs to inherit and bequeath in 
perpetuity” (qtg. Coetzee 6: 204).  As such, the South African farm has become a 
symbol of colonial oppression, and thus a contested space for patriarchal 
control, just as it has in neighbouring Zimbabwe.  One of the myriad reasons 
that farm space is disputed in southern Africa is because of size, which averages 
on 1,200 hectares per privately-owned, commercial farm (Gbetibouo and 
Ringler 7), the remains of colonial expansion.  These large tracts of land were 
originally claimed by white European settlers and made into farmland overseen 
by white custodians.  The correlation between the rhetoric of colonial land-
grabbing and that of seduction in the European aesthetic tradition is made 
precisely because imperialism is a patriarchal system.  Moreover, the Western 
canon is made largely of men’s writing, where the literature of seduction quite 
often belies the misogynist and imperialist ideals of its writers, who make 
metaphorical connections between the conquering of women’s bodies and land.  
Take, for example, John Donne’s poem, “Elegy 19, To His Mistress Going to Bed” 
(1669), which makes such a comparison between the newly-“discovered” 
Americas and the body of the woman who he is at pains to seduce: 
  O my America! my new-found-land, 
  My kingdom, safeliest when with one man manned, 
  My mine of precious stones, my empery, 
  How blest am I in this discovering thee! (26-30) 
It is precisely from this tradition that David Lurie performatively constitutes his 
masculine authority and desire. 
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 While Lurie himself is not a conquistador of space in this way, he is 
certainly a conqueror of women.  Instead, Coetzee makes the connection 
between the patriarchal control of women’s bodies and colonisation through 
Lucy’s rape, which takes a very different form from Melanie’s.  In fact, Lucy’s 
rape perhaps best fits what Akin calls “legitimate” rape, that is to say, rape that 
is part of a violent physical assault, perpetrated by invasive strangers, and 
which is very obviously unwanted.  Significantly, in the context of the novel, 
Lucy, who is white, is raped by three black men, who drag her into her own 
house to enact the assault, a detail for which Coetzee received a lot of criticism 
following the publication of Disgrace.  Graham remarks that there is an 
argument that the rhetoric of “black peril” is reiterated by this move, but she 
refutes this by pointing out that that such an argument “obscures the fact that 
most rapes in South Africa are intraracial” (435).  The uproar in South Africa 
regarding Lucy’s rape scene was such that politicians, academics, and 
journalists all weighed in with their displeasure at what was deemed a racist 
attack on the policies of the new South Africa.  Graham quotes Jeff Radebe, 
Minister for Public Enterprises under Thabo Mbeki’s A. N. C. government, as 
saying: “In this novel J. M. Coetzee represents as brutally as he can the white 
people’s perception of the post-apartheid black man” (435), while Moffett 
explains that “luminaries from the President himself to the cream of South 
Africa’s writers and academics assumed all too readily that any discussion of 
rape [such as that posited by Disgrace] is predicated on a rapist who is black” 
(135).  What is made quite clear in either case is that only Lucy’s ordeal has 
been regarded as rape, whereas Melanie’s has not. 
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 In fact, many of the critics writing about Disgrace do not regard Melanie’s 
ordeal as rape, or they simply choose not to write about it: both Herron (477) 
and Maria Lopez (924) refer to Melanie’s rape as “abuse,” while Cooper names it 
only “effectively a rape” (25); Sue Kossew, meanwhile, perplexingly contends 
that Lurie’s behaviour is “more morally complex than rape, than pedophilia” 
(159).  Kossew does not elaborate on what she means by behaviour that is 
“more morally complex” than these crimes and I do not think she would write 
so flippantly if she properly considered the comparison Coetzee makes between 
Melanie’s case and Lucy’s.  The point is precisely that neither rape nor 
paedophilia (which I will unfortunately not have time to give proper 
consideration here) are clean-cut, dye-in-the-wool occurrences, but are subject 
to a great amount of what Higgins and Silver call “undecidability” between post-
incident narratives (2-3).  As I have already pointed out, this is in part due to the 
prevalence of cultural modes that dictate the definition of incidents according to 
patriarchal systems of belief and understanding.  In Disgrace, neither incident is 
narrated by the victim, but instead framed by the protagonist, who is, in one 
case, the perpetrator, and in the other, a failed defender.  As such, we never hear 
Melanie’s take on the incident that leads her to report Lurie to the university 
authorities, and, because Lucy adamantly refuses to give life to her attack 
through its narration, neither do we get a clear picture of what happens to her.  
Higgins and Silver explain that it is often the case in narrative representations 
of rape that the actual event is in fact absent from the telling, where it instead 
“exists as an absence or gap that is both product and source of textual anxiety, 
contradiction or censorship” (3).  In Disgrace, while we are shown the sordid 
details of Melanie’s rape, Lucy’s is left to the imagination.  What Coetzee 
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manages with this telling and lack of telling is a fetishization of the kind of rape 
that Melanie is subjected to, to the point that its very definition as rape is 
obscured, which is precisely why criticism of the novel only ever touches on 
Lucy’s rape and not Melanie’s. 
 Part of the reason for this, as I have emphasised in this chapter, is the 
long history of deflecting rape through representation, “where it has been 
turned into a metaphor or a symbol or represented rhetorically as titillation, 
persuasion, ravishment, seduction, or desire (poetic, narrative, courtly, 
military)” (Higgins and Silver 4).  Another reason that the definition of rape is 
obscured is because it has everything to do with having the authority to rape.  
Higgins and Silver maintain that “rape and rapability are central to the very 
construction of gender identity” (3), which is precisely what I argued in the 
previous chapter: whether or not the body of the victim is female, the act of 
rape performatively constitutes that body as feminine, simultaneously 
(re)producing the masculinity of the person who rapes.  Moffett, meanwhile, 
writes that, at least in the South African context, “sexual violence has become a 
socially endorsed punitive project for maintaining patriarchal order” (129).  
The key words here are “punitive” and “patriarchal”: with the move from 
apartheid to the “new” South Africa, what has clearly been demonstrated by the 
bewildering number of reported rapes in the advent of the new democracy is 
that this move has precipitated the rise of a new black patriarchy which is 
establishing its masculine authority through rape.  This is especially the case 
with instances of rape that are coupled with severe violence and assault, as with 
Lucy’s case in Disgrace.  The controversy associated with Lucy’s rape was partly 
fuelled by the sensationalism surrounding many of these cases, especially as 
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many of them were perpetrated by black men against white women.  However, 
these cases hardly give an accurate representation of the realities of rape for 
most women in South Africa because these are sensationalised reports of 
violent crimes and not the (no less unfortunate) everyday incidents of partner-
rape or coercion that constitutes most rape, as Moffett contends, pointing out 
that “the majority of rapists in South Africa are black only because the majority 
of the South African population is black” (135). 
 What is more, the sensationalized accounts of violent rapes, especially of 
black men against white women, make light of the kind of rape that Lurie 
perpetrates against Melanie, to the point that such rape is not even regarded as 
rape, but as “[n]ot rape, not quite that” (Disgrace 25), the result of which is that 
rape is the continued model of human sexuality.  The upshot of this model, 
popularised in English Literature through metaphors of colonial expansion, 
hunting,110 and other masculine pursuits, is the extreme dichotomisation of 
masculine and feminine sexuality, where being a man has become synonymous 
with being a rapist inasmuch as being a woman has become synonymous with 
being a disenfranchised and passive victim.  Some feminist critics, such as Susan 
Brownmiller (1975), view male sexuality as inherently rapacious in its nature, 
but to make this assumption means falling back to essentialist views of 
sexuality, regarding both masculinity and femininity, in a move that is precisely 
one in which second-wavers such as Brownmiller herself would find highly 
problematic. 
 The current focus on rape in academia, the media, women’s lobby 
groups, global politics, and rape crisis centres alike, has been on making clear 
the definition of rape, so that there can be no mistake as to what constitutes 
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rape and who should be held culpable for its perpetration, as well as pointing 
out that much of the behaviour considered merely to be seduction techniques or 
normal masculine behaviour (“boys being boys”) is in fact contributing to rape 
culture.  Instead of excusing men on the grounds that it is “in their nature” as 
Brownmiller does, making known the kinds of behaviour that contribute to the 
constitution of rape culture, as Coetzee’s novel arguably does, seems to have a 
far greater effect on curbing the behaviour of would-be perpetrators.  While on 
the witness stand for his teammates, Trent Mays and Ma’lik Richmond, high 
school footballer, Evan Westlake tried to explain why he did nothing when he 
witnessed his friends sexually assaulting an as yet unnamed, intoxicated 
sixteen-year-old, in Steubenville, Ohio, stating that he did not understand this 
behaviour as rape, that he had “always pictured it [rape] as forcing yourself on 
someone” (qtd. in Wetzel 2013).  The Steubenville case in 2013, which resulted 
in the incarceration of Mays and Richmond, along with the Assange case in 
2010, have certainly cleared things up for a number of people who may have 
been mistaken in thinking that only incidents such as the Delhi rape case in 
2012111 make the cut, those cases that Akin would describe as his much taunted 
“legitimate rape.”  However, the reason for each of these cases seems to be the 
(re)affirmation of masculine authority and/or privilege: like Lurie, Julian 
Assange is a privileged, white man; Mays’ and Richmond’s privilege, while 
neither racial nor fiscal in Richmond’s case, stems from their near-celebrity 
status as high school footballers in small-town America; the rapists in Delhi 
were exercising their authority to rape in a country that on many levels holds 
victims responsible for the crimes committed against them; and Lucy’s rape is 
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quite clearly an exercise of masculine authority as a punishment for claiming a 
masculine authority of her own. 
 
Performing “Inappropriate” Masculinity: Black Patriarchy and 
the “Correction” of Lesbians in the New South Africa 
 Lucy’s masculinity is manifested in two ways: first, as a lesbian, she 
performs a masculine sexuality through her “ownership” of women, and, 
second, by owning land, Lucy claims an authority that is denied her by her 
material body.  That is, Lucy’s masculinity is only “inappropriate” with regard to 
the context in which it is performed, which is in the shift from apartheid to the 
“new” South Africa, from one patriarchal centre of control to another.  Much of 
the criticism targeted towards apartheid was quite obviously for its obscene 
racial prejudice and oppression, but what is often omitted from such criticism is 
the status of women during its tenure.  While white women were given the right 
to vote in 1930, all people of colour waited until 1994 before they could 
exercise their democratic right.  Yet, white women were not regarded as white 
men’s equals during apartheid, and though far from living with the oppression 
black women endured during this time, they faced additional oppressive 
systems that were vindicated by the state.  In short, apartheid was a patriarchy, 
where being a white woman meant being oppressed by white men, but being a 
black woman meant being oppressed by both black men and white women, 
while, as Jennifer R Wilkinson comments, “white men did not even view black 
women as women” (353).  All other racial and ethnic groups living in South 
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Africa during apartheid fell somewhere in the middle of this complex order of 
oppression. 
 Lucy’s rape signifies what both Graham and Cooper refer to as a shift 
from one patriarchal group to another, where Lucy’s sexuality and status as 
landowner put her in the precarious position of performing a masculinity that is 
forbidden her material reality by the emerging power.  This power is 
symbolised in the novel both positively, in the material success of Petrus, Lucy’s 
neighbour and one-time employee, and negatively, through Lucy’s rape.  As 
Cooper points out “the assault signifies, on a broad symbolic level, the black 
phallus replacing the defunct white one as the features of patriarchal authority 
are reconfigured in South Africa” (29): it is the second rape to occur in the 
novel, which is written in two parts, the first showing the demise of the “fallen” 
Lurie, and the second showcasing the emerging success of black patriarchal 
control through the figure of Petrus.  As Graham contends, there is more than a 
suggestion that being a lesbian is partly what provoked Lucy’s rape (439), and 
the reason for this is because, as a lesbian, Lucy performs a masculinity that is 
regarded by her black neighbours as inappropriate.  To illustrate this more 
fully, it is crucial to this argument to realise that as rape rates continue to rise in 
South Africa, and, among these rapes, a large portion are committed with the 
intent to (re)feminise an unapproved lesbian population.  Like the 
sensationalised rapes committed against white women that make the news, the 
rapes of South Africa’s lesbians are often coupled with extreme violence, bodily 
assault and in some cases, murder.  In an article covering the “corrective” rapes 
of lesbians in South Africa, Pumza Fihlani notes that many of these rapes are 
committed against “butch” lesbians, as they are considered to be “stealing” 
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women from men (2011).  Interviewing men on the streets of Johannesburg for 
their opinions on the topic, this BBC reporter found that what many had to say 
corroborated the performative act of rape, quoting one man as saying “When 
someone is a lesbian, it’s like saying to us men that we are not good enough” 
(qtd.in Fihlani 2011).  Thus, the pervading logic that such statements and that 
“corrective” rape imply is that women are property to be used by men as they 
see fit. 
 This is precisely the reason Coetzee conflates Lucy’s identity as a woman, 
and especially as a lesbian, with her status as landowner: as a woman, Lucy is 
regarded under the new patriarchal order as property, which means that she 
has no rights to property ownership herself, whether that is of land, as is the 
case with her farm, or of goods and chattel, which she claims by taking other 
women into her bed.  Graham writes that “[a]s a lesbian, Lucy would be 
regarded as ‘unowned’ and therefore ‘huntable’” (439), as little more than an 
animal, which is precisely the connection Coetzee wishes us to make.  I shortly 
move on to an analysis of the animal in Disgrace, but first, I want to give greater 
consideration to the link Coetzee makes between the lesbian/female body and 
land.  This relationship is more complex than simply that of ownership of goods; 
land, as well as its symbolic representation in the Western tradition, is also a 
conceptual metaphor for space, namely between public/private, and 
rural/urban settings.  I have already discussed earlier in this chapter Coetzee’s 
dystopian representation of the English pastoral in Disgrace, which is reinforced 
by Lurie’s consistent allusions to the Western tradition.  However, Coetzee’s 
critique of the genre relies heavily on the same modes in order to convey this 
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critique, where the conceptual binary is reinforced between rural and urban 
settings, between the farm in Grahamstown and the university in Cape Town. 
 Maria Lopez argues that the novel “makes a clear opposition between 
Lucy’s way of coping with her rape in the rural context, and the sexual abuse 
suffered by Melanie in Cape Town, an urban context in which women can more 
easily turn to institutions and to the law in order to protect themselves” (925), 
but I think this oversimplifies the vastly different experiences of women living 
in both contexts.  First, Lopez does not take class or economic stature into 
account in this argument, forgetting that not every woman living in an urban 
context such as the sprawling suburbs of Cape Town has access to institutional 
help such as that offered by universities and technikons.112  The ongoing 
corrective rape of urban lesbians is testament to this, as most reported cases of 
corrective rape take place in urban townships, while the lesbians living here 
have little reason to trust institutional assistance, because their experience with 
the South African police force has taught them that institutional authority is not 
on their side.  Fihlani explains that a corrupt police force is more likely to taunt 
a victim of corrective rape than help her, quoting a young lesbian from Soweto, 
who says that “[s]ome policemen in the township mock you saying: ‘How can 
you be raped by a man if you are not attracted to them?’  They ask you to 
explain how the rape felt.  It is humiliating” (qtd. in Fihlani 2011).  Secondly, 
although Lucy lives on a farm in the outskirts of Grahamstown, Grahamstown 
itself is a thriving university town, with one of the oldest universities in South 
Africa, as well as having the necessary institutional support that any large town 
with a population over 12,000 requires.  Yet, Lopez’s assertion that Coetzee 
“carefully situates Lucy’s rape in a delimited context in which it acquires a 
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significance it would not have in a different place” (925) is not altogether 
erroneous: although rapes such as Lucy’s take place across South Africa113 on a 
daily basis, its significance is not cleanly based on a rural/urban divide, but on 
its intersection with the dissolving boundaries between public and private 
spaces (that women have long had a precarious relationship with), as well as 
the dissolution of designated black spaces and white spaces that apartheid 
enforced. 
 As I have made abundantly clear in this thesis, the concept of place and 
the process of placement are crucial to ontological distinctions between a “you” 
and an “I.”  Moreover, any conceptualisation of Otherness or monstrosity is born 
out of a pre-existing notion of one’s place within (or without) human 
communities, not just in a physical sense, but on a Symbolic level, and, as 
Kristeva has demonstrated, it is from the obfuscation of inside and outside that 
our deepest fears are made known to us.  By owning land, Lucy confounds the 
private and the public spheres: because she is a woman, Lucy can neither be the 
Afrikaner “husband-farmer” nor a post-apartheid custodian of the land such as 
Petrus.  For flouting this “rule,” Lucy is raped, which, as Cooper writes, is an act 
that puts her “in her place,” that is, “the conventional place of wife and mother –
albeit in a reshaped system” (31, my emphasis).  Just as Gallimard’s rape by 
Isabell in M. Butterfly has the effect of feminising him, because it places him 
according to a binary system, so too does Lucy’s rape have the performative 
effect of putting her in “her place.”  What is more, Cooper points out that by 
taking place within her home and thus within the sphere associated with 
femininity, the idea is driven home most literally, invading the inner sanctum of 
her home as well as of her body (31).  By eventually accepting Petrus’ offer of 
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marriage, Lucy’s feminisation within the new patriarchal order is complete, 
which, she points out, hinges not only on his ownership of her, but of her land: 
“‘I don’t believe you get the point, David.  Petrus is not offering me a church 
wedding followed by a honeymoon on the Wild Coast.  He is offering an alliance, 
a deal.  I contribute the land, in return for which I am allowed to creep in under 
his wing.  Otherwise, he wants to remind me, I am without protection, I am fair 
game’” (Disgrace 203). 
 
Unconditional Hospitality: Welcoming the Unwelcome Guest 
 While commentators such as Harald Leusmann read Lucy’s acceptance of 
her fate as retribution for apartheid (“J. M. Coetzee’s Cultural Critique” 61), 
Barnard indicates that such a reading means “that one accepts or ignores her 
own enormously troubling proposition that the rape is ‘the price [she] has to 
pay for staying on’” (221:158, Barnard’s addition).  “[B]y the same token,” 
writes Barnard,  
  [there may also be] something sentimental about seeing her labor in a 
  positive light.  It requires, after all, that we forget an ugly word that 
  resurfaces right before David Lurie’s final visit to the farm: bywoner.  
  Considered morpheme by morpheme, the word should mean the same 
  thing as “neighbor” does in English (“by,” after all, means “near” and 
  “woon” means “dwell”). But bywoner bears none of the English word’s 
  implications of equality and reciprocity: it conveys instead humiliating 
  connotations of indebtedness and poverty and suggests, depressingly, 
  that the old rural economy has remained intact, even if the roles within 
  it have been reassigned along racial lines (221). 
 
The price to pay for apartheid, it would seem, is the resubjugation of (white) 
women to the new patriarchal order, which is highly problematic.  My 
suspicions are that Coetzee produces this conundrum in Disgrace purposefully, 
that his intent is (among other things) to illustrate the same difficulty Shelley’s 
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Frankenstein has with the Enlightenment principles of liberty, fraternity, and 
equality, maxims born of the French Revolution.  The difficulty Shelley and 
Coetzee articulate with regard to these ideals accrues as a crisis in the 
conceptualisation of unconditional hospitality, illustrated by the arrival of an 
unwelcome guest.  For Shelley, this “guest” is Frankenstein’s Creature, whose 
“birth” through Frankenstein’s proto-scientific practices is immediately 
regretted by his creator and the Creature is abandoned.  Even after reasoning 
with Frankenstein, the Creature’s request for a mate is violently refused, which 
results in the deaths of everyone that Frankenstein loves.  Frankenstein could 
neither welcome his Creature into the world, abandoning him at “birth,” nor his 
mate, who Frankenstein destroys when she is half-made, leaving the Creature 
alone and vengeful – a thoroughly unwelcome guest when he comes to “visit” 
Frankenstein and his kin. 
 For Coetzee, in the aftermath of apartheid, the figure of the unwelcome 
guest is obscured by (post)colonial violence.  In Disgrace, as Maria Lopez notes, 
hospitality is featured in “the continuous use of synonyms, quasi-synonyms or 
semantically related terms . . . with the words ‘here,’ ‘visit,’ ‘intrude,’ ‘friend’ and 
‘kind’” (924).  Lopez points out that “’friend’ is the only word whose etymology 
is given in the novel” (930), where Lurie muses “Modern English friend from Old 
English freond, from freon, to love” (Disgrace 102), which Lopez concludes 
“underlines its prominent significance” in the novel (930).  In a move that 
mirrors the concerns of Frankenstein, the ideals of friendship and kinship are 
questioned in Disgrace, especially in the aftermath of visitation (the Derridean 
“event”), because friendship and kinship have everything to do with likeness, 
similarity, and difference, which Lopez reminds us is precisely what the politics 
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of apartheid were hinged upon (931).  In his first letters to his sister, Walton 
confesses a primal need for a friend, which he finally finds in the dying 
Frankenstein, a man who is “like” him in so many ways: “I desire the company 
of a man who could sympathize with me; whose eyes would reply to mine.  You 
may deem me romantic, my dear sister, but I bitterly feel the want of a friend” 
(Frankenstein 10).  The Creature, in turn, confesses his need for friendship to 
Frankenstein, which is how he is able to extract Frankenstein’s promise to make 
him a mate.  In Disgrace, we are shown a view of the new South Africa through 
the eyes of a man who is, for all intents and purposes, the continued animation 
of the Creature in Frankenstein, still desperately seeking after a mate in the 
attempt to be at one with her, but this at-oneness is, for Lurie, only the joining 
of bodies and the relief of his desires.  Although he thinks loftily that his affair 
with Melanie was motivated by a “force that drives the utmost strangers into 
each other’s arms, making them kin, kind, beyond all prudence” (Disgrace 194), 
when this physically materializes in Lucy’s pregnancy, Lopez notes that he is 
not at all enamoured by the possibility that he may now be related to Petrus, 
through her possible rape by Pollux,114 to whom Petrus refers as “my family, my 
people” (201). 
 Within the rhetoric of kin and kind, fraternity and friendship, the politics 
of monstrosity is always already present.  Using Derrida’s Of Hospitality, Lopez 
explains how: 
  In Of Hospitality, Derrida poses the question, ‘How can we distinguish 
  between a guest and a parasite [?]’, describing the parasite as ‘a guest
  who is wrong, illegitimate, clandestine, liable to expulsion or arrest’.  If 
  ‘absolute hospitality requires that I open up my home and that I give 
  not only to the foreigner (provided with a family name, with the social 
  status of being a foreigner, etc.) but to the absolute, unknown, 
  anonymous other’, the implied answer to Derrida’s question is that we 
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  cannot distinguish between a guest and a parasite, since I must open 
  my home to an other of whom I know nothing, independently of who 
  s/he is (933: 59, 61, 25). 
Monsters represent the arrival of the unwelcome guest par excellence, not just 
as parasites that eat one out of house and home, but visitors that will cross both 
the threshold of one’s hearth and the very boundaries of one’s body with 
impunity.  The concept of regarding another, any other, as unconditionally 
welcome found its naissance in Enlightenment philosophies that sought to re-
establish the means of gaining political power in Europe according to a 
democratic template set out by the Ancient Greeks, and was literally enacted by 
the undertakings of the French Revolution.  In order to vindicate the 
overthrowing of the French monarchy, a new system had to be proposed that 
could determine who had the rights to leadership and what form a leader’s 
responsibilities towards his/her people should take. 
 Hirsch writes that at the crux of the democratic ideal proposed by the 
Revolution is an “instability” implemented by “the Revolutionary key word 
fraternité, which simultaneously connotes competing designations of the locus 
of social cohesiveness and responsibility” (“Liberty, Equality, Monstrosity” 117).  
What this means is that in adopting the rhetoric of fraternity, the Revolution’s 
“[m]etaphorical brotherhood threatens to dissolve the naturalness of literal, 
descent-based concepts of kith, kin, and kind” (118), resulting in the 
conceptualisation of responsibility not exclusively towards family, but towards 
one’s absolute Other, even if that other is regarded as a parasite.  Shelley’s 
father, William Godwin, famously rejected the idea of familial responsibility in 
favour of a democratic model of responsibility to the other in his highly 
influential Political Justice, and, in many ways, Shelley’s novel takes the form of 
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an argument that tempers Godwin’s rational, by pointing out the aporetic 
impossibility of welcoming the absolute Other.  What is more, Shelley manages 
to do this without merely subverting Godwin’s argument, because the Creature 
is, as I argued earlier, Frankenstein’s family, his “hideous progeny.”  Hirsch 
points out that Godwin’s reasoning rests on an interrogation of the use of “my,” 
where he asks “What magic is there in the pronoun ‘my’?  My brother or my 
father may be a fool or a profligate, malicious, lying or dishonest.  If they be, of 
what consequence is it that they are mine?” (Political Justice qtd. in Hirsch 
122:170). 
 In an intriguing move, Hirsch responds: “Should brother refer only to 
one’s legal or biological kin, Godwin, like Cain, would disavow the responsibility 
of being his brother’s keeper, and in doing so uphold the impartial 
responsibilities of social fraternity” (122, his emphasis).  Lest we forget, Cain is 
the titular character of one of Byron’s most famous works, one that Lurie is 
teaching to his Romantics class, of which Melanie is a member.  Cain can be 
classed as a Byronic hero, a “disaffected, self-pitying, self-hating, suicidal” and, 
often, highly desirable hero (Leonard Michaels 71), which Byron popularised in 
many of his works,115 including Childe Harold’s Pilgrimage (1812-8) and Lara 
(1814), the latter being another text Lurie covers in his class.  Selecting a 
passage from Cain to examine with his class, Lurie lectures on the character, 
Lucifer: 
  Note that we are not asked to condemn this being with the mad heart, 
  this being with whom there is something constitutionally wrong.  On 
  the contrary, we are invited to understand and sympathize.  But there is 
  a limit to sympathy.  For though he lives among us, he is not one of us.  
  He is exactly what he calls himself: a thing, that is, a monster.  Finally, 
  Byron will suggest, it will not be possible to love him, not in the deeper, 
  more human sense of the word.  He will be condemned to solitude 
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  (Disgrace 33-4, emphasis in the original). 
There are various reasons for putting this passage in the novel, not least of 
which is an invitation by Coetzee to compare Lurie with the kind of Byronic 
hero presented in Lara.  Like Byron’s Lucifer, we are “invited to understand and 
sympathize” with Lurie throughout the novel, but, as he himself says “there is a 
limit to sympathy” (33).  While Lurie regards himself as monstrous because of 
his age, an “old man” who, thinking through his students, cannot possibly “know 
about love116” (23), but what truly has him “condemned to solitude” is his 
mistreatment of Melanie, which is the point at which our sympathy for Lurie 
runs out. 
 We are again expected to make the connection between Lurie and the 
Byronic hero in the next passage, where “[h]eads bent, they scribble down his 
words.  Byron, Lucifer, Cain, it is all the same to them” (34).  Yet, we are also 
required to see these figures as “all the same” (the legend of Byron, rather than 
the man himself, is perhaps the most Byronic of all Byronic heroes), and to 
regard Lurie in the same manner.  Lurie is indeed a brooding, “disaffected” and 
“self-pitying” individual, but what differentiates him from the classic Byronic 
hero is that instead of rebelling against the higher forces that impose their will 
on him, he blames a fictional set of higher forces in which he does not even 
believe for his downfall, calling himself a “servant of Eros” (52, 89), stating that 
a “god acted through” him (89).  Yet, it is precisely because he does not meet the 
standards of the Byronic hero in this regard that he is monstrously alone and 
that our sympathy for him is limited; in many ways, Lurie exemplifies what 
were the higher powers in apartheid South Africa, being white, affluent, young, 
good-looking, and well-educated, and it is only with the onset of his twilight 
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years and the rise of a new patriarchy that he finds himself a Byronic outcast.  
Our sympathy is very limited, indeed.  More importantly, we are shown in this 
passage (33-4) the real connections Coetzee wants us to make between Lurie 
and the Romantics, not the self-aggrandised version that Lurie creates.  The key 
words to this passage are “sympathy” and “love.”  Like the account 
Frankenstein’s Creature conveys on Montanvert, we are expected through this 
narrative to sympathise with Lurie; yet, as Sue Kossew writes, although we are 
required to connect Lurie with the Byronic figures of Cain and Lucifer, he is 
“also a smooth talker of the Stavrogin and Humbert Humbert117 school, those 
who, in the very act of confession, are seen to be justifying themselves” (158). 
 However, the sympathy that Coetzee wishes to elicit is not from the 
reader, at least, not directly.  Lurie can only act the way he does because he has 
cut himself off from others, because he has deliberately made of himself a 
Byronic figure.  Finding himself in a new political landscape, no longer the 
authority he once was, Lurie monstratively constitutes himself as Other as a 
way of justifying the monstrative act of rape that he puts Melanie through.  It is 
only through really sympathising with the Other, by literally Becoming-Other 
through his disgrace that Lurie is able to receive redemption for his acts.  
Moreover, this sympathy can only be elicited by a love for the absolute Other, 
“the deeper, more human sense” of love that he insists Byron’s Lucifer could not 
be given, the love that he finds at the root of the English word for ‘friend,’ 
“freond, from freon, to love.”  This is precisely what the rhetoric of friendship 
and fraternity has to do with Disgrace: to love the absolute Other as family, even 
if that Other is responsible for one’s own misery and maltreatment, which in 
Disgrace takes the form of Lucy’s rape and subsequent pregnancy.  When Lucy 
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explains on Lurie’s second visit that the “boy,” Pollux, is back living with Petrus, 
she clarifies his position with regard to her rape, saying “Pollux turns out to be a 
brother of Petrus’s wife’s.  Whether that means a real brother I don’t know.  But 
Petrus has obligations toward him, family obligations” (200, my emphasis).  As 
Lucy puts it, whether or not Pollux is a blood-relative of Petrus’ wife, Petrus has 
“family obligations” toward the boy, and these are the same obligations he will 
have toward Lucy if she concedes to marry him. 
 What Petrus is putting into practice by protecting the boy is a model of 
responsibility much like that of the Enlightenment model of fraternity, which is 
not based on actual family ties but on a perceived brotherhood of man.  In 
certain Southern African traditions, this philosophy is known as “Ubuntu,” an 
“anti-Cartesian notion that [states] ‘I am because you are’” (Jennifer R 
Wilkinson 356), or as Archbishop Desmond Tutu has put it: 
  [Ubuntu is] the essence of being human, it is part of the gift Africa will 
  give to the world.  It embraces hospitality, caring about others, being 
  willing to go the extra mile for the sake of others.  We believe a person 
  is a person through another person, that my humanity is caught up, 
  bound up and inextricable in [sic] yours.  When I dehumanize you, I 
  inexorably dehumanize myself.  The solitary human being is a 
  contradiction in terms and therefore you seek to work for the common 
  good because your humanity comes into its own community, in 
  belonging (qtd. in Wilkinson 356, my emphases). 
However, inasmuch as Enlightenment or Ubuntu models may open the door to a 
possible utopia, novels such as Shelley’s and Coetzee’s demonstrate that 
accepting the Other as brother is easier said than done.  While the Ubuntu 
philosophy insists that the creation of the “I” is dependent on its responsibility 
towards a “you,” in a move that is even more egalitarian than the Enlightenment 
model of fraternity, it explicitly states that it is a human mode of being that does 
not demonstrate an affinity with any of the other beings with whom we share 
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this earth.  Given the manner in which women have been systematically likened 
to animals, not just aesthetically, but through the kind of treatment that 
demonstrates the regard for women as useable and ownable, it is no wonder, 
then, that the political change in South Africa has resulted only in the move 
from one patriarchy to another. 
 What is more, even if I see myself only through my responsibilities 
towards the Other, and through what I can provide for the Other, and that I do 
so even if the Other is truly monstrous and unlovable, such a model for being is 
still aporetic: 
  I am responsible to the other as other, I answer to him [sic] and I 
  answer for what I do before him [sic].  But of course, what binds me 
  thus in my singularity of the other, immediately propels me into the 
  space or risk of absolute sacrifice.  There are also others, an infinite 
  number of them, the innumerable generality of others to whom I should 
  be bound by the same responsibility, a general and universal 
  responsibility . . . I cannot respond to the call, the request, the 
  obligation, or even the love of another without sacrificing the other 
  other, the other others . . . (Derrida The Gift of Death 68). 
 
It is precisely for this reason that we pick and choose our allegiances, forming 
boundaries that dictate to whom we are responsible, and which simultaneously 
create alterity and the concepts of hospitality and visitation, welcome or not.  As 
Lopez has noted (924), Disgrace not only emphasises the idea of hospitality, but 
quite clearly demonstrates the precariousness of being a host, as “[t]he logic of 
visitation in the novel . . . goes beyond the strictly political and historical sphere, 
as the father-daughter relationship between Lurie and Lucy is also depicted in 
terms of the guest-host dyad, and animals are portrayed as friendly visitors” 
(Lopez 926), yet it also signals the physicality of unwelcome intrusion and 
likens it to rape. 
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 However, Coetzee purposefully obfuscates the “logic of visitation” by 
showing the varying degrees of being a host or a guest and how and why we 
should question our responsibilities as either.  For it would seem, according to 
the logic of the Western tradition, that the responsibilities of the host always 
outweigh those of the visitor.  If, for example, we read Lucy’s rape and resulting 
pregnancy as hopeful, as “some new annunciation or intervention – the arrival, 
perhaps, of an unexpected grace” (Barnard 219), then we must effectively 
ignore the violation of her right to bodily sovereignty; however, if we do not, 
then the implication is that even God gives visitors the right to violate their host, 
and the story of the Annunciation suddenly becomes rape.  Was Mary ever 
asked if she wanted to bear the son of God?  The New Testament narrative 
implies that it was her “duty” to bring the child to term and forebear the agony 
of its insemination, however fantastical that may or may not have been.  Lurie 
himself becomes an unwelcome visitor when he arrives at the Isaacs’ house for 
dinner, calling himself the “unwanted visitor, the man whose name is darkness” 
(Disgrace 168).  However, inasmuch as he most certainly is an intruder in this 
instance (neither Melanie’s mother nor her sister are happy to have him there), 
he is treated cordially and welcomed to break bread with the Isaacs, in an 
episode that exemplifies the responsibilities of the host.  Yet, Lurie is all too 
aware that he owes them something in return and he eventually apologises for 
his trespass against Melanie, going so far as to bow down in supplication before 
Mrs Isaacs and Desiree.  Melanie, however, never hears an apology for what he 
has put her through and it is only to Mr Isaacs that the words “I apologize” are 
uttered, making Lurie’s redemption far from clear cut.  It is as though Lurie still 
regards women as the property of their menfolk, fathers or lovers alike. 
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 The associations between Lucy’s rape and biblical events, though subtly 
portrayed, are nevertheless there.  By naming her rapists “the men who visited 
them” (107), “their visitors” (115), and “the three visitors” (159), he gives them 
religious importance (Barnard 219), lexically and narratively, as their narrative 
can be compared to the tale of Sodom and Gomorrah, and the lexical 
associations with visitation also liken Lucy’s conundrum to Mary’s.  Shortly 
before sending angels to the city of Sodom to see if there are any people to be 
saved from his wrath, God sends three visitors to Abraham, who, having 
received these visitors with perfect hospitality, is gifted with his aging wife’s 
pregnancy.  Abraham asks God, through a series of questions, whether he will 
save Sodom and Gomorrah from destruction if he believes there are at least ten 
people worth saving.  God sends two of his “visitors” to Abraham’s nephew, Lot, 
in the city of Sodom, who are also properly received in hospitality.  However, 
the city’s inhabitants hear of the strangers and demand that Lot release his 
guests so that they may “know them,” a phrase which has come to be 
understood as “know them carnally” (Gen. 19: 4-5).  Lot refuses, offering instead 
his two virginal daughters as compensation.  In a twist of biblical events, 
Disgrace names the visitors rapists and demonstrates the horror of rape that 
would have befallen Lot’s daughters, had the city’s people accepted Lot’s 
offering.  What is more, this passage in Genesis is often used as a means by 
which to prove the “sinfulness” of homosexuality, as the men of the city want to 
have sex with the strangers (who, as angels, one can only assume are male).  By 
making Lucy a lesbian, Coetzee not only plants the account of her rape firmly in 
the context of the new South Africa, but subverts the biblical narrative by 
pointing out that if there is any “sin” to be found in the story of Lot’s visitors, it 
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is that no consent is asked of the strangers, and that to allow the men of Sodom 
to rape his visitors, Lot would be violating the rules of hospitality. 
 Furthermore, it is the protagonist’s daughter who is violated by the 
visitors in Disgrace (rather than instead of the visitors, as with Lot’s story), 
which subverts the responsibilities of the host to those of the guest, perhaps 
signifying that if there is such a thing as a good host, there is also such a thing as 
a good guest.  As one can never be sure of whether one is inviting a parasite or a 
good guest into one’s home, the onus is on the responsibilities of the host before 
those of the guest.  What is implicated by the host/guest dyad and the rhetoric 
of hospitality in Disgrace is that the responsibilities of the host do not outweigh 
those of the guest, and it is through this implication that we are made to review 
the colonial encounter.  Lucy’s pregnancy, meanwhile, is tied to the notion of 
visitation, not just through its obvious links to the Annunciation, but lexically, 
through the narrative of the pregnant Mary at her equally pregnant friend’s 
house during an episode referred to in the Bible as the Visitation.  In this 
encounter, Mary’s visitation is regarded as the arrival of grace, which anoints 
the unborn child of her friend, Elizabeth, with this grace.  Thus the concept of 
visitation is intimately interwoven not just with hospitality and friendship, but 
with pregnancy and birth, significantly allying these primal concepts with 
monstrosity.  Coetzee’s intertextual readings of the Western tradition are also 
indelibly linked to animal imagery in Disgrace, where the event of Lucy’s rape is 
immediately presaged by another arrival, that of three wild geese to the farm.  
Of the geese, Lucy says, “They come back every year.  The same three.  I feel so 
lucky to be visited.  To be the one chosen” (88).  Occurring a few pages before 
the rape scene, the insinuation is that the three rapists will be back to collect 
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their dues from Lucy, over and over again.  What is also suggested by the arrival 
of the geese is that opening one’s home to the absolute Other might not result in 
tragedy at all, but instead in grace.  However, animals play a far more important 
role in Disgrace than merely portending human doom or acting as symbols for 
human interaction in the novel.  Animals feature as the absolute Other in 
Disgrace, the kinds of monster that cannot be assimilated but that instead 
assimilate us. 
 
The “Dog-Man”: David Lurie’s Atonement and Becoming-Animal 
 Animals, particularly in their use as symbols or metaphors, have a long 
history in the Western aesthetic tradition, one that is both reiterated and 
deconstructed in Disgrace.  Throughout the history of Western art, literature, 
medicine, and science, animals have been subject to and subjected by the 
human gaze, and all that this gaze brings with it, namely discursive and bodily 
subjugation, without possible recourse.  For scholars of feminist, Queer, or 
postcolonial theory, this subjugation sounds very familiar indeed.  Like Derrida, 
Coetzee understands the animal as our absolute Other, even though we are also 
animal.  For Derrida, the animal is figured as a neighbour, but one of “absolute 
alterity” (The Animal That Therefore I Am 11), for one cannot know or even 
begin to guess what the animal sees when it returns one’s gaze.  The animal’s 
gaze, unlike ours, is silent, and not paired with discursive parameters that 
performatively constitute what it sees.  David Wood writes that “it is no 
accident that . . . categorial distinctions are actually wielded by only one of each 
pair [of binary “opposites”]” (“Thinking with Cats” 133), where “animal” is “a 
word that men have given themselves the right to give” (The Animal That 
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Therefore I Am 32), inasmuch as injurious names have been bestowed upon 
other Others.  Thus, when Butler writes that the injurious address “may also 
produce an unexpected and enabling response” by “inaugurating a subject in 
speech who comes to use language to counter the offensive call” (Excitable 
Speech 2), the only Other who cannot “counter the offensive call” through 
speech is the animal.  However, even though we “may admit that the ‘other’ has 
a role to play in determining who I am” (Wood 130), defining what part the 
animal Other determines is absolutely impossible, precisely because of its 
silence. 
 Silence is the point in Disgrace where the animal and the human 
converge, not just with regard to being unable to speak or to narrate past 
events, but of having the right not to speak or narrate.  In Disgrace, silence has 
everything to do with abjection and bodily trauma, where speech and the 
command to account for oneself are likened to violent physical penetration.  
Wood points out that “what is true of naming . . . is equally true of silence (and 
speaking out).  Silence can preserve possibilities that articulation would 
prematurely close off, but, in many political contexts, silence is construed with 
consent, and can be fatal” (135).  Earlier in this chapter, I explained how 
Melanie’s silence and co-operation with Lurie during their rape scene has 
resulted in many critics not regarding the episode as rape at all, precisely 
because silence (and co-operation) have been understood ideologically as 
consent.  That Lurie cannot understand Lucy’s choice to remain on the farm 
after her rape is also because he views her silence on the matter as consent to 
her violation.  As animals cannot speak at all, they have very little chance of 
denying the “violence and genocide” (Wood 129) we continue to put them 
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through every day.  This violence does not only take the form of bodily trauma, 
although the cruelty, torture, and neglect that animal welfare societies highlight 
on a global level showcase the destruction that comes with objectifying our 
animal Others.  Lurie notes the same of animals in Disgrace once he starts 
working with Bev, who does what she can to alleviate their suffering, including 
euthanizing the animals (chiefly dogs) that nobody wants. 
 Violence towards animals also comes in the form of linguistic 
categorisation, which not only creates conceptual parameters that favour 
humanity but subjects the animal to a binary system of mastery and slavery, 
which, being speechless, they cannot answer for: “[f]inding oneself deprived of 
language, one loses the power to name, to name oneself, indeed to answer 
[répondre] for one’s name” (The Animal That Therefore I Am 19).  Derrida writes 
of the scene in Genesis in which Adam is told by God to name the animals, which 
he explains allows Adam (the progenitor of all mankind), to “subject, tame, 
dominate, train, or domesticate the animals born before him and assert his 
authority over them” (16, emphasis in the original).  Linguistic categorisation 
has lent itself to symbolic associations between animals and human traits, so 
that animals have come to represent certain human behaviour, becoming 
metonymic supplements for our own virtues and vices.  Thus, lions have come 
to be associated with royalty, foxes with cunning, dogs with loyalty, and so on, 
even if animal behaviour bears nothing in common with what it represents.  Our 
propensity to view animals symbolically has also often led to their destruction, 
such as in the case of foxes, whose presumed “cunning” is part of the rhetoric 
used in their culling by farmers and fox hunters alike.  Lurie’s mastery of the 
Western aesthetic tradition means that these representations of animals have 
234 
 
made their way into his vocabulary, especially when speaking of women and of 
the men who rape his daughter, that is, those he subconsciously believes are 
beneath him.  Lurie’s use of animal imagery to describe women is also often in 
line with the aesthetic of the hunt, a poetic device used to suggest human 
seduction and which is common of Greek mythology as it is of Renaissance 
poetry.  Every woman he encounters in the text is compared to an animal or to 
animals, especially where sexuality is concerned. 
 Of Soraya, the “exotic” escort he meets once a week before embarking on 
his affair with Melanie, Lurie says “[i]ntercourse between Soraya and himself 
must be, he imagines, rather like the copulation of snakes: lengthy, absorbed, 
but rather abstract, rather dry, even at its hottest” (Disgrace 2-3).  Once he sees 
her outside her role as an escort, however, in a chance encounter in which she 
has her two boys with her, Soraya terminates her work with the agency; Lurie 
manages to track her down, and, on telephoning her at home, she commands 
that he cease his harassment of her.  Lurie’s comments on the episode confirm 
his self-view as hunter, where “[h]er shrillness surprises him: there has been no 
intimation of it before.  But then, what should a predator expect when he 
intrudes into the vixen’s nest, into the home of her cubs?” (10)  Interestingly, 
Soraya is not considered prey in the way that Melanie is later, but is instead 
referred to as a “vixen,” a term that suggests an aberrant over-abundance of 
female sexuality.  Foxes are predatory, which makes Soraya predatory, a fitting 
description, Lurie must think, for a prostitute.  After this outburst, Lurie leaves 
Soraya at peace, but not because of her insistence; instead, Lurie loses interest 
in Soraya precisely because she shows these attributes as part of her “real” self, 
no longer the obedient escort who Lurie had described as “[a] ready learner, 
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compliant, pliant” (5).  It is also for this reason that he quickly loses interest in 
the new secretary in his department; describing their union as “a failure” (9), 
Lurie is disgusted by her sexual enjoyment, which is illustrated by animalistic 
imagery: “Bucking and clawing, she works herself into a froth of excitement that 
in the end only repels him” (9).  Her sexual mannerisms are comparable to two 
animals, one that traditionally alludes to masculine sexuality, the horse, and the 
other to aberrant female sexuality, a predatory animal with claws, probably a 
feline. 
 What is more, the horse imagery conveyed by the secretary’s “bucking” 
and the “froth of excitement” she gets herself into also alludes to an unchecked, 
bestial sexuality that is symbolised by the horse/human hybrid, the centaur.  
Centaurs often (although, not always) traditionally represent a monstrous form 
of male sexuality that is bestial and rapacious in nature.  That the secretary’s 
mannerisms allude to a typically masculine sexuality is not a mistake, as it is 
precisely because she is not timid about her sexual enjoyment that Lurie finds 
her repulsive.  That this symbolism is paired with feline imagery also suggests 
her masculinity: predation and predatory animals allude to hunt imagery, which 
has traditionally cast men in the role of predator or hunter, and women as prey.  
Indeed, Lurie casts himself in the role of hunter, describing himself at various 
stages as a “fox” (25), a “worm” (37), a “viper” (38), and a “shark among the 
helpless little fishies” (53).  That he is able to do so is through his monstrative 
constitution of women, particularly Melanie, as animals, usually of the 
“helpless” variety.  This monstrative constitution is what enables Lurie to 
consider himself a hunter or predator, because he views the world according to 
a binary logic.  Thus, he is a “fox” only because Melanie is a “rabbit” (25), and 
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because she is a “little bird” (32) and a “little dove” (34), he can fill the role as 
her predator.  However, it is not only for the purpose of reifying his masculinity 
that he casts Melanie as prey, but to vindicate his misuse of her.  While his 
mastery of the Western tradition performatively constructs this vindication by 
normalizing its rhetoric, he also reiterates the human propensity to regard 
animals as objects.  Thus, by likening Melanie to an animal, he unconsciously 
recreates her objectification. 
 Coetzee makes a lexical connection between Melanie’s objectification 
and the objectification of animals through use of repetition.  When he first 
“invites” Melanie to embark on an affair with him, his reasoning is that “a 
woman’s beauty does not belong to her alone.  It is part of the bounty she brings 
into the world.  She has a duty to share it” (16), thinking to himself “She does 
not own herself.  Beauty does not own itself” (16).  Lurie uses the very same 
reasoning to console himself later of the impending slaughter of Petrus’ two 
sheep, thinking “Sheep do not own themselves, do not own their lives” (123).  
Reading Disgrace post-women’s liberation, our reaction to Lurie’s 
objectification of Melanie through the logic of ownership should cause at least a 
few hackles to rise; the purpose, however, of Coetzee’s lexical repetition is not 
only to point out the Western patriarchal objectification of women through their 
similarity to animals, but to emphasise the calm acceptance most of us have 
with regard to the fate of the sheep.  What is more, the fact that they are sheep, 
animals used as livestock, allows Coetzee to make his argument all the more 
pointed: we are meant to regard these animals as similar to Melanie, insofar as 
they are also similar to Lurie, and to the rest of humankind.  What, therefore, 
gives us the right to claim ownership of sheep, to claim ownership of any 
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animal?  For, it is not only to Melanie that we are to make this connection; 
thinking that Melanie “does not own” herself, Lurie adds later “perhaps he does 
not own himself either” (18).  At this point in the novel, when Lurie ruminates 
on his lack of self-ownership, he is attempting to justify his behaviour, where, as 
Sue Kossew argues, confession (in this case, to the reader) enacts vindication 
(158).  Furthermore, in a religious context, confession also performs the act 
atoning for one’s sins, as it “becomes an end in itself” (156). 
 As the title suggests, the novel is about being in a state of disgrace for 
which the protagonist must atone.  He is smart enough to realise that a formal 
confession before the committee to which he is called following Melanie’s 
complaint will not perform the act of atonement for him.  In what can only be 
described as a mockery of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 
a formal hearing that was put in place in order to hear the truths of 
perpetrators as understood by them and by victims, for the purpose of 
reconciling and moving on, Lurie refuses to narrate the events of the rape 
before the committee.  Instead, the events are put to us in the form of the novel.  
Kossew writes that “remorse was not considered part of the T. R. C. process, as 
it was deemed too difficult to measure its sincerity” (159), which is how the T. 
R. C. differs from other formal confession-based institutions, such as Catholic 
confession.  The point of confession within the Catholic context is to begin the 
act of atonement, and is followed by further vocal performances that are said to 
express the sinner’s penitence, such as the “Hail Mary” and the Lord’s Prayer.  
According to the Church, confession, followed by repetitive chanting, thus 
performs the act of atonement.  When Lurie is summoned by the committee to 
answer for his actions against Melanie, he is expected to “express contrition,” to 
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which he exclaims “I have said the words for you, now you want more, you want 
me to demonstrate their sincerity.  That is preposterous.  That is beyond the 
scope of the law” (Disgrace 55).  Lurie realises, much like the conductors of the 
T. R. C., that inasmuch as his illocutionary utterance may be perfect, the cavity 
between the performative and the perlocutionary answer, its desired effect of 
retribution, is unbridgeable. 
 Lurie must atone, instead, by what Kossew describes as “attending to the 
everyday, to the respective needs of an unborn child [Lucy’s] and desperate 
dogs” (161).  However, while “attending to the everyday” is perhaps the method 
by which Lurie finds atonement, his amends only start to properly take place 
when he finds himself in a state of Becoming.  Lurie’s Becoming is specifically 
that of Becoming-animal, because the animals that he helps in Bev’s centre elicit 
his sympathy.  If the first section of the novel demonstrates Lurie’s fall from 
grace, the second section finds him learning how to welcome the absolute Other 
through his atonement, that is, his at-one-ment with the animals in his care.  In 
the first part of the novel, Lurie uses animals as metaphors to justify his 
behaviour, naturalizing his desire for dominance over Melanie by likening it to 
predatory behaviour.  Similarly, the pages of Disgrace are filled with animal 
metaphors; written from Lurie’s perspective, these metaphors become 
metonyms for human behaviour.  Coetzee uses Lurie as a focalizer in order to 
demonstrate how the protagonist distances himself intellectually from both his 
own base desires and the acts of those he feels are beneath him, thereby 
monstratively making parts of himself and others into signs of abject Otherness.  
The very act of metaphoric association is monstrative because it relates humans 
to animals according to a human viewpoint.  Thus, Lurie regards his aging self 
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as a cockroach (8) because the signifier “cockroach” is a stand-in for something 
abject, revolting, and Other, something to be shuddered at (8).  However, 
Braidotti explains that by using metaphors, one may run into a problem, which 
is that by relying “on the mechanisms of metaphor and metonymy as 
hermeneutical keys,” one’s expectation is that the Imaginary order runs on the 
same logic as the Symbolic: “[t]he imaginary is not conceptualized along the 
same semiological axis [as the Symbolic] and the logic of latent and manifest 
meanings.  That is to say, the ‘meaning’ – of a symptom, a text, a piece of music – 
is not indexed on the power of the signifier” (Metamorphoses 139). 
 While there are common associations between animal metaphors and 
their meaning, these are only common insofar as they have common ancestry, 
which is to say that we only regard, for example, cockroaches as abject and 
filthy because we see them crawling out of drains and existing on the effluvium 
of other animals.  In other words, our use of animal metaphor is hinged upon a 
long history of associating animals with human vice and virtue.  This is partly 
because of the existence of medieval bestiaries, which documented animals, real 
and fantastical, according to real or perceived behaviour, for which the animal 
became metonymic of similar behaviour in humans.  This is precisely why we 
still make metaphorical connections between human characteristics and 
animals, even if these metaphors have been scientifically disproven, such as 
being as greedy as a pig or as blind as a bat.118  What is more, animal metaphors 
became so culturally ingrained in the West, thanks in no small part to the 
popularity of bestiaries, that they ceased to be metaphors and became fact, a 
practice that has had an interesting effect (to say the least) on psychoanalytic 
discourses.  Braidotti points out that in classic psychoanalysis, “each animal 
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signifies a repressed or disavowed aspect of the patient’s remembered 
experience, now festering silently into pathology,” where animals are 
“metaphoric representations or metonymic displacements of unprocessed 
traumas” (Metamorphoses 140).  However, as she has proven, these 
representations are based on the psychoanalyst’s understanding of what each 
animal represents, which, in turn, is hinged on centuries of repeated metaphors.  
Thus, Freud’s entire thesis on subject formation119 is based solely on the 
material fact that horses have large penises and therefore represent a 
threatening masculinity with which the boy child must compete.  As with much 
psychoanalytic discourse, this tells us far more about the analyst than the 
patient. 
 It is precisely this “reliance on the mechanisms of metaphor and 
metonymy as hermeneutical keys” (139) that Lurie suffers from and which take 
part in his Othering of Melanie.  Yet, after his fall from grace, Lurie is offered 
salvation through his Becoming-animal, which is not the same as using animals 
as metaphors, which he is inclined to do before his fall.  As Deleuze and Guattari 
argue, Becoming “is not a correspondence between relations . . . [and] neither is 
it a resemblance, an imitation, or, at the limit, an identification” (87), meaning 
that it is not a metaphorical association between two bodies.  Lurie does not 
become the “dog man” by imitating the dogs in his care, but rather by being 
affected by their lot, by suffering with them: 
  He had thought he would get used to it.  But that is not what happens.  
  The more killings he assists in, the more jittery he gets.  One Sunday 
  evening, driving home in Lucy’s kombi, he actually has to stop at the 
  roadside to recover himself.  Tears flow down his face that he cannot 
  stop; his hands shake.  He does not understand what is happening to 
  him.  Until now he has been more or less indifferent to animals.  
  Although in an abstract way he disapproves of cruelty, he cannot tell 
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  whether by nature he is cruel or kind.  He is simply nothing . . . His 
  whole being is gripped by what happens in the theatre (Disgrace 142 
  3). 
This affectivity “is not a personal feeling, nor is it a characteristic; it is the 
effectuation of a power of the pack that throws the self into upheaval and makes 
it reel” (Deleuze and Guattari 89). 
 Certainly, it is not characteristic of Lurie to sympathise with others; 
when he tries to reflect on Lucy’s rape, he finds himself unable to put himself in 
her position: “Lucy’s intuition is right after all: he does understand; he can, if he 
concentrates, if he loses himself, be there, be the men, inhabit them, fill them 
with the ghost of himself.  The question is, does he have it in him to be the 
woman?” (Disgrace 160).  That he can “become” the men who rape his daughter 
is easy for Lurie, not least because he is a rapist himself (even if he does not 
regard himself in this way); when Lucy speaks to him of the incident, she recalls 
for him the violence associated with penetrative sex which is what allows him 
in the first instance to imagine this Becoming: 
  ‘Maybe, for men, hating the woman makes sex more exciting.  You are a 
  man, you ought to know.  When you have sex with someone strange  
  when you trap her, hold her down, get her under you, put all your 
  weight on her – isn’t it a bit like killing?  Pushing the knife in; exiting 
  afterwards, leaving the body behind covered in blood – doesn’t it feel 
  like murder, like getting away with murder?’ (158). 
However, when he tries to inhabit Lucy’s body, he is left only with the question 
of whether he can.  His work in the clinic is what starts Lurie’s journey to 
redemption because of the affectivity of the dogs’ deaths: by being at one with 
the animals in their last minutes, he eventually finds a way to be at one with 
women as well. 
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 This occurs in his return to the opera on Byron that he had started before 
leaving Cape Town, where he had originally conceived of it “as a chamber-play 
about love and death, with a passionate young woman [Teresa, Byron’s married 
lover] and a once passionate but now less than passionate older man” (180).  He 
finds, however, that there is no heart or spirit to this piece of writing, and so he 
attempts to rewrite the opera, this time from the point of view of a middle-aged 
Teresa, asking himself, “Can he find it in his heart to love this plain, ordinary 
woman?” (182), an echo of his earlier question about Lucy’s rape.  This, in turn, 
echoes Lurie’s earlier sentiment on Byron’s Lucifer, telling his Romantics class 
  Note that we are not asked to condemn this being with the mad heart, 
  this being with whom there is something constitutionally wrong.  On 
  the contrary, we are invited to understand and sympathize.  But there is 
  a limit to sympathy.  For though he lives among us, he is not one of us.  
  He is exactly what he calls himself: a thing, that is, a monster.  Finally, 
  Byron will suggest, it will not be possible to love him, not in the deeper, 
  more human sense of the word.  He will be condemned to solitude (34, 
  his emphasis). 
Eschewing sympathy for the abject Other, such as that which he suggests here, 
has only resulted in Lurie’s fall, and it is in finding sympathy for the Other that 
he is able to redeem himself.  His Becoming-animal is what instigates his 
sympathy with women, those he had made monstratively Other through 
animalisation, because he is at-one with the abject Other.  It has now become 
possible to love the Other, in, as Lurie says “the deeper, more human sense of 
the word,” precisely because that Other has changed him, has assimilated him so 
that he can get to this point of understanding. 
 However, like Frankenstein, Disgrace is altogether ambivalent about 
Becoming, because of the potential for violence that such sympathy can elicit.  
In Disgrace, sympathy is met with the violence of rape, which is an extremely 
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troubling outcome and not at all far from the experience of South African 
women today.  Barnard writes that the end of the novel, where Lucy stays on 
the farm under Petrus’ protection (ownership), “remains strange, unexpected, 
unpredictable in terms of generic codes.  By ending Disgrace in this way, 
Coetzee refuses to make his novel the critic’s friend and reminds us that the 
radically new, both in literature and society, will be impossible to predict and 
difficult to welcome” (223).  Thus, the novel itself is monstrous, because of what 
it suggests but also because of its strangeness and unpredictability; it is also 
monstrous because of its use of intertextuality and the splicing of excerpts from 
the European literary tradition, which makes Disgrace a very strange hybrid.  
Inasmuch as the novel ends ambivalently, I would suggest, however, that it 
remains that monsters will arrive at our thresholds, and, whether or not we 
receive them with sympathy and welcome them as guests, these monsters will 
change us so that we will sympathise with them and become them.  What is 
more, while Lurie’s use of animal metaphor is a perfect example of the 
monstrativity of language, Becoming-animal, although performative is not 
monstrative. 
 If the monstrative is a performative force that makes the Other sign, 
Becoming is a process that includes the “I” within its constitution of the Other.  
Thus, monstrative acts form the Other through a differentiation between the 
self and the Other, thereby constituting the Other as other.  Becoming-monster, 
on the other hand, while acknowledging the differences between the self and 
the Other, is instigated through the sameness, the spirit of fraternity between 
beings.  Becoming-monster is affective, it hybridises meaning so that difference 
becomes difficult to see; it is also contagious, mutating me into the monster I 
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have already made of you through monstrative acts.  I cannot make you 
monstrous without also making myself monstrous; however, the monster I have 
made of you is enacted through a violent process whereby you have become 
Other to yourself (monstrativity), whereas the monster you have made of me is 
elicited through the sympathy I feel for your abjection (Becoming-monster).  
Monstrativity relies on the power dichotomy of master-slave, whereas 
Becoming-monster occurs in the deconstruction of binary pairs.  Either way, the 
monsters created by monstrative forces will have to be welcomed because their 
arrival and ensuing contagion is immanent. 
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Conclusion 
 
Monstrativity and Becoming: Becoming-monster Versus Being 
Monstrous 
 This thesis has enacted the birth of the monstrative, a performative force 
which creates monsters.  However, it has also recognised the importance of 
discerning monstrative acts from that of Becoming, as Deleuze and Braidotti 
have conceptualised it.  Both the monstrative and Becoming are processes, but 
the monstrative is teleological, in that it is a process that results in the creation 
of a monster by an Other; Becoming, on the other hand, only results in the 
creation of a monster because its hybridity resists categorisation.  To clarify, 
where the monstrative is a performative force that makes the body into a 
signifier, that is, a demonstration or warning of something yet to come, 
Becoming enacts monstrosity by situating the “I” between ontological 
categories that are in constant flux and mutation, in a process that has no end, 
but is in fact the end itself.  The “to come” therefore does not arrive, at least not 
in any way that is predictable, and therefore, as Derrida has consistently 
maintained, is always already in perpetuity.  Arguably, the key difference 
between the monstrative and Becoming is that the outcome of the monstrative, 
the being-Other-to-oneself, results in pathology, in an ambiguity within the “I” 
that cannot be consolidated because of the “I’s” inability to think of itself 
pluralistically. Becoming, meanwhile, is a state of Being that allows simultaneity 
without engendering a crisis in the psyche.  The two literary case studies I 
explored in chapters four and five exemplify this difference: in M. Butterfly, 
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Gallimard cannot exist as both the masculine self that ensnared Song and the 
feminine Butterfly that (it turns out) he has always embodied, thereby ending 
the play by ending his life; in Disgrace, Lurie empathises with the animals he 
helps to euthanize, finding himself at one with them and able to atone for his 
misuse of Melanie and thereby finding peace with the dog-man that he is 
becoming. 
 The difference is that Gallimard, in being a stranger to himself, is 
alienated from himself (the Butterfly part of him), whereas Lurie “has it in him 
to be” as low down and disgraced as the dogs who wind up in his and Bev’s care, 
because, although he is surprised by it, he accepts this new aspect of his 
Becoming.  The difference between the monstrative and Becoming ultimately 
boils down to the ability to welcome the uninvited guest at the most intimate 
level of all, that is, one’s psyche.  While the monstrative forces a new identity 
upon the psyche, resulting in the “I’s” anxious existence as sign in abjection, 
Becoming is a process in which the “I” is involved – she must accept this new 
identity in order to embody it and live it simultaneously with her older ways of 
Being, so that she can be Other to herself without being in a state of psychic 
crisis.  What is more, Becoming is an infinitely more positive view than classic 
psychoanalysis would suggest such a splitting of the psyche can be, as it 
embraces the fragmented nature of Being and the Becoming-monster that such 
fragmentation implies.  Like Braidotti, I understand being monstrous as 
something far more positive than it has traditionally been viewed: because 
Becoming-monster opens the possibilities for Being in ways that we have not 
yet conceived, the promise monsters offer is that not even the sky is our limit.  
However, lest we forget, monsters do not only make us promises, they also pose 
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a threat, warning us that once we have pushed through the limit, even our own 
reactions may be unpredictable.  The lesson to take from monsters is that we 
must always welcome them, because, either way, they will infect our world (our 
homes, our psyches, whatever that may be) and mutate it into one in which they 
can make themselves at home.  The point remains to welcome without knowing 
the end result, or even if there may be an end result at all. 
 What is more, Becoming is also a way of Being that allows for playfulness 
that traditional modes do not.  While Deleuze and Guattari argue that Becoming 
is not “a resemblance [or] an imitation” (87), I believe that Becoming can be 
manifested through imitation, even if it is not the thing itself.  For example, a 
trans* woman’s Becoming-woman is certainly not an imitation in the way that a 
drag act can be,120 but it requires imitation in order to be carried out effectively; 
imitation is the means by which Becoming is initiated, but to say that it is 
merely pretence or to refute its legitimacy under such a rubric is to gravely miss 
the point of the embodied performances carried out by trans* individuals.  
Furthermore, Deleuze’s and Guattari’s refutation of mimicry implies origin: 
imitating animals, one can only imitate behaviour (acts), which is always 
already “translated” by human conceptualisation, meaning that there is no 
original meaning to decipher and hence no original act to imitate.  As Butler has 
consistently maintained, stylistic performances only signify a certain gender 
insofar as meaning has been attributed to performance: there is nothing 
inherently masculine or feminine about bodily acts, and that we regard these 
acts as gendered is only because a gendered meaning has been ascribed to them 
in order to make them recognisable.  That certain styles are regarded as 
feminine or masculine has only occurred because repetition has given meaning 
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to gesticulation.  The seriousness of patriarchal modes of Being has not only 
resulted in the view of multiplicity and fragmentation as pathology, but the 
sustained attempt to force meaning into a binary system, which, as we know, is 
at the root of gendered, sexual, and racial inequalities. 
 Deleuze and Guattari write that Becoming is a state of Being that is 
“always in the middle [and] one can only get to it by the middle.  A becoming is 
neither one nor two, nor the relation of the two; it is the in-between, the border 
or line of flight or descent running perpendicular to both” (94).  What I want to 
suggest is that Becoming, by situating the “I” as healthier and more evolved in 
its hybrid form, not only deconstructs the idea that multiplicity results in 
illness, but challenges patriarchal modes by allowing the “I” to exist as multiple 
and fluid in a playful and creative manner.  Consequently, what differs 
Becoming from monstrative acts is that Becoming “is always a mutual process” 
(Urpeth 108, my emphasis), whereas monstrative acts are carried out by the “I” 
onto the body of the Other.  With regard to the existence of monsters, what this 
entails is the following: Patricia MacCormack writes that “any woman is a 
monster to begin with and has been for as long as can be historically traced.  A 
body of difference, while being (especially in a compulsory hetero normative 
culture) an object of fascination, is simultaneously that of disgust” (8).  What 
MacCormack describes is the sustained monstrativity of the acts that have 
implicated women’s bodies in this way, literally making monsters of us.  Yet, as 
she later contends, “[a]ll becoming is becoming monster; even the desire to 
want to become is monstrous, because all becoming is about an ambiguity 
between, but never attaining either of, two points” (11).  What this suggests to 
me is that the kind of monster that women have been monstratively constituted 
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as is (rightly) viewed as a negative construction that, as MacCormack agrees, 
has not been chosen by us but for us (8), whereas Becoming, which Urpeth 
insists is a mutual process accepted by the “I” as part of her self (108), is a type 
of monstrous existence that not only can be but must be embraced in order for 
Becoming to ensue.  Both Becoming and monstrativity are performative, in that 
they constitute identity, and they are also both monstrous, but in very different 
ways: while monstrative acts force identity upon the “I,” making her a living 
sign of the monstrative speech that creates her, Becoming is a mutual process 
that is welcomed by the “I” through sympathy for the Other, which creates a 
hybrid form that escapes classification and thus escapes being made sign.  
Becoming thus provides a liveable space outside the Symbolic without making 
that space one of abjection, and, in so doing, deconstructs binary logic. 
 
Woman, the Primordial Monster 
 For women, as I pointed out in chapter two of this thesis, Becoming is not 
only a psychic possibility but a bodily prospect, one which results in not only 
the creation of an entirely new being, but the creation of the woman as mother 
and the perpetuation of her status as monster.  As MacCormack reminds us, the 
“primary monster” in all human cultures is Mother (8).  This point leads me to 
the second conclusion I have made compiling this thesis, which is that woman is 
the original monster upon which the monstrosity of others has been based.  
This has furthermore resulted in the continued denigration of the feminine in 
theoretical settings, particularly in gender performance theory.  Because 
difference and the uncanny ability to reproduce are written across our bodies, 
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the feminine has been the visual and material template of monstrosity, a 
primordial Other upon which other Others have been based.  Thus, in the 
formation of Orientalist discourse, a device used for making entire ethnic and 
cultural groups subservient to Western dominance and expansion, a model of 
subservience upon which Western patriarchy could base its binary code of 
Orient and Occident was already in existence.  As Meyda Yeğenoğlu attests, 
representations of sexual difference, such as the discursive formation of the 
feminine, are “of fundamental importance in the formation of a colonial subject 
position” (Colonial Fantasies: Towards a Feminist Reading of Orientalism 2).  The 
result, as we know, has been the feminisation of the East and its people, and the 
subsequent masculinisation of the West. 
 However, it has been pointed out by various theorists, such as Wong and 
Santa Ana (173), that much of the monstrative discourse used to keep 
“Orientals” in check was the hyper-masculinisation of Asian men.  Yet, the 
purposes of these discursive practices were not to create equality between 
Eastern and Western men, but to instigate fear in white women for Asian men, a 
device used to keep white women in check.  Thus, narratives that feminised 
Asian men did so in order to masculinise white men, while narratives espousing 
male Asian hyper-masculinity reaffirmed the femininity of white women, and 
thus their reliance on white men to protect them. Similar tropes have occurred 
in the monstrative discourse on black men in both colonial and postcolonial 
settings.  Aside from the obvious inequalities that abound from this kind of 
binary thinking, what this logic also entails is that the feminine is always 
already a maligned form of gender expression.  Since the implementation of 
gender performance theory, which Butler has played no small part in, the 
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emphasis has been on the acceptance of male femininity and particularly of 
female masculinity.  An unfortunate outcome of this decoupling of gender from 
material sex is that the expression of masculinity as a gendered form has 
continued to be advocated in optimistic terms, whether the actor is male or 
female, while feminine forms are still regarded as unfavourable.  I mean, for 
example, the promotion of identity markers such as ambition and self-sacrifice, 
in women as well as men, and the continued vilification of “weaknesses” such as 
ill health (particularly mental health) and tolerance of others.  For instance, 
Gallimard’s self-recognition as feminine in M. Butterfly is what leads to his 
suicide: to be feminine is not a liveable space, it would seem, particularly for 
men. 
 While it certainly was not the intention of gender performance theorists 
to promote the continued denigration of femininity (given that much of this 
theory has stemmed from feminism), a probable cause is a general inability to 
imagine a world beyond a binary logic, which not only constricts expression 
into One or the Other, but creates and maintains a hierarchy between the holy 
One and its monstrous Other.  However, to refute a binary logic does not 
necessarily translate into the rejection of difference: basing her theoretical 
work on Deleuze, Braidotti has demonstrated that an acceptance of difference 
can also result in multiplicity, or, what she names “multiple becomings” 
(Nomadic Subjects 102).  Embracing difference in this way can only occur, 
however, through the instigation of sympathy, by being affected by the Other, 
where “affect is not a personal feeling, nor is it a characteristic; it is the 
effectuation of a power of the pack that throws the self into upheaval and makes 
it reel” (Deleuze and Guattari 89).  Becoming is affective; it is an affect that 
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infects the “I” and thus mutates it into a hybridised version of what it was and 
what it is becoming, through the mechanism of sympathy effected by the 
monstrous Other.  The multiplicity implied by Becoming also opens the 
possibilities for reading gender expressions that go beyond just masculine or 
feminine, which is something Butler already put forward in Gender Trouble, 
writing that “even if the sexes appear to be unproblematically binary in their 
morphology . . . and constitution . . . there is no reason to assume that genders 
ought also to remain as two” (10).  The “Becoming” of gender is, I think, made 
most clear in those forms of expression that refute the masculine-feminine 
binary, such as Queer, androgyny, or gender-fuck, exemplified by 2014 
Eurovision Song Contest winner, Conchita Wurst, whose masculine and 
feminine physical attributes and bodily expressions certainly do “fuck” with the 
binary code. 
 Stylistic bodily expressions such as Wurst’s simultaneous donning of a 
beard and perfect eye makeup are, however, only one aspect of gender 
performance.  Stylistic expression aside, certain identity markers that are 
considered either feminine or masculine – markers that have been considered 
essential to femininity (such as nurturing) or masculinity (such as risk-taking) –
are also given expression through the body.  In this sense, gender performance 
theory has done much in the way of bringing the body back to ontological 
discourse.  Butler’s defence with regard to the criticism she received for Gender 
Trouble resulted in the publication of Bodies That Matter, which points out that 
the constitutional aspect of discourse does not necessarily negate the existence 
of materiality, but that it claims “that there is no reference to a pure body which 
is not at the same time a further formation of that body” (Bodies That Matter 
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10).  What is more, she reiterates in Bodies That Matter the importance of the 
body to enable repeated performances, something she had already made clear 
as early as “Performative Acts and Gender Constitution”: “gender is instituted 
through the stylization of the body and, hence, must be understood as the 
mundane way in which bodily gestures, movements, and enactments of various 
kinds constitute the illusion of an abiding gendered self” (519).  In other words, 
to be a gendered subject, that is, to be, requires the existence of the body in 
order to be actualised through the body’s performances.  There is thus no Being 
without the body. 
 Butler’s gender performance theory is also a theory of gender 
performativity because it explains that performance (acts, gestures, expression, 
and the like) is constitutive of gender and that gender is constitutive of the “I.”  
Butler is able to refashion Austin’s linguistic theory into one on gender precisely 
because she realises that performative utterances are constitutive of reality, 
and because she appreciates the mechanics of the performative (something 
Austin himself could not grasp), which is that an act is only performative 
because of its repetition and its repeatability within a community of witnesses.  
A performative is an act, whether one is speaking of speech acts or bodily 
gestures, which means that it always requires a body in order to be 
(re)produced.  What this thesis has done to advance the return of the body to 
ontology is not just to point out the ways in which discourse acts on the body as 
a constitutional force but, that bodily acts (carried out by and to the body) also 
perform as discourse, by physically (re)enacting symbolic meaning.  What is 
more, it has done so through the introduction of the monstrative, a 
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performative force that makes the Other into sign, by demonstrating that the 
monstrativity of bodily acts is in fact the reiteration of ideological structures. 
 
Speech as Act, Act as Speech: The Return of the Body to Ontology 
 This thesis has analysed monstrative bodily acts such as rape and 
castration as a way in which to develop an appreciation of the mechanics of 
gender performance theory, but also to garner a more thorough understanding 
of the complexity of the constitutional effects of the body.  Where Butler’s 
original contribution to ontological theory was to explain that bodily acts are 
the cause rather than the effect of gender, her emphasis on the constitutionality 
of stylistic acts done by the body and speech acts done to the body has meant 
that the constitutionality of other bodily acts have been overlooked, particularly 
those acts whose aim it is to constitute the body as gendered.  I have named 
these acts performative for their constitutional effects but also monstrative for 
constituting the “I” as a sign of his/her gender.  Thus, both rape and castration 
performatively constitute the “I” as feminine by enforcing the binary logic of 
rapist/victim or castrator/castrato, in tandem with monstratively making the 
victim of rape or castration into a living sign of subjugation.  As such, these 
violent bodily acts inaugurate the “I” into the social world as dominated, and, 
significantly, as dominated specifically through the process of feminisation.  For 
instance, on an ideological level, the act of rape symbolically positions the “I” as 
feminine by putting the victim in “her” place, which is a place that has 
performatively become “hers” through repeated iterations, and the 
heteronormativity of the act ensures that the corresponding effect is the 
masculinisation of the perpetrator.  As such, a variety of ideologies may be 
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present in the inducement of such an act, serving as the purpose for the act.  In 
rape, these include binary logic and heteronormativity, where, even if the act is 
used as a weapon in attacks of a racial nature, the ideological purpose remains 
the same, which is to reduce the victim to the status of the abject feminine and 
to affirm the masculine power of the perpetrator. 
 By understanding violent bodily acts as constitutional, both of the “I” and 
the Other, this thesis works towards a recognition of the complex involvement 
of the body in the formation of identity.  We are not simply our bodies but 
neither are we detachable from our materiality; by relegating the body as 
impure and base, and, through the logic of binary polarity, implicating the Other 
as a sign of this impurity, we risk alleviating ourselves of our responsibility for 
the Other, for ensuring the Other’s rights to bodily sovereignty and the right to 
exist without fear of violence and injury.  Coming into contact with literary 
monsters such as Frankenstein’s Creature, we are not only warned of these 
implications, but made into monsters ourselves through the process of 
Becoming-monster that occurs when we read.  Deleuze and Guattari argue that 
writing is a Becoming (89); while I agree, I also consider reading to be 
constitutional, precisely because of its affectivity.  Affect is not merely emotional 
or intellectual, but is a bodily effect, one “that throws the self into upheaval and 
makes it reel” (89).  Indeed, it is very rarely possible to separate the 
emotionality or intellectuality of affectivity from the corporeal: that we cry, 
laugh, shiver, scream, or orgasm is certain proof of the body’s involvement in 
Becoming.  As social actors, what we do or say is of immense importance to the 
Becomings of others, but the question remains: what kinds of monster will we 
make of them? 
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End Notes 
                                                 
1 To use Shoshana Felman’s delicious phrase in The Literary Speech Act: Don Juan with J. L. 
Austin, or Seduction in Two Languages. 
2 Such as Judith Halberstam’s Skin Shows: Gothic Horror and the Technology of Monsters (1995) 
and Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s The Coherence of Gothic Conventions (1986). 
3 See for example Partha Mitter’s Much Maligned Monsters: A History of European Reaction to 
Indian Art (1977) and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s “Three Women’s Texts and a Critique of 
Imperialism” (1985). 
4 I mean this in its literary sense, but also in the sense that the author is a speaking body that 
has the authority to wield language. 
5 This resistance of the monstrous body to signify anything but sign will be demonstrated in my 
analysis of two fictional monsters: Grendel’s Mother in the Old English poem, Beowulf, and the 
Creature in Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein (1818). 
6 Which Austin already tries to keep apart in his inauguration of the performative. 
7 And between writing considered academic and creative, as Phelan’s work epitomises. 
8 I use this bodily metaphor most consciously here, because this Becoming is also a Becoming-
body. 
9 I am, of course, aware that there are overlaps between gender theory and sexuality theory, 
where to speak of feminine or masculine constructs is also pertinent to Queer Theory. 
10 The original is italicised. 
11 I should note that, at present, a colleague in UCC’s School of English, Alison Killilea, is 
presently making the case for Grendel’s Mother’s lack of monstrosity, if not in a psychological 
sense, most certainly in a taxonomic sense.  Killilea’s research is based on her own intensely 
detailed translation of the original Old English text, where mine is based on extant translations, 
and her findings thus far point to a Victorian misinterpretation of the poem’s context, and thus 
the view of Grendel’s Mother as a monster.  For the present, however, I will remain with the 
interpretation of Grendel’s Mother as a monster in a taxonomic sense. 
12 These include the titular characters of both texts, as well as an evaluation of Modthryth in 
Beowulf. 
13 Again, I use the reproductive implications of the term most consciously here. 
14 Excitable Speech (1997). 
15 Austin could have no way of understanding the citational quality of language, given that he 
was working within a world framed by Structuralist ways of thinking.  
16 For there to be performance, there must be a body. 
17 Psychoanalysis would, in any case, contend that who the subject thinks s/he is is always in 
relation to the Other. 
18  I omit the dragon from this reading for the purposes of time, and because his taxonomy 
indicates his animalism: Grendel and Grendel’s Mother both seem to me to be more monstrous, 
both by their absence of category (whereas the dragon belongs to a taxonomic group, Grendel 
and his Mother do not signify a specific category) and by the poet’s lack of a physical description 
of either of the creatures. 
19 Insofar as documented monstrosities can be understood to be “real.” I will be relying on Early 
Modern texts that document the existence of these monsters. 
20 As Derrida has done in Limited Inc and Butler in Excitable Speech. 
21 Gullestad notes Felman’s view of Austin’s “parasite” as a joke (303); in a book that is most 
certainly tongue-in-cheek in many places, I tend to agree to a certain point, although it is hard to 
say if Austin would have indeed been dismayed by Butler’s “parasitism” of the performative or if 
he would have in fact found her hypothesis as intriguing as I do. 
22 “The Critic as Host” (1977). 
23 In this case, Derrida is speaking of scholarly writing, specifically Critical Theory. 
24 As with his earlier writing, which incorporates birth metaphors, Derrida uses language that is 
startlingly bodily to describe events that are anything but. 
25 For example, I first learnt of performativity in an undergraduate module in the Sociology of 
Gender and Sexuality, only coming across Austin in my MA year.  Performativity was, for me, a 
term that described gender before it ever described the ability for speech to perform an act. 
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26 Austin’s use of “performance” as a homophonous history for his “performative,” as well as his 
use of a certain kind of performance, that is, the performance of “serious” acts, is ironic because 
of his insistence on separating the “seriousness” of speech acts in life from “non-serious” acts 
that are described as purely performance. 
27 Gender Trouble has often been incorrectly criticised for claiming that gender is a performance 
that can be “put on” or “taken off” as one does clothing.  Such criticisms lack an understanding of 
performativity, confusing the term with performance: this is the parasite at work, where the 
parasite is confused with the host because of its homophony as well as its theoretical reliance 
on performance to explain the performativity of speech acts. 
28 Nicholas Royle reminds us that Darwin’s theory of evolution cannot work without mutation 
(Literature, Criticism and Theory 252). 
29 The OED defines the verb “etiolate” as “to give a pale and sickly hue.” 
30 Prior to Austin’s performative, speech had been understood in opposition to action, where 
linguists busied themselves with the truth-value of statements rather than the effect of speech 
on the world. 
31 Hence my referral to it as a “conception.” 
32 I shall return to this in the next chapter, where I turn to the name and its various 
performative functions. 
33 Hillis Miller points out that Austin’s provision of rules and doctrines for the felicitous 
enactment of performative utterances is itself inaugural (36). 
34 Even if modern medicine can now determine many of these things. 
35 I will discuss the monstrative qualities of naming more thoroughly in the next chapter. 
36 Taken to mean roughly the end of the Middle Ages to the beginning of the Enlightenment 
37 Dennis Todd’s Imagining Monsters: Miscreations of the Self in Eighteenth-Century England tells 
Toft’s unfortunate tale in great detail. 
38 One of which was “a lamb calved by a heifer” (Walsham 171). 
39 “especially Aristotle, Cicero, and Pliny” (171). 
40 Chiefly from England and France. 
41  Such as Margaret Homans in “Bearing Demons: Frankenstein’s Circumvention of the 
Maternal” (1986). 
42 However, Killilea argues in her research that only Grendel is “Caines cynne,” where Grendel’s 
Mother is not, which would mean that Grendel’s monstrosity stems from his paternal lineage 
instead. 
43 William St. Clair writes that by the mid-eighteenth century “the chances of dying in childbirth 
were one in ten” (The Godwins and the Shelleys: The Biography of a Family 142). 
44 I might add at this point that his experiment is also monstrous in a Derridean sense because it 
is entirely inaugural: Frankenstein is able to do something that has not yet been achieved by 
science. 
45 Moers writes that feeling fear is to “get to the body itself” (214). 
46 Shelley’s mother, the proto-feminist writer, Mary Wollstonecraft, died 11 days after giving 
birth to her daughter. 
47 Because of its various translations and the loss of some of the Anglo-Saxon words, which has 
resulted in various interpretations of meaning, the Beowulf text cannot really be regarded as 
one text, but, rather like the body of Frankenstein’s Creature, a hybrid amalgam of disparate 
categorical contexts. 
48 Their identities are literally constituted by the text because it is literary. 
49 Grendel’s Mother’s masculinity will be discussed in the following chapter. 
50 See the previous chapter for a detailed analysis of the anamorphic image. 
51 “Did I request thee, Maker, from my clay /To mold me man?  Did I solicit thee /From darkness 
to promote me?” From Book X, l. 743-5. 
52 St. Clair notes that “proper precautions” needed to be taken when exposing women to certain 
texts, as their feeble minds were considered incapable of making fair judgements of fiction from 
reality (The Godwins and the Shelleys 219).  A good example of the improper influence of the 
wrong sort of writing on women is Jane Austen’s Northanger Abbey (which coincidently was 
also published first in 1818).  The writing of certain types of books, such as Frankenstein, would 
also have been considered improper by young ladies, and writing was, in fact, considered to be 
even more dangerous to women than reading, because women’s writing “harbours disturbing 
possibilities for male conceptions of authority” (Botting 10). 
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53 This is not to say that William Godwin or PB Shelley had no understanding for the volatility of 
the sovereign “I” but that the conception both men had of the precariousness of autonomy could 
not have been bodily in the same manner in which Mary understood it, precisely because they 
had no experience of pregnancy and childbirth and the bodily/identificatory loss associated 
with both. 
54 Wilson describes him as “a perfect baby” (13). 
55 Which is ironic given the parasitic nature of the foetus to fool its mother’s immune system. 
56 What is more, his use of language here makes him sound exactly like an etiolated plant. 
57 One should bear in mind that the term derives from the Latin monstrum and therefore has no 
known translation in Old English. 
58 This is excepting the term aglæca, which does not seem to have a direct translation in modern 
English.  This term will come under more scrutiny later on in this chapter. 
59 Heaney’s translation describes her as “a queen outstanding in beauty” (1940-1). 
60 Butler seems to confuse iterability with citationality here. 
61 I find Butler’s use of “remembered” compelling, particularly because her work in Excitable 
Speech is so centred on the echo of bodily trauma in injurious speech: if we, in a sense, re-
member the trauma of repeated speech acts, it would seem that the injury implied in the act 
happens precisely because we relive it in a specifically bodily sense –we re-member it, we give 
the injury a body to hurt. 
62 Grendel’s Mother is referred to as aglæcwif at 1259. 
63 Aglæcwif is translated as “monstrous hell-bride” (1259) by Heaney, which not only sexualises 
her, but paradoxically also ensures that she is in a permanent state of virginity, rather like an 
inverse Madonna.  
64 While Beowulf, Sigemund and Victor Frankenstein are arguably monstrous, I am classing the 
“monsters” of these texts as those figures that are treated by their human Others as frightening, 
aberrant, and unrecognisable, which, for the purposes of this argument, are Grendel, his Mother, 
the dragon, and Frankenstein’s Creature. 
65 I realise that the dragon also has no proper name; due to time constraints and the dragon’s 
animalism, I will have to unfortunately leave him out of this analysis. 
66 As I mentioned earlier, the textual elements that constitute the change in Beowulf’s behaviour 
are exemplified by the exchange between occupying forces in the text: the monsters’ narrative 
begins with Grendel’s unwelcome arrival in Heorot, followed by that of Grendel’s Mother, 
followed by Beowulf’s invasion of her mere, and finally, by Beowulf’s conquest of the dragon’s 
cave. 
67 Besides Modthryth, whose monstrosity is also indicative of “inappropriate” behaviour by a 
woman, and which I will shortly discuss. 
68 Killilea’s research is ambivalent about Grendel’s Mother’s monstrosity with regard to her 
“inappropriateness” in avenging her son, pointing out that female warriors, while uncommon, 
were not unheard of in Norse mythology (which Beowulf exemplifies).  Killilea rejects this 
reading, asserting that Grendel’s Mother’s actions were only regarded as “inappropriate” by the 
poem’s Victorian audience (the poem was first published in modern English in the nineteeth-
century).  
69 103 refers to Grendel as mearc-stapa, “wanderer in the wastes” (trans. Fulk). 
70 She is a “bad” mother according to Dockray-Miller, who proposes that by her inability to save 
her son from Beowulf, she has failed in her maternal performance (96). 
71 I have chosen to name him Creature as Being is confusing in a thesis that focuses on ontology. 
72 Which the OED states means “great size” and “ferocious appearance.” 
73 Using the 1818 edition, “fiend” appears on pages 60, 65, 67, 103, 105, 112, 114, 117, 118, 119, 
122, 128, 131, 132, 133, 136 (twice), 137 (twice), 141, 142, 143 (twice), 144 and 154; “monster” 
on pages 35, 37 (twice), 38, 60, 65, 99, 104, 105, 112, 116, 122, 126, 127, 131, 133, 136, 138, 
139, 141, 146 (twice) and 153; “demon” on pages 15, 48, 54, 65, 101, 111, 114, 115, 116, 117, 
118, 131, 138, 140, 142 (twice), 144, 145, 153; and “wretch” on pages 34, 35 (twice), 48, 49, 65, 
115 (twice), 128, 154 and 155. 
74 “þa se wyrm onwoc, wroht wæs geniwad;/ stonc ða æfter stane, stearcheort onfand feondes 
forlast” (Beowulf 2287-9) –Orchard’s translation is “Then the dragon awoke, strife was 
renewed; he hastened along the rock, the stout-hearted one discovered the footprints of the foe” 
(Orchard 30). 
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75 See the last chapter, where I compared Milton’s Adam to God, having been made in His image, 
and where Adam is the prototype for humanity and masculine authority. 
76 This is certainly indicative of the abuse with which the Creature is treated by Frankenstein. 
77 Heaney and Fulk both translate “ellor-gast” or “ellor-gæst” as “alien spirit” or “spirit from 
another world.” 
78 The Old English poem, “The Wanderer” describes the pain of exile as a fate worse than death. 
79 At least for a pagan such as Beowulf. 
80 See the first chapter of Mary Shelley (2008). 
81 Puccini did not “invent” Butterfly; his opera, although the most well-known version of the 
story, is based on the short story “Madame Butterfly” (1898), by John Luther Long. 
82 Although, it has been pointed out that the technological abilities of many “Oriental” countries 
was far superior to the West long before the European “voyages of discovery.” 
83 An excellent literary example of the slippage between the representation of a hypersexual, 
rapacious Asian male and colonial crisis is in E. M. Forster’s A Passage to India (1924), where an 
Indian doctor is accused of the rape of an English woman during the British withdrawal from 
India. 
84 Unless if what Wong means by the ethnicization of gender is that women have been 
conceptualised as cognitively alien to masculine ways of thinking, as if the gap that differs men 
and women includes highly disparate cultural differences, which I do not think it has; there is 
textual evidence, for example that the conceptual differences between men’s and women’s 
bodies have only been exaggerated since the eighteenth-century. 
85 c. 960-1279. 
86 Men, of course, can also be raped, by other men as well as by women, but rape statistics 
indicate that rape is usually perpetrated by men against women. 
87 And which has been compared to their “war on terror” in Afghanistan and Iraq –both 
countries where, it can be argued, an Orientalist narrative has been used to vindicate US 
occupation. 
88 If you will forgive the terrible pun. 
89 When I speak of an audience, I am merely postulating about an imaginary audience rather 
than actual spectators of a specific performance of the play.  Because I am using the play text 
rather than a performance or series of performances, it is important to remember that what I 
am writing about (the play text) is only a blue-print for the finished piece, which may look and 
feel very different each time it is performed, depending on the director, cast, props and sets of 
each performance. 
90 The play is remarkably adept in using aural signs to invoke both familiarity and a sense of the 
exotic, for obvious textual reasons but, also, as a way in which to juxtapose hearing and seeing.  
The use of excerpts from Puccini’s opera makes the familiar sound of Western music seem 
strange when contrasted with the look of its setting, because of the integration of sound and 
performance from the Beijing opera.  While Beijing opera sounds unfamiliar to the Western ear, 
its use at strategic points in the play denaturalizes the coupling of Puccini’s opera with an Asian 
aesthetic, where the effect is a deconstruction of the Western usurpation of Asian narrative and 
the relocation of an Asian voice.  Much more could be written about aural signification in the 
play, particularly with regard to its relationship with visual signs and narrative, but this analysis 
is unfortunately not within the scope of this thesis. 
91 Butler has a tendency to read all drag as parody, which disallows other playful uses of drag 
and which imbibes it with a seriousness of meaning that might not be the intention of its actor 
or even the outcome of the act. 
92 If one is, of course, speaking about Christian/Western weddings. 
93 In Lemony Snicket’s Series of Unfortunate Events (Paramount/DreamWorks 2004), one of the 
ways in which the antagonist, Count Olaf, tries to rob his charges, the unfortunate Baudelaire 
children, is by concocting the performance of a play in which he marries his cousin, Violet 
Baudelaire.  Olaf convinces the town judge, a lawful solemniser of marriage ceremonies to “play” 
the judge on stage, while obtaining a lawful marriage certificate and ensuring a large crowd of 
“witnesses” for the event, in order that he may actually marry his cousin and thus obtain her 
inheritance.  While his plan backfires when Violet’s brother, Klaus, manages to burn the 
marriage certificate, what Olaf’s plot reveals is that there is nothing much to separate 
performative acts on stage from those in life, as long as the “appropriate” people perform the 
ceremony and the correct props are in place. 
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94 Bearing in mind that in Elizabethan England, the golden age of English drama, women were 
not allowed on stage and women’s parts had to be performed by men; also, that in Chinese 
opera, of which Song is a star, women’s parts are also played by men. 
95 See chapter one. 
96 The apotropaic qualities of the erect phallus have been well-documented by Classicists, not 
just in Greek and Roman mythology, but in the everyday use of phallic totems to ward off evil. 
97 I say “feminine” here instead of “female” because rape is not only committed against women 
(as the last chapter demonstrated, men can also be victims of rape), but it is an act that 
feminizes its victims, whether or not its victim is biologically female. 
98 Including essays by Sheila Croucher (2002), Jacklyn Cock (2003), and Kevin J. Graziano 
(2004). 
99 By Rita Barnard (2003), Lucy Valerie Graham (2003), Kimberly Wedeven Segall (2005), and 
Maria Lopez (2010). 
100 Including The Psychic Life of Power (1997), Precarious Life (2004), Giving an Account of 
Oneself (2005), and, most recently, Parting Ways (2012). 
101 There are various types of harassment women (in particular) are faced with in the public 
sphere, which include street harassment (which is itself comprised of various types of 
behaviour), sexual harassment, and harassment on the internet, which has gained unfortunate 
ground in the past ten years, and which specifically targets women within the public eye, 
including female videogame developers, academics, media personalities, and celebrities. 
102 Akin explained in a televised interview that in instances of “legitimate rape,” pregnancy 
concerns are groundless because “the female body has ways to try to shut that whole thing 
down” (qtd. in Williams 2012).  Akin’s comments were anti-abortion in their focus and used to 
counter the view that women who are raped should have access to abortion.  
103 WikiLeaks founder, Assange, was accused of rape by a woman with whom he had already 
had consensual sex, who testified in court that after having consensual sex with Assange, she 
woke up to find him having intercourse with her while she slept.  
104 He probably bases this in her name, Melanie Isaacs, and the names of her family members, 
especially that of her sister, Desiree.  Also, “coloured” was a term used by the apartheid 
government to describe persons of mixed race, rather than of strictly black African descent; 
coloured people are thus quite likely to have European surnames, such as Melanie’s.  
105 Original text is italicised to denote Lurie’s thoughts. 
106 Startlingly, in every case, the victim was aged between only ten and fourteen years at the 
time of the assault, and two out of three cases were resided by a female judge (Rawlinson 2013, 
Zuckerman 2014, Slifer 2014). 
107 Original text is italicised, again to denote Lurie’s thoughts. 
108 Coetzee writes of Lurie’s station in the university as “Once a professor of modern languages, 
he has been, since Classics and Modern Languages were closed down as part of the great 
rationalization, adjunct professor of communications.  Like all rationalized personnel, he is 
allowed to offer one special-field course a year, irrespective of enrolment, because that is good 
for morale.  This year he is offering a course in the Romantic poets” (Disgrace 3). 
109 As well as Disgrace, other novels of Coetzee’s that focus on the colonial relationship with land 
include In the Heart of the Country (1977), Life and Times of Michael K (1983), and Boyhood: 
Scenes from Provincial Life (1997). 
110 Many love poems from the English tradition use hunting as a theme in which to convey the 
poet’s desire for sexual union, such as Thomas Wyatt’s “Whoso List to Hunt” (1557). 
111 In this case, a young Indian woman and her friend boarded a bus that was ostensibly headed 
towards her home, where instead, she was brutally gang-raped and he was assaulted, before 
being thrown from the bus without clothing.  The young woman later died from the injuries 
sustained during this attack (Mandhana and Trivedi 2012).  Like Lucy’s rape in Disgrace, the 
behaviour that constituted this case is what many people consider to be the only definition of 
rape. 
112 Technikons are institutions much the same as Irish Institutes of Technology. 
113 And, let us not forget, much of the rest of the world. 
114 Pollux is one of the three men who are present in the room when Lucy is raped; whether or 
not he actually does the deed is not made clear, as Lucy remains tight-lipped about her ordeal 
and Pollux’s involvement in it.  By her behaviour at Petrus’ party, it is, however, confirmed that 
261 
 
                                                                                                                                          
he was at least present in the room; when Lurie asks “And the third one, the boy?” Lucy replies, 
“He was there to learn” (159). 
115 The Byronic hero can also be found in many later texts, including Heathcliff from Emily 
Brönte’s Wuthering Heights (1847), Dracula from Bram Stoker’s Dracula (1897), and even later 
texts such as Morpheus from Neil Gaiman’s graphic novel series, The Sandman (1989-96), and 
Angel from Joss Whedon’s Buffy the Vampire Slayer (1997-2003) and its spin-off, Angel (1999-
2004). 
116 The original is italicised to denote Lurie’s thoughts. 
117 Nikolai Stavrogin is one of the protagonists of Fyodor Dostoevsky’s Demons (1872), also 
known as The Possessed, and Humbert Humbert is the narrator of Vladimir Nabokov’s Lolita 
(1955).  Both narrators justify horrifying acts of paedophilia and torment, and the links between 
their behaviour and Lurie’s is not accidental on Coetzee’s part. 
118 Many of these bestiaries were based on Isidore of Seville’s Etymologiae, a monstrous 
manuscript that documented the history and thus meaning of many words, including the names 
of animals (as its title suggests).  Many of these etymologies were purely conjectural, which led 
to some interesting speculations about many animals. 
119 Freud writes that this occurs when the boy child sees his mother’s lack of a penis, thereby 
producing castration anxiety, which he based on the horse phobia of a patient called “Little 
Hans,” whose fear of horses were regarded by Freud as metaphoric representations of the 
phallus. 
120 Although, this is not always necessarily the case, either; for example, the 2008-2014 set of 
performances named Walking in the Way, allowed performers, Pauline Cummins and Frances 
Mezzetti the experience of occupying urban spaces as men.  Although imitation was the 
mechanism by which Cummins and Mezzetti were able to become men, the point was not to 
pretend to be men, but to negotiate public spaces in a way that affected the performers’ bodies 
and gendered identities. 
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